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Abstract
Stream ciphers are symmetric key cryptosystems that are used commonly to pro-
vide confidentiality for a wide range of frame-based applications; such as mobile
phone communication, pay TV transmission and Internet traffic. For these ap-
plications, stream ciphers are preferred for encryption due to the simplicity of
implementation, security against known attacks, efficiency and high throughput.
In modern stream ciphers, the initialisation process (also known as resyn-
chronisation) involves the use of publicly known material as well as the secret
key. Unless it is carefully designed, this process may reveal some information
about the secret key or may leave a stream cipher vulnerable for some attacks.
Analysis of the initialisation process in the literature is limited and has not been
addressed thoroughly.
The main objective of this research is to provide design recommendations
for strengthening initialisation processes in modern stream ciphers. We achieve
this by examining in-depth the initialisation process of three well-known stream
ciphers: A5/1, Sfinks and the Common Scrambling Algorithm. Our reasons for
choosing these algorithms are:
• These ciphers are broadly representative of modern stream ciphers.
• They cover a variety of loading processes
• A5/1 and the Common Scrambling Algorithm are both used widely.
We have examined the initialisation processes of these three ciphers
Design criteria provide to prevent these flaws as well as other flaws in the
initialisation process of stream ciphers.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Stream ciphers are used in a wide range of real-time applications; such as the
internet, pay TV and mobile phone transmissions; in order to provide confiden-
tiality. That is, the information should not be accessible to unauthorised parties.
However, before the cipher can be used to protect information, it must be ini-
tialised using secret key material and sometimes other publicly known material
commonly referred to as an initialisation vector (IV) .
For some applications, the communication is divided into packets or frames,
and initialisation is performed for each section of the communication. Generally
the same secret key is used for the whole communication but with a different
IV for each packet or frame. After initialisation is completed, a keystream is
generated and used for encryption.
Stream ciphers are considered as an important class of encryption algorithms
for several reasons. Stream ciphers in general are faster than block ciphers. They
also have less complex hardware implementation. Stream ciphers have limited
error propagation, and in some applications there is no error propagation [83, p.
191]. The security provided by stream ciphers depends on both the initialisation
and keystream generation processes being secure.
Most cryptanalysts focus on the keystream generation phase, rather than
considering both the initialisation and keystream generation phases. However,
the security of the initialisation process is also important. The initialisation pro-
cess must ensure that the keystreams produced using the same secret key but
different IVs appear unrelated. A good initialisation process should ensure that
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each key-IV pair generates a distinct and unpredictable keystream. This is pos-
sible for recent proposals where the state size of the keystream generator is large
enough. Also, the initialisation process (loading and diffusion phases) should not
reveal any information about the secret key. The initialisation process should
ensure that the key recovery attack is hard and the mathematical relationships
between the key-IV pair and the keystreams are hard to establish as well.
This research aims to determine whether the initialisation processes are se-
cure at least against the known attacks. It focuses on the initialisation processes
as a necessary step before keystream generation. The security of the initialisation
processes is investigated and examined for different existing stream cipher pro-
posals. Initialisation processes are examined against generic attacks to identify
the features which contribute to successful attacks. This investigation covers the
strengths and weaknesses of the initialisation processes to identify the flaws that
may occur.
Efficiency of initialisation processes is another important point for some ap-
plications. For example, real-time applications such as mobile phones require
efficient initialisation processes because rekeying is performed for each portion of
data. For example, for mobile phone systems (such as GSM) , the rekeying pro-
cess is performed every 4.6 milliseconds (using the same secret key and different
IV) [24]. Efficient initialisation processes allow stream ciphers to perform fast
rekeying using the secret key and multiple IVs to produce multiple keystreams
without any noticeable delay between parties. In general, efficiency may involve
energy consumption, area (footprint) or required memory and space, although
these are beyond the scope of this research. In this research, we comment on
the efficiency as a secondary concern and only related to the time required to
complete the process.
1.1 Motivation
Communications between parties through public channels require security. Global
System for Mobile communications (GSM) , Internet and Pay TV, for example,
all may require confidentiality. In many cases, this is provided by encryption
using synchronous stream ciphers. A problem arises when the parties lose syn-
chronisation. So in this case, the sender is required to resend the lost message.
Therefore, the communication systems require techniques to maintain synchro-
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nisation. To address this problem efficiently, the requirement for reinitialisation
(rekeying) appears to be especially important for real-time applications.
Prior to 2000 most stream cipher proposals utilised only a secret key to gen-
erate the keystream sequences. This is the case, for example, for the widely
used RC4 stream cipher [91, p. 397]. Around that time, the problems of loss of
synchronisation and the generation of whole keystream using only the secret key
alone (vulnerable to TMTO) were identified with this practice of using secret
key alone. Therefore, the initialisation process and the use of an initialisation
vector (IV) was introduced to solve the practical problem of resynchronisation,
allowing the generation of multiple keystream sequences from the same secret
key with multiple IVs. Figure 1.1a illustrates the general models of keystream
generators that use only a secret key to generate a keystream, and Figure 1.1b
shows a keystream generator that uses both the secret key and an IV to generate
a keystream.
Keystream
Generation
KeystreamInitialisation
Secret key Initial
state
(a) Using only secret key as input
Keystream
Generation
KeystreamInitialisationSecret key
IV Initial
state
(b) Using secret key and IV as inputs
Figure 1.1: General structure of keystream generator
The requirement to use both a secret key and IV is comparatively recent, and
the security analysis of initialisation processes is less thoroughly addressed than
that of the keystream generation process but it is no less important. The New
European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE) project
(between 2000 and 2003) [68] marks a time point for stream cipher design, where
the use of an IV with the secret key became essential. The original call for
primitives did not require the use of an IV with the stream cipher algorithms.
However, requests to add rekeying proposals to submissions were made dur-
ing the project. Since then, rekeying schemes have become mandatory for new
stream cipher proposals. For example, the eSTREAM project (between 2004
to 2008) [50] sponsored by the European Network of Excellence for Cryptology
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(ECRYPT) required that the initialisation vector (IV) be used and an initialisa-
tion process specified as an essential part of the submissions.
To date, there is a limited number of studies on the resynchronisation problem
of the initialisation processes of stream ciphers. Resynchronisation attacks are
applied for some stream ciphers: for Grain stream cipher in [10, 45, 73, 76, 108],
and for Trivium stream cipher in [63, 64, 86]. Also, Hong and Kim [65] reported
entropy loss in the internal state of MICKEY stream cipher after a number of
iterations of the initialisation state update function.
1.2 Aims and Objectives
The general aim of this research project is to investigate the initialisation pro-
cesses of stream ciphers, primarily in terms of security. The research considers
both the loading phase (loading of secret key and IV) and the diffusion phase of
the initialisation process. In more detail, the aims of this research project are as
follows:
1. To identify common features and properties in the initialisation processes
of the keystream generators for stream ciphers during the loading and dif-
fusion phases.
2. To examine and determine the impact of these features on the security
provided by performing an in-depth analysis of the initialisation processes
of three stream ciphers to identify any potential flaws.
3. To propose design criteria for the initialisation process of stream ciphers
to avoid the identified weaknesses.
1.3 Contributions and Achievements
The contributions that have been achieved in this thesis are as follows:
1.3.1 Analysis of the Initialisation Process of A5/1 Stream
Cipher
In this contribution, the initialisation process of A5/1 stream cipher is analysed.
Three flaws are identified: state convergence, the existence of slid pairs and weak
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key-IVs. This contribution helps to achieve aims 1 and 2 from Section 1.2.
State Convergence in A5/1 Stream Cipher
In prior work, Golic´ [54, 55] demonstrated the proportional reduction of the
internal state space after one clock. In our research, we extended Golic´’s work
by examining the reduction in the state space for further five iterations. We
extrapolated to estimate the state space reduction after 100 iterations. The
proportion of internal states which can be obtained is reduced after six iterations
by approximately half.
This contribution appears in the following publication:
• Sui-Guan Teo, Ali Alhamdan, Harry Bartlett, Leonie Simpson, Kenneth
Koon-Ho Wong and Ed Dawson. State convergence in the initialisation
of stream ciphers. In Udaya Parampalli and Philip Hawkes, editors, Pro-
ceedings 16th Australasian Conference Information Security and Privacy,
(ACISP 2011), Melbourne, Australia, volume 6812 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (LNCS), pages 75-88. Springer, 2011.
Slid Pairs in A5/1 Stream Cipher
The A5/1 stream cipher uses the same update function during both the initial-
isation and keystream generation processes. Additionally, each internal state
obtained after any number of iterations, is a legitimate loaded state. This is
used to show that slid pairs and shifted keystream can be obtained easily, even
after only one or two clocks. An attack procedure and the attacking algorithm
are presented using slid pairs and shifted keystream flaws for the A5/1 cipher.
This attack targets secret key recovery using a ciphertext-only attack model.
This contribution appears in the following publication:
• Ali Alhamdan, Harry Bartlett, Ed Dawson, Leonie Simpson and Kenneth
Koon-Ho Wong. Slid pairs in the initialisation of the A5/1 stream cipher.
In Clark Thomborson and Udaya Parampalli, editors, Proceedings of the
11th Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2013), Adelaide,
Australia, volume 138 of Conference in Research and Practice in Informa-
tion Technology (CRPIT), pages 3-12. Australian Computer Society, 2013.
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Weak Key-IV in A5/1 Stream Cipher
It is shown that the non-autonomous feedback mechanism during the key-IV
loading phase may result in the contents of one, two or three registers containing
all zeros. When two or three registers contain all-zeros, it is possible to perform
key recovery using ciphertext-only attack.
This contribution will appear in the following publication:
• Ali Alhamdan, Harry Bartlett, Ed Dawson, Leonie Simpson and Kenneth
Koon-Ho Wong. Weak key-IV Pairs in the A5/1 Stream Cipher. In Udaya
Parampalli and Ian Welch, editors, Proceedings of the Australasian Infor-
mation Security Conference (AISC 2014), Auckland, New Zealand, volume
149 of Conference in Research and Practice in Information Technology
(CRPIT). Australian Computer Society, to appear, 2014.
1.3.2 Analysis of the Initialisation Process of Sfinks Stream
Cipher
In this contribution, the initialisation process of the Sfinks stream cipher is anal-
ysed. Two flaws are identified: state convergence and the existence of slid pairs.
This contribution helps to achieve aims 1 and 2 from Section 1.2.
State Convergence in Sfinks Stream Cipher
This contribution demonstrates that, even though the individual components
of the state update function are one-to-one, the combination and interaction
between these components may not be one-to-one and therefore state convergence
can still occur.
This contribution appears in the following publication:
• Ali Alhamdan, Harry Bartlett, Leonie Simpson, Ed Dawson, and Ken-
neth Koon-Ho Wong. State convergence in the initialisation of the Sfinks
stream cipher. In Josef Pieprzyk and Clark Thomborson, editors, Pro-
ceedings 10th Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2012),
Melbourne, Australia, volume 125 of Conference in Research and Practice
in Information Technology (CRPIT), pages 27-32. Australian Computer
Society, 2012.
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Slid Pairs in Sfinks Stream Cipher
The occurrence of slid pairs and shifted keystreams is investigated for the Sfinks
stream cipher. Due to the padding pattern and the specification of the state up-
date function, the occurrence of slid pairs is deferred until the 17th iteration. We
demonstrate a modification to the padding pattern which is based on changing
the content of just one stage. This modified version dramatically changes the
time interval before slid pairs are obtained, and the probability of slid pairs and
shifted keystreams.
The contribution appears in the following publication:
• Ali Alhamdan, Harry Bartlett, Ed Dawson, Leonie Simpson and Kenneth
Koon-Ho Wong. Slide Attacks on the Sfinks Stream Cipher. In Proceedings
of the 6th International Conference on Signal Processing and Communica-
tion Systems, IEEE, Radisson Resort, Gold Coast, QLD, Dec. 2012.
1.3.3 Analysis of the Initialisation Process of the CSA-SC
This contribution is obtained from analysis of the initialisation process of the
Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSA-SC). Two flaws have been
identified in the CSA-SC: state convergence and the existence of slid pairs. This
contribution helps to achieve aims 1 and 2 from Section 1.2.
State Convergence in CSA-SC
The state update function during the initialisation process is not one-to-one,
because the registers are not updated autonomously. This leads to state conver-
gence during the majority of the initialisation process.
Slid Pairs in CSA-SC
The occurrence of slid pairs and shifted keystreams in the CSA-SC is demon-
strated. This occurs due to the padding pattern and the state update functions
of both the initialisation and keystream generation processes. The highest proba-
bility to obtain slid pairs and shifted keystreams occurs after four clocking steps,
which is 2−43.65.
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1.3.4 Criteria for the Initialisation Process of Stream Ci-
phers
This contribution provides recommendations for designing the initialisation pro-
cess of shift-register based stream ciphers so as to achieve secure and efficient
stream ciphers. These recommendations are based on an in-depth analysis of
the initialisation processes of such stream ciphers, taking into account our own
contributions (as described in Sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3) as well as existing
results in the public literature.
In particular, our analysis identifies features and properties of the loading
and diffusion phases that can cause the flaws identified in our other contributions
and in the existing literature, while the recommendations provide guidelines for
avoiding these flaws and reducing the severity of their effects. In all, we provide
eight recommendations for the design of the stream cipher initialisation processes.
This contribution helps to achieve aims 2 and 3 from Section 1.2.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The organisation of this thesis is to present the literature review and then present
the results from analysing the initialisation processes of three different ciphers:
A5/1, Sfinks and CSA-SC. Each cipher is described and the initialisation process
analysed in a separate chapter. Following this, a discussion of common flaws and
possible mitigation strategies is provided. In more detail, this thesis is organised
as follows:
Chapter 2. This chapter reviews the literature and background information
that is the basis of this research. It introduces the terminology and nota-
tion used in this thesis. A general overview of stream ciphers and more
detail on the initialisation processes are provided. After that, examples of
initialisation processes from commonly used ciphers are discussed. Crypt-
analysis of stream ciphers, generic attacks, flaws and existing attacks on the
initialisation process are also discussed. It gives the necessary background
for an understanding of the stream cipher initialisation processes.
Chapter 3. This chapter describes the specification of A5/1 stream cipher and
the initialisation process thoroughly, and reviews the previous analysis on
the initialisation process of this cipher. It investigates three flaws in the
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initialisation process of A5/1 as follows: state convergence, the existence of
slid pairs and synchronisation attacks, and key-IV weaknesses. This chap-
ter represents the first major contribution by analysing the initialisation
process of the A5/1 stream cipher.
Chapter 4. This chapter describes the specification of the Sfinks stream cipher
and the initialisation process thoroughly. It investigates two flaws in the
initialisation process of Sfinks as follows: state convergence and the exis-
tence of slid pairs and synchronisation attacks. This chapter represents the
second major contribution by analysing the initialisation process of Sfinks
stream cipher.
Chapter 5. This chapter describes the specification of the Common Scrambling
Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSA-SC) and the initialisation process thor-
oughly. It investigates two flaws in the initialisation process of CSA-SC as
follows: state convergence and the existence of slid pairs and synchronisa-
tion attacks. This chapter is the third major contribution which analyses
the initialisation process of CSA-SC stream cipher.
Chapter 6. This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of flaws and attacks
on the initialisation process of stream ciphers. This discussion is based
on the literature analyses in Chapter 2 and the investigations presented in
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. This chapter discusses the causes of these flaws in
terms of design choices in the loading and diffusion phases, or the com-
bination of these phases. It also reviews briefly the weaknesses identified
in initialisation process in the existing literature. Finally, it gives some
recommendations for the initialisation processes to overcome or mitigate
these flaws.
Chapter 7. This chapter concludes the research and gives some directions for
future work in this area.
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents an overview of the topics relevant to secure stream cipher
initialisation processes, including a review of the literature of stream ciphers,
concentrating on the initialisation processes. This review provides the necessary
information to support the research conducted in the thesis. It gives a general
view of stream ciphers and their initialisation (rekeying) process. Also, it reviews
the generic methods of attack that are used against stream ciphers and which
are also useful to attack the initialisation process. Finally, several examples of
initialisation processes from well known stream ciphers are provided, together
with some existing analysis of their weaknesses.
Section 2.1 gives a general overview of the terminology that is used in this
thesis. Following this, an overview of stream ciphers, types of stream ciphers
and properties of keystream sequences are presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3
discusses the phases of the initialisation process and gives a brief overview of the
keystream generation process. Section 2.4 provides some examples of initialisa-
tion processes of stream ciphers. Section 2.5 gives an introduction to cryptanal-
ysis of stream ciphers. Some generic attacks that are used for stream ciphers and
applied to the initialisation process are discussed in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 dis-
cusses three generic flaws in the initialisation processes. Some existing attacks on
the initialisation processes of ciphers from Section 2.4 are shown in Section 2.8.
Section 2.10 presents a summary of this chapter.
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2.1 Terminology and Notation
The following terminology and notation are used in this research project:
• Plaintext: The original intelligible data, such as a conversation or any data.
• Keystream: The sequence of random or pseudorandom bits that are gen-
erated by a keystream generator using a secret key and (optionally) an
IV.
• Ciphertext: The output of the encryption algorithm for a given plain-
text. For most stream ciphers, it is the combination of a plaintext and a
keystream using the bitwise “XOR” operation. It is unintelligible informa-
tion.
• Encryption algorithm: The procedure or method used to convert a plain-
text to ciphertext using a secret key and (optionally) an IV.
• Decryption algorithm: The inverse of the encryption algorithm. It is the
procedure or method used to convert a ciphertext to a plaintext using a
secret key and (optionally) an IV.
• Internal state: Information stored within the components of a stream ci-
pher, this information is updated during the operation of the cipher and is
used to generate the keystream.
• State size: The total number of bits or words that can be held by a stream
cipher component.
• State space: The total number of states that can be held by the components
of the cipher is 2s, where s is the state size (length).
• Initialisation vector (IV): (or frame number). Publicly known information
which is used with the secret key (master key) to generate the session key
that is used in turn to generate the keystream.
• IV space: The set of all possible IVs that can be generated from a specific
number of bits (length of IV). If j is the length of IV, the IV space is 2j.
• Cryptographic keys:
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◦ Secret key (Master key): An input to the encryption and decryption
algorithms which is combined with the known IV to produce a session
key. It is assumed that this input is known only to the sender and
receiver.
◦ Initial state (Session key): The internal state immediately following
the initialisation process which is then used by the keystream generator
to generate the keystream sequences.
• Key Space (secret key space): The set of all possible secret keys that can
be generated from a specific number of bits (length of secret key). If the
secret key length is l, then the key space is 2l.
• State update function: The function that is used to update the content of
the internal state at each clock.
• Loading phase: The process of loading the secret key and sometimes the
IV also into the internal state of a stream cipher, resulting in a loaded state
. This is the first phase of the initialisation process.
• Diffusion phase: The process of diffusing, mixing and expanding the secret
key and IV over the internal state of a stream cipher. This is the second
phase of the initialisation process. Eventually, the diffusion phase produces
the initial state (session key). After that the keystream generation process
can begin.
2.2 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are a security mechanism used in a wide range of real-time ap-
plications to provide confidentiality. Stream ciphers are symmetric key ciphers.
This means that the same secret key, IV and algorithm used for encryption must
also be used to perform decryption.
Stream ciphers are defined by Rueppel [89, p. 1] “stream ciphers divide the
plaintext into characters and encipher each character with a time-varying func-
tion whose time-dependency is governed by the internal state of stream cipher”.
Stream ciphers are defined by Menezes et al [83, p. 191] as “stream ciphers en-
crypt individual characters (usually binary digits) of a plaintext message one at a
time using an encryption transformation which varies with time”. Stallings [97, p.
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189] reported that stream ciphers may be designed to operate on one bit at a
time or in units larger than a byte at a time.
Stream ciphers can be classified as bit-based or word-based depending on the
operation and output size of the key stream generator. The bit-based stream
ciphers process a single bit per clock. Some stream ciphers are bit-based but can
be modified to produce several keystream bits per clock, such as Grain stream
cipher [59]. (It seems to be word-based in the output function.) Bit-based
stream ciphers are the earliest design and implementation of stream ciphers [48]
and many bit-based stream ciphers are based on shift registers [54]. Bit-based
stream ciphers are more suitable for hardware implementation. Examples of
bit-based stream ciphers are A5/1 [54], Trivium [43], LEX [22] and Grain [59].
Word-based stream ciphers are designed for faster software implementation as
they can manipulate words per clock. Bit-based stream ciphers may be slower
in software implementation [32]. The word-based stream ciphers produce an n-
bit word at a time where the word size varies based on the structure of ciphers.
This type of stream cipher is efficient for software implementation and provides a
possible solution to the security efficiency trade-off [32]. There are several well-
known algorithms that are word-based stream ciphers; for example, RC4 [91]
commonly uses a word size of 8 bits, Turing [88] uses word size of 32 bits and
the Dragon stream cipher [32] uses 32-bit words in the operational stages and
generates 2 output words (64 bits) per clock. In software applications, the clock
frequency is generally constant for a given processor (related to the clock rate)
and the throughput is increased by increasing the word size.
The most common type of stream cipher is the binary additive stream cipher,
which uses the “XOR” operation to combine the plaintext mi and the keystream
zi to produce the ciphertext ci; and vice versa, by combining the ciphertext with
the keystream to recover the plaintext; as shown in Figure 2.1. This combining
feature has two major advantages: it is very fast and the same algorithm can
be used for both encryption and decryption without any modification. The
encryption and decryption equations are as follows.
For encryption, ci = zi ⊕mi, 1 ≤ i (2.1a)
For decryption, mi = zi ⊕ ci, 1 ≤ i (2.1b)
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where: zi is the individual keystream bit, mi: the individual plaintext bit, ci: the
individual ciphertext bit, ⊕ is the XOR Boolean operation (addition (mod 2))
and i is the time index.
Encryption Decryption
Keystream
Generation
Initialisation
Secret key
Insecure 
Channel
Public IV
Keystream
Generation
Initialisation
Figure 2.1: Binary additive stream cipher
Most recent stream ciphers consist of two main processes: initialisation pro-
cess and keystream generation process. Figure 2.2 shows a general construction
of recent stream ciphers using initialisation and keystream generation processes.
Keystream 
Generation
state-update 
function
Initial 
state
Initialisation
state-update 
function
Keystream
GenerationInitialisation
Figure 2.2: Stream cipher with initialisation and keystream generation processes
Most stream ciphers use a keystream generator to produce pseudorandom
keystream sequences. The security provided by the cipher depends on these
keystream sequences appearing to be random [20, 24]. Most modern keystream
generators utilise two inputs: a secret key and a sequence of initialisation vectors
(IVs) or frame numbers [67]. The IVs are assumed to be known information. The
keystream generator loads the secret key and IV and performs some initialisation
process in order to form the session key (initial state of the keystream generator)
before any keystream can be produced. Suppose a secret key, K, and IV are
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used to generate a keystream z. We can represent z as z = {zi}n1 = f(K, IV),
where n is the number of keystream bits and f is the cipher function.
2.2.1 Types of Keystream Generators
Keystream generators are commonly classified into synchronous and self-synchronous
keystream generators. This classification is related to the dependence of the
keystream sequences on the previous ciphertext as explained below.
A - Synchronous Stream Ciphers
Synchronous stream ciphers generate the keystream solely from the internal state
(formed from the secret key and IV) and an update function which are indepen-
dent of the plaintext or ciphertext [83, p. 193]. Encryption and decryption of
synchronous stream ciphers are described by the following equations and illus-
trated in Figure 2.3.
Keystream output {zi}n1 = f(K, IV)
Ciphertext ci = zi ⊕mi
where mi is plaintext bit, ci is ciphertext bit, zi is keystream bit, k is secret
key, v is initialisation vector, f is the cipher function and n is the number of
keystream bits.
Encryption Decryption
Keystream
Generation
Initialisation
Keystream
Generation
Initialisation
Figure 2.3: Encryption and decryption of synchronous stream cipher
A major advantage of synchronous stream ciphers is that there is no er-
ror propagation during the decryption processes, i.e. any bit/word errors that
may occur in the ciphertext during transmission affect only the corresponding
bit/word of the plaintext [37]. However, synchronous stream ciphers require both
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the sender and receiver to be synchronised to allow the message to be intelligi-
ble to the author and receivers; that is the keystream generator used by both
encryptor and decryptor have simultaneously the same internal state during the
encryption and decryption. If synchronisation is lost, the decryption processes
will fail and need an additional technique for resynchronisation. For example,
if bits/words are inserted or deleted from a ciphertext, then the decryption will
fail and the synchronisation is lost [83].
Frequent Rekeying (Re-initialisation)
Rekeying is the process of using the secret key and multiple IVs to generate
multiple keystream sequences. (That is to avoid using same keystream sequence
with multiple messages.) Rekeying or re-initialisation process is the method
that is used to solve the problem of synchronisation of the synchronous stream
ciphers, to diffuse the secret key across the entire internal state and to gener-
ate multiple keystream sequences from one secret key associated with multiple
IVs. It is used to avoid the requirement for a resynchronisation technique for
the synchronous stream cipher. If the synchronisation is lost and the interval is
small, then only that small amount of information before rekeying will be lost.
This should not cause any significant degradation in the recovery of the original
message. For example, A5/1 performs rekeying for a GSM conversation every
4.6 milliseconds [24]. This high performance rekeying stream cipher is compet-
itive in practical applications and is preferred for real-time applications, such
as mobile and wireless communications [32]. Rekeying is affected by the trans-
mission packet size. For example, the packet size of Digital Video Broadcasting
(DVB) is 184 bytes, Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC) is 208
bytes, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is 160, 240, 288 or 400 bits and
GSM mobile phone is 228 bits. Figure 2.4 shows the general concept of rekeying
for a keystream sequence using the same secret key, K, and multiple IVs.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2.4: A keystream generated using the same secret key, K, and multiple
IVs
Frequent rekeying process (re-initialisation) of stream ciphers must operate
with the transmission speed between parties (sender and the receivers). There-
fore, frequent rekeying of a system requires efficient initialisation process, espe-
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cially for real-time applications. If the rekeying process is slow, then the stream
cipher cannot encrypt or decrypt all the transmitted messages properly. How-
ever, the requirement of efficiency should not compromise the security of the
initialisation process.
B - Self-Synchronous Stream Ciphers
Self-synchronous (or asynchronous) stream ciphers generate keystream as a func-
tion of the secret key, IV and a number of bits from the previous ciphertext [91, p.
198]. Figure 2.5 shows the general concept of self-synchronous stream ciphers.
The self-synchronous stream cipher encryption function can be described as a
function of the secret key, IV and the feedback of the ciphertext.
Keystream output {zi}n1 = f((K, IV), σi)
Ciphertext ci = zi ⊕mi
where, σi = (ci−t, ci−t+1, . . . , ci−1). From the above equations, it is obvious that
the internal state is a function of the previous ciphertext, and the encryption
processes depend on the previous ciphertext.
Encryption Decryption
Keystream
Generation
Initialisation
Keystream
Generation
Initialisation
Figure 2.5: Encryption and decryption of self-synchronous stream cipher
Self-synchronous stream ciphers have the ability to automatically resynchro-
nise themselves after a loss of synchronisation. That is, if ciphertext bits/words
are deleted or inserted, the cipher loses the synchronisation; however, self-synchronous
stream ciphers will automatically recover the synchronisation after several de-
cryption steps. Self-synchronous stream ciphers propagate errors for a limited
number of clocks. If a ciphertext bit is modified, then the decryption processes
will affect a number of ciphertext sequences before synchronising itself. The
drawback of the self-synchronous stream ciphers is that this type of cipher may
be vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attack [107].
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From the above argument, the characteristics of synchronous, self-synchronous
stream ciphers and the requirement for frequent rekeying are highlighted. Based
on the fact that the synchronous stream ciphers resist the chosen ciphertext at-
tack, this thesis focuses on analysis of the initialisation process of the synchronous
stream ciphers.
2.2.2 Properties of Keystream
Pseudorandom keystream sequences are intended to be indistinguishable from
truly random sequences. However, as Schneier comments, “it is impossible to
produce something truly random on a computer” [91, p. 44]. Therefore, stan-
dard properties of the keystream sequences are used to measure unpredictability
of the pseudorandom keystream sequences. These include criteria for period,
linear complexity and white noise statistics [41]. Meeting the relevant criteria
for these properties is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for generating
pseudorandom keystream sequences. These properties and their effects on the
security of keystream sequences are explained in the rest of this section.
• Period. A deterministic keystream generator produces pseudorandom se-
quences or sequences that eventually become periodic. The period of the
keystream sequences should be longer than the length of the plaintext.
If the keystream is periodic or repeated for another plaintext, it may be
possible to recover the message by ciphertext-only attack [40].
• Linear complexity. Any periodic sequence can be constructed using a suit-
able chosen linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The linear complexity
L of a sequence is the length of the shortest binary LFSR that generates
the specified sequence. The details of the appropriate LFSR for a given
sequence can be determined from 2L bits of known output sequence using
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [14,80]. Therefore, the linear complexity
of the LFSR should be sufficiently large to avoid a reconstruction of the
internal state [41].
• White noise statistics. The output sequences of random generators are
statistically independent and unbiased [83]. A pseudorandom sequence
generated by a keystream generator should mimic this behaviour. That
is, it should be indistinguishable from a random sequence. In a pseudo-
random sequence, occurrence of single, pairs, triples bits etc are uniformly
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distributed. The keystream should appear to be random in short and long
subsequences. [41]. The output sequences should pass all the statistical
tests of randomness [91]. There are five commonly used statistical tests to
measure the security of pseudorandom keystream sequences as follows: (1)
frequency test: the number of ones and zeros in any sequences are approx-
imately the same; (2) serial test: (two-bit test), this test ensures that the
number of occurrences of 00, 01, 10 and 11 are approximately the same; (3)
poker test: if m is a positive integer and divides the keystream sequence Z
into n non-overlapping parts of length m, the poker test will determine if
the sequences of length m appear approximately the same number of times
in each keystream sequence; (4) runs test: in a specific period, half of the
runs should have a length of one (zero or one), a quarter of the runs should
have a length of two (zeros, ones) and so on; and (5) autocorrelation test
which checks the correlations within a sequence in a period p [83].
2.3 Initialisation Process
The initialisation process is a critical phase that must be performed before
keystream generation can begin [60]. After that, the keystream generator can be
used to produce keystream sequences. Figure 2.2 illustrates the sequencing of the
initialisation and the keystream generation processes. For security, the initiali-
sation process must not reveal any information about the secret key and must
be secure against at least the known generic attacks. The initialisation process
consists of two main phases, loading and diffusion and are described below.
2.3.1 Loading Phase
In most stream ciphers, in the loading phase the secret key and IV (if relevant)
are loaded into the internal state to produce the loaded state. In some ciphers
this is performed sequentially. For example the A5/1 stream cipher loads the
secret key first, followed by the IV. Alternatively, some stream ciphers such as
Grain and Trivium load both secret key and IV simultaneously into the internal
state. The loading phase itself may use either a linear or nonlinear function.
After the loading phase is performed, the diffusion phase is applied.
In some stream ciphers there is no specific format for the loaded state, such
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as the A5/1 stream cipher (so any internal state after a number of iterations
is a legitimate loaded state). Some other ciphers have specific format (padding
pattern), such as Trivium and Sfinks stream ciphers (so, any internal state after
α iterations can be counted as a legitimate loaded state, only if it meets the
loaded format). This padding system fills specific stages by predetermined val-
ues according to the cipher algorithm’s design. The padding system should be
considered in the security analysis.
2.3.2 Diffusion Phase
The diffusion phase consists of a specified number of iterations of the ini-
tialisation state update function to generate the initial state without producing
any keystream bits. The objective is to diffuse the secret key and IV across the
internal state. In some cases, the IV is loaded during the diffusion phase, such
as the Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher [104]. The state update
function during the diffusion phase is usually a nonlinear function. It may use
Boolean functions or other nonlinear functions such as S-boxes. The purpose of
this state update function is to make the derivation of the secret key from the
initial state mathematically hard.
In general, the initialisation process should prevent secret key recovery from
a known initial state (session key). In this case, if attackers have an ability to
construct the initial state (session key) of a stream cipher, then the initialisation
process should be sufficiently complicated to prevent the secret key recovery
attack (except by exhaustive key search). If the key recovery attack is impossible,
then the attackers must repeat their attack processes to find the session key each
time when the cipher is rekeyed. Conversely, if an attacker is able to obtain
the secret key, it can produce the keystream for any combination of the secret
key and the known IVs. Therefore, initialisation processes are critical for stream
ciphers.
2.3.3 Keystream Generation Process
Once the initialisation process is complete, the cipher is in its initial state that
is the session key has been generated, and the keystream generation can be-
gin. Keystream generation performs a specific number of clocks to generate a
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keystream sequence that should meet the required properties to be distinct and
unpredictable. Keystream generation process consists of a state update function
to update the content of the internal state and an output function to form the
output keystream bits or words. The state update function of the keystream
generation may be the same, different or have a degree of similarity to the state
update function of the initialisation process (diffusion phase).
2.4 Examples of Initialisation Processes
This section reviews some stream ciphers that were submitted to the NESSIE [68]
or eSTREAM [50] projects or that are well known for other reasons. This review
gives a description of the ciphers, concentrating on the initialisation process.
The initialisation processes of these stream ciphers have been analysed in the
literature as presented in Section 2.8. We consider in this section the stream
ciphers: RC4, Trivium, Grain, Dragon, MICKEY and LILI-II. As well, three
stream ciphers A5/1 [30], Sfinks [29] and CSA-SC [15] will be presented in more
detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. After we describe the other ciphers,
we will include an explanation of our reasons for choosing these three ciphers.
2.4.1 RC4
Description
RC4 was designed in 1987 [97, p.191] by Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security,
Inc. It is widely deployed in software applications such as secure sockets layer
(SSL) due to its efficiency. RC4 is a word-based stream cipher with words of
size n bits (mostly n = 8 bits) and a variable secret key-size. In the remaining
of this section, we assume each word of RC4 is one byte in length (i.e. n = 8)
as is commonly use. Let l denote the size of the secret key in bytes, commonly
between 1 and 256 bytes. Let K denote the key and let each key byte be denoted
as k[i] for i = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1. The key is used indirectly to form the contents of
an array, denoted S. The array S has size 2n words. So the most common size
of S is 256 bytes.
RC4 generates keystream sequences independently of the plaintext. The op-
eration requires performing two phases: the key scheduling algorithm (KSA)
and the pseudo random generator algorithm (PRGA). The KSA and PRGA are
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equivalent to the initialisation process for the internal state, S, and the keystream
generation process (where each clock of the PRGA produces a keystream byte),
respectively.
Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)
The initial process of RC4 is to fill the stages of array S with the integers
from 0 to 255 in ascending order; that is S[0] = 0, S[1] = 1, . . . , S[255] = 255. A
temporary vector, T , of size 256 bytes is created and filled with the secret key.
The secret key is transferred into the temporary vector T and may be repeated if
it is necessary (if the key size is less than T size). Following this, a key dependent
shuffling of S is performed. The secret key in the temporary array T is used to
form the permutation of the S array only. Algorithm 2.1 illustrates the shuffling
process of the key scheduling algorithm (KSA) in detail (which is applied on the
array S).
1: for i = 0 to 255 do
2: S[i] = i
3: T [i] = k[i mod l]
4: end for
5: j = 0
6: for i = 0 to 255 do
7: j = (j + S[i] + T [i]) mod 256
8: Swap (S[i], S[j])
9: end for
10: return S
Algorithm 2.1: RC4: Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)
Pseudo Random Generator Algorithm (PRGA)
After the key scheduling algorithm is complete, the pseudo random generator
algorithm starts. The state update function is shuffling the bytes and then the
output function selects a stage of S. The content of this stage is the output byte
of the keystream as shown in Algorithm 2.2 (state update function is steps 4-6
and output function is steps 7 and 8). The keystream byte S[u] is XORed with
a plaintext byte using bit level XORing to produce a ciphertext byte.
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Require: S
1: i = 0
2: j = 0
3: loop
4: i = (i+ 1) mod 256
5: j = (j + S[i]) mod 256
6: Swap (S[i], S[j])
7: u = (S[i] + S[j]) mod 256
8: print S[u]
9: end loop
Algorithm 2.2: RC4: keystream generation PRGA
2.4.2 Trivium
Description
The Trivium stream cipher was submitted to eSTREAM project, by De Cannie`re
and Preneel [43]. Trivium has been selected to be in the final portfolio of the
eSTREAM project. It is a hardware oriented bit-based synchronous stream
cipher. It aims to provide flexible speed and space trade-off. Trivium takes an
80-bit secret key, K and 80-bit initial vector, IV, as input to a 288-bit shift
register internal state as shown in Figure 2.6. It is designed to generate up to 264
bits of keystream before the rekeying process. It consists of nonlinear feedback
shift registers and a linear output function.
288
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177
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Clock
Figure 2.6: Trivium construction
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Initialisation Process
During the loading phase, the 80-bit secret key and 80-bit IV are loaded into
the 288-bit internal state in a linear manner and the remaining stages are set to
zeros except the stages s286, s287 and s288 which are set to all ones. Let the secret
key bits be ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ 80, the IV bits be vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 80 and the stages of internal
state S be si, 1 ≤ i ≤ 288. Algorithm 2.3 shows the loading and diffusion phases
of Trivium. During the diffusion phase, the initialisation process performs 4 full
cycles (4× 288) before producing any keystream.
Require: K and IV
1: (s1, s2, . . . , s93)← (k1, . . . , k80, 0, . . . , 0)
2: (s94, s95, . . . , s177)← (v1, . . . , v80, 0, . . . , 0)
3: (s178, . . . , s286, s287, s288)← (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1)
4: for i = 1 to 4 · 288 do
5: t1 ← s66 ⊕ s91 · s92 ⊕ s93 ⊕ s171
6: t2 ← s162 ⊕ s175 · s176 ⊕ s177 ⊕ s264
7: t3 ← s69 ⊕ s243 ⊕ s286 · s287 ⊕ s288
8: (s1, s2, . . . , s93)← (t3, s1, . . . , s92)
9: (s94, s95, . . . , s177)← (t1, s94, . . . , s176)
10: (s178, s179, . . . , s288)← (t2, s178, . . . , s287)
11: end for
12: return S
Algorithm 2.3: Trivium initialisation process
Keystream Generation
The keystream generation uses 15 specific bits to update three bits. The output
keystream bit is generated by XORing six bits from the internal state using
a linear output function. This process is repeated until n ≤ 264, where the
maximum keystream bits that can be generated by a key-IV pair is 264 bits.
Algorithm 2.4 illustrates the keystream generation process.
2.4.3 Grain v1
Description
The Grain v1 stream cipher was submitted to eSTREAM project, by Hell, Jo-
hansson and Meier [59] and was selected in the final portfolio of the eSTREAM
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Require: S
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: t1 ← s66 ⊕ s93
3: t2 ← s162 ⊕ s177
4: t3 ← s243 ⊕ s288
5: zi ← t1 ⊕ t2 ⊕ t3
6: t1 ← t1 ⊕ s91 · s92 ⊕ s171
7: t2 ← t2 ⊕ s175 · s176 ⊕ s264
8: t3 ← t3 ⊕ s69 ⊕ s286 · s287
9: (s1, s2, . . . , s93)← (t3, s1, . . . , s92)
10: (s94, s95, . . . , s177)← (t1, s94, . . . , s176)
11: (s178, s179, . . . , s288)← (t2, s178, . . . , s287)
12: end for
13: print zi
Algorithm 2.4: Trivium keystream generation
project. It is a hardware oriented bit-based synchronous cipher. It aims to pro-
vide flexible speed up to 16 bit/clock based on the available hardware. Grain
takes an 80-bit secret key, K and 64-bit initial vector, IV, as input to a 160-bit
internal state as shown in Figure 2.7. The main components of Grain are two
feedback shift registers and one output function. One of the registers is a linear
feedback shift register (LFSR) with polynomial function f(x), and the second
register is a nonlinear feedback shift register (NFSR) with polynomial function
g(x). Each shift register has a size of 80 bits. The output function h(x) is a
nonlinear function with five-bit inputs (four bits from the LFSR and a bit from
the NFSR).
Initialisation Process
The Grain stream cipher performs the initialisation process before producing any
keystream bits. Let the secret key bits be denoted ki, 0 ≤ i ≤ 79 and the IV
bits be denoted vi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 64. Firstly, the loading phase is performed. The
80-bit secret key is loaded into the nonlinear feedback shift register (NFSR).
Let the stages of NFSR be bi where bi = ki for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79. The 64 bits of
IV are loaded into 64 bits of the linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Let the
stages of LFSR be si where si = vi for 0 ≤ i ≤ 63. The remaining bits of the
LFSR are filled by ones, si = 1 for 64 ≤ i ≤ 79. Secondly, the diffusion phase
proceeds by clocking the LFSR and NFSR registers 160 times before producing
any keystream, and the output bit zi is fed back and XORed to the input of both
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the LFSR and NFSR. The general concept of Grain is illustrated in Figure 2.7
with the polynomial functions of f(x) and g(x). The update function of the
LFSR and NFSR, h(x) and zi are defined as follows:
si+80 = si+62 ⊕ si+51 ⊕ si+38 ⊕ si+23 ⊕ si+13 ⊕ si
bi+80 = si ⊕ bi+62 ⊕ bi+60 ⊕ bi+52 ⊕ bi+45 ⊕ bi+37 ⊕ bi+33 ⊕ bi+28 ⊕ bi+21⊕
bi+14 ⊕ bi+9 ⊕ bi ⊕ bi+63bi+60 ⊕ bi+37bi+33 ⊕ bi+15bi+9⊕
bi+60bi+52bi+45 ⊕ bi+33bi+28bi+21 ⊕ bi+63bi+45bi+28bi+9⊕
bi+60bi+52bi+37bi+33 ⊕ bi+63bi+60bi+21bi+15⊕
bi+63bi+60bi+52bi+45bi+37 ⊕ bi+33bi+28bi+21bi+15bi+9⊕
bi+52bi+45bi+37bi+33bi+28bi+21
h(x) = x1 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x0x3 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ x0x1x2 ⊕ x0x2x3 ⊕ x0x2x4⊕
x1x2x4 ⊕ x2x3x4
zi =
∑
k∈A bi+kh(si+3, si+25, si+46, si+64, bi+63)
where x0, x1, x2, x3, x4 = si+3, si+25, si+46, si+64, bi+63
where A = (1, 2, 4, 10, 31, 43, 56)
NFSR LFSR
h(x)
g(x) f(x)
Figure 2.7: Grain construction
Keystream Generation
After the initialisation process is completed, the output bit is no longer used
as feedback into both NFSR and LFSR registers. Now Grain v1 is ready to
generate the keystream bits zi. Grain is a bit-based cipher, it generates a bit per
clock. Hell et al [59] reported that the period of Grain v1 is at least 280− 1 with
probability 1− 2−80.
28 Chapter 2. Background
Comments on Grain v0 and Grain-128
Grain v1 [59] is released in response to several attacks [13,70,81] on Grain v0 [58].
Both Grain v0 and Grain v1 have the same internal state size (same registers
80-bit LFSR and 80-bit NFSR). They use an 80-bit secret key and a 64-bit IV
as input to the ciphers. So, the general structure and components are similar.
The bit positions of the feedback and output functions were adjusted according
to the new cipher. The actual clocking mechanism also remains unchanged.
Grain-128 [60] was designed later, by Hell, Johansson, Maximov and Meier
and submitted to the eSTREAM project as well as an enhancement of the Grain
stream cipher. Grain-128 uses 128-bit secret keys and 96-bit IVs. It was designed
with a larger secret key and IV length to resist time-memory-data trade-off attack
(as they mentioned the 128-bit key is a minimum key length in secure applica-
tions). It works similarly to the previous version except for some modifications
in the polynomial equations. One bit per clock is produced in the keystream
generation. The output can be increased up to 32 bits per clock by adding some
hardware components.
2.4.4 Dragon
Description
The Dragon stream cipher was submitted to eSTREAM project, by Chen, Hen-
ricksen, Millan, Fuller, Simpson, Dawson, Lee and Moon [32,39]. It is a sofware
oriented word-based synchronous stream cipher. Dragon aims to provide high
speed throughput by generating two words (64 bits) every clock. (It uses two
variable lengths of secret key and initialisation vector, with 256 bits or 128 bits
for both as input to a nonlinear feedback shift register (NFSR) 1024-bit internal
state.) Dragon is designed to use an F function which consists of three parts:
premixing, substitution and post-mixing using G and H functions, two S-boxes
(S1 and S2) and a 64-bit memory (M). The F function maps six input words to
six output words (each word is 32 bits). Algorithm 2.5 shows the specification
of the F function where ⊕ denotes XOR,  denotes addition (mod 232) and ‖
denotes concatenation. After that, Dragon starts the initialisation process before
producing any keystreams using the nonlinear function and multiple iterations
to give a high throughput and secure keystream generation.
The G and H functions are:
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Require: {a, b, c, d, e, f}
1: Pre-mixing Layer:
2: b = b⊕ a; d = d⊕ c; f = f ⊕ e
3: c = c b; e = e d; a = a f
4: S-box Layer:
5: d = d⊕G1(a); f = f ⊕G2(c); b = b⊕G3(e)
6: a = a⊕H1(b); c = c⊕H2(d); e = e⊕H3(f)
7: Post-mixing Layer:
8: d′ = d a; f ′ = f  c; b′ = b e
9: c′ = c⊕ b; e′ = e⊕ d; a′ = a⊕ f
10: return {a′, b′, c′, d′, e′, f ′}
Algorithm 2.5: Dragon: F function
G1(x) =S1(x0)⊕ S1(x1)⊕ S1(x2)⊕ S2(x3)
G2(x) =S1(x0)⊕ S1(x1)⊕ S2(x2)⊕ S1(x3)
G3(x) =S1(x0)⊕ S2(x1)⊕ S1(x2)⊕ S1(x3)
H1(x) =S2(x0)⊕ S2(x1)⊕ S2(x2)⊕ S1(x3)
H2(x) =S2(x0)⊕ S2(x1)⊕ S1(x2)⊕ S2(x3)
H3(x) =S2(x0)⊕ S1(x1)⊕ S2(x2)⊕ S2(x3)
Initialisation Process
Dragon [32, 39] can use 256 bits or 128 bits for both the secret key and IV as
mentioned above. The 1024-bit internal state is formed by register containing
the secret key and IV plus the memory. The initialisation process uses the F
function extensively with 16 iterations. Rekeying (reinitialising) is performed at
least once every 264 bits of the output keystream. Algorithm 2.6 and Figure 2.8
illustrate all the initialisation process of the Dragon stream cipher. For the key-
IV in Algorithm 2.6, x¯ and x′ denote the complement and the swapping of the
upper half and the lower half of x respectively.
Keystream Generation
Dragon has an internal state with a size of 1024 bits divided into 32 words.
During each cycle, six words (word numbers 0, 9, 16, 19, 30, 31) are used as
input for the F . The memory is used as a counter. Each clock, Dragon produces
30 Chapter 2. Background
Require: {K, IV } (256-bit) or {k, iv} (128-bit)
1: W0‖. . . ‖W7 = K‖K ⊕ IV ‖K ⊕ IV ‖IV (256-bit) or
2: W0‖. . . ‖W7 = k‖k′ ⊕ iv′‖iv‖k ⊕ iv′‖k′‖k ⊕ iv‖iv′‖k′ ⊕ iv (128-bit)
3: M = 0x0000447261676F6E
4: for i = 1 to 16 do
5: a‖b‖c‖d = (W0 ⊕W6 ⊕W7)
6: e‖f = M
7: (a′, b′, c′, d′, e′, f ′) = F (a, b, c, d, e, f)
8: W0 = (a
′‖b′‖c′‖d′)⊕W4
9: for i = 7 to 1 do
10: Wi = Wi−1
11: end for
12: M = e′‖f ′
13: end for
14: return {W0‖. . . ‖W7}
Algorithm 2.6: Dragon’s initialisation process
F
W0 W4 W6 W7
M
128 128 128 128
64
128 64
Figure 2.8: Initialisation of Dragon
an output word, z, (64 bits), updates the state and increases the value of memory
by one. Algorithm 2.7 shows the general principle of keystream generation.
2.4.5 MICKEY v1
Description
The MICKEY v1 stream cipher was submitted to eSTREAM project, by Bab-
bage and Dodd [6]. It is a hardware oriented bit-based synchronous cipher.
MICKEY v1 takes an 80-bit secret key, K and an IV between 0 and 80 bits
in length as inputs to a 160-bit internal state (two shift registers) as shown in
Figures 2.9. MICKEY is designed to generate up to 240 bits of keystream before
2.4. Examples of Initialisation Processes 31
Require: {B0‖. . . ‖B31,M}
1: (ML‖MR) = M
2: a = B0, b = B9, c = B16, d = B19, e = B30 ⊕ML, f = B31 ⊕MR
3: (a′, b′, c′, d′, e′, f ′) = F (a, b, c, d, f, e)
4: B0 = b
′, B1 = c′
5: for i = 31 to 2 do
6: Bi = Bi−2
7: end for
8: M = M + 1
9: z = a′‖e′
10: return {k,B0‖. . . ‖B31,M}
Algorithm 2.7: Dragon’s keystream generator
the rekeying process.
MICKEY v1 consists of two shift registers R and S. Register R is a linear
feedback shift register that is clocked based on the value of CB R. If CB R is 0,
register R is clocked in the standard way. When CB R is 1, register R is clocked
240 − 23 times. Register S is a nonlinear shift register that is clocked based
on the value of CB S. Let r0, r1, . . . , r79 and r
′
0, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
79 denote the stages of
register R before clocking and after clocking respectively. Let s0, s1, . . . , s79 and
s′0, s
′
1, . . . , s
′
79 denote the stages of register S before clocking and after clocking
respectively. The feedback tap positions of register R is defined as: TAP R = {0,
2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 49, 51, 52,
54, 56, 62, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 78, 79}. For the state update function fo register S,
Let sˆ0, sˆ1, . . . , sˆ79 denote intermediate variables. Define four sequences as follows:
COMP0i and COMP1i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 78, and FB0i and FB1i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79, as
shown in Table 2.1.
Initialisation Process
MICKEY v1 performs the initialisation process before producing any keystream
bits. At the beginning, all stages are set to be zeros. Then, the IV (vj, for
0 ≤ j ≤ 80) and 80-bit secret key are loaded into the 160-bit internal state.
Let the secret key bits be denoted ki, 0 ≤ i ≤ 79 and the IV bits be denoted
vi, 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1. Firstly using a nonlinear function, the IV bits are loaded
into both registers R and S. Following that the key bits are loaded in the same
manner. MICKEY v1 performs 80 clocks for both registers and the output bits
are discarded. The initialisation process is performed as follows:
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Table 2.1: The four sequences COMP0i, COMP1i, FB0i and FB1i
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
COMP0i 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
COMP1i 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
FB0i 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FB1i 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
i 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53
COMP0i 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
COMP1i 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
FB0i 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
FB1i 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
i 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
COMP0i 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
COMP1i 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
FB0i 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
FB1i 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
                   Register R
                   Register S0
0
Controls R
feedback
Controls S
feedback
Keystream bit
Figure 2.9: MICKEY stream cipher
• Loading phase:
– Initialise both registers R and S to all-zeros contents,
ri = si = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79.
– Load the IV bits to both registers R and S simultaneously,
CLOCK KG(R, S, 1, vi), for 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1.
– Load the key bits to both registers R and S simultaneously,
CLOCK KG(R, S, 1, ki), for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79.
• Diffusion phase:
– CLOCK KG(R, S, 1, 0), for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79.
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Require: R and S to execute CLOCK KG(R, S,MIX, In B)
1: CB R = s27 ⊕ r53
2: CB S = s53 ⊕ r26
3: if MIX =1 then
4: IB R = In B ⊕ s40
5: else
6: IB R = In B
7: end if
8: IB S = In B
9: CLOCK R(R, IB R,CB R)
10: CLOCK S(S, IB S,CB S)
Algorithm 2.8: Clocking the overall generator
Require: R to execute CLOCK R(R, IB R,CB R)
1: FB R = r79 ⊕ IB R
2: for i = 1 to 79 do
3: r′i = ri−1
4: end for
5: r′0 = 0
6: for i = 0 to 79 do
7: if i ∈ TAP R then
8: r′i = r
′
i ⊕ FB R
9: end if
10: end for
11: if CB R = 1 then
12: for i = 0 to 79 do
13: r′i = r
′
i ⊕ ri
14: end for
15: end if
Algorithm 2.9: Clocking register R
Keystream Generation
During the keystream generation, the state update function no longer uses s40
for the feedback of register R. Each clock, MICKEY v1 generates a keystream
bit as follows: zi = r0 ⊕ s0.
CLOCK KG(R, S, 0, 0), for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79.
Comments on the MICKEY v2 and MICKEY-128
Hong and Kim [65] demonstrated a state entropy loss weakness (state conver-
gence) in MICKEY v1. To overcome this weakness, the designers proposed an
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Require: S to execute CLOCK S(S, IB S,CB S)
1: FB S = s79 ⊕ IB S
2: for i = 1 to 78 do
3: sˆi = si−1 ⊕ ((si ⊕ COMP0i) · (si+1 ⊕ COMP1i))
4: end for
5: sˆ0 = 0
6: sˆ79 = s78
7: if CB S = 0 then
8: for i = 0 to 79 do
9: s′i = sˆi ⊕ (FB0i · FB S)
10: end for
11: else
12: for i = 0 to 79 do
13: s′i = sˆi ⊕ (FB1i · FB S)
14: end for
15: end if
Algorithm 2.10: Clocking register S
improved cipher, referred to as Mickey v2 [8]. Mickey v2 is one of the stream ci-
phers in the final eSTREAM project portfolio, for the second profile (hardware).
Register lengths of R and S were increased to be 100 bits instead of 80 bits for
each register. The tap positions and the feedback and clocking were adjusted ac-
cording to the new proposal. The general structure and components are similar
to Mickey-v1 and the clocking mechanism remains unchanged.
MICKEY-128 v1 [5] was designed to use a 128-bit secret key. This cipher pro-
posal has similar design and clocking mechanism principles to MICKEY v1 with
two registers each 128-bit, where the clocking and feedback taps were relocated
accordingly. Later, another improvement of MICKEY-128 v1 was proposed and
referred as MICKEY-128 v2 [7]. MICKEY-128 v2 has increased register lengths
to be 160-bit for registers R and S instead of 128-bit each. This is the only
difference.
2.4.6 LILI-II
Description
The LILI-II stream cipher was designed by Clark, Dawson, Fuller, Golic´, Lee,
Millan, Moon, and Simpson [35] which is from the LILI family together with
LILI [95] and LILI-128 [38] (was submitted to NESSIE project [68]). It is hard-
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ware and software oriented, and a bit-based synchronous cipher. LILI-II takes
128-bit key and 128-bit IV as input to a 255-bit internal state (two shift registers)
as shown in Figure 2.10. It was designed to have a period of 2255.
Let ki and vi denote the key and IV bits for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127. There are two
registers LFSRc and LFSRd of lengths 128 and 127 bits respectively. LFSRc is
clocked normally and the LFSRd is controlled by a function fc. This function fc
takes two inputs from the LFSRc to calculate the output c(t) at time t, where
c(t) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The output Boolean function fd takes twelve bits from register
LFSRd as inputs to produce the output bit. Let ci and dj denote the stages for
registers LFSRc and LFSRd for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 126 respectively.
. . .
Figure 2.10: LILI-II stream cipher
Initialisation Process
LILI-II performs the initialisation process as follows:
• Loading LFSRc, the secret key, k, and the IV, v, are XORed to generate
the loaded state of LFSRc as follows, ci = ki ⊕ vi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127.
• Loading LFSRd, the secret key, k, and the IV, v, are XORed to generate
the loaded state of LFSRd by ignoring k0 and v79 as follows:, di = ki+1⊕vi,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 126.
• Generates 255 keystream bits, the first 128 bits are loaded to register
LFSRc, and then 127 bits are loaded to register LFSRd.
• Generates another 255 keystream bits, the first 128 bits are loaded to reg-
ister LFSRc, and then 127 bits are loaded to register LFSRd.
Keystream Generation
Now, the LILI-II stream cipher has completed the initialisation process and the
keystream generation can begin. The keystream generation process uses the
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same state update function from the initialisation process. The keystream bit is
formed from the fd function as mentioned above:
zi = fd(d0, d1, d3, d7, d12, d20, d30, d44, d65, d80, d96, d122)
2.4.7 Why A5/1, Sfinks and CSA-SC
We first discuss the rationale behind the selection of the three ciphers A5/1,
Sfinks and the Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSA-SC) as sub-
jects for in-depth analysis of the initialisation processes. These are all commonly
used ciphers which take different approaches to the loading and diffusion phases
of initialisation and there has been a limited analysis of security of their initiali-
sation processes. Also, these three ciphers use different state, key and IV sizes,
and perform different approaches of key and IV loading processes.
Most stream ciphers use shift registers in combination with non-linear func-
tions. So, we choose these ciphers because they have the same structure as
most other stream ciphers. In common with most stream ciphers, these three ci-
phers use shift registers with variety of structures and nonlinear functions. They
cover both cases when state size is less and larger than the total of the key
and IV sizes. They cover three different type of loading phases and initialisa-
tion processes: with majority clocking scheme, update function with delay and
loading the IV during the diffusion phase. Moreover, they cover autonomous
and non-autonomous operations for both loading process and update function.
Therefore, the recommendations and outcomes from these analyses are relevant
to most stream ciphers that are based on shift registers.
A5/1 Stream Cipher
The A5/1 [30] cipher is a well known stream cipher which is used widely to
provide confidentiality for GSM mobile phone communications. It is used by
about 130 million customers in Europe [24]. The keystream generation process
of A5/1 has been heavily analysed, (see [12,19,53,82]), but there was only limited
analysis of the initialisation process prior to this research [24,54]. The description
of A5/1 and its initialisation processes are given in Section 3.1.
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Sfinks Stream Cipher
The Sfinks stream cipher was submitted to eSTREAM project, the ECRYPT call
for stream cipher proposals in April 2005, by Braeken, Lano, Mentens, Preneel
and Verbauwhede [29]. The Sfinks initialisation process is not well studied in
the public literature. The individual components of the state update function of
Sfinks are one-to-one, but during the initialisation process their combination is
not one-to-one. This is the central point in choosing this cipher to be investigated.
The description of Sfinks and its initialisation processes are given in Section 4.1.
Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher
The Digital Video Broadcasting Common Scrambling Algorithm (DVB-CSA) is
specified by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [51] .
It has been used for scrambling and encrypting the MPEG-2 transport stream
(digital television or pay TV) since 1994. The DVB-CSA consists of a cascade of
block and stream ciphers. In this thesis, we examine the stream cipher in DVB-
CSA which is referred to as CSA-SC [16]. There is some analysis of the keystream
generation process of the CSA-SC [74,96,104,105], but the initialisation process
of CSA-SC is not well studied in the public literature. The description of CSA-SC
and its initialisation processes are given in Section 5.1.
Table 2.2 presents the summary of characteristics of the ciphers that have
been discussed in this section. It also includes three ciphers A5/1, Sfinks and
CSA-SC which will be discussed and analysed in great detail in Chapters 3, 4
and 5. It shows some of the important components and comparison among these
ciphers.
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2.5 Cryptanalysis of Stream Ciphers
Attacking stream ciphers usually aims to either distinguish between stream ci-
phers, to find internal state, to recover secret key or message recovery. These
attacks are discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.2. Attackers exploit any avail-
able information, methods or tools that may assist the attacking process.
Certain assumptions are made when analysing any encryption algorithm.
From the general viewpoint of cryptanalysts, the stream cipher algorithms and
initial vectors (IVs) are assumed to be known. The challenge is to break a stream
cipher given the algorithm and also any IVs that are used but assuming that the
secret key is unknown.
For more specific situations there are some assumptions about each attack
method. For example, slide attacks assume the self-similarity of iterations of the
stream cipher [25]. In another example, the algebraic attack assumes the at-
tacker has gained knowledge of the stream cipher algorithm and some keystream
bits [3]. Consequently, there are general assumptions for cryptanalysis and spe-
cific assumptions for each cryptanalysis method as well as for each application.
The complexity of attacks and cryptanalysis of stream ciphers are usually
measured by the following parameters:
• Memory complexity. The amount of memory that is required to hold in-
formation for attacking. Memory may be required for pre-computation
and the attack itself such as in the Time Memory Time Trade-Off attack
(TMTO), which is discussed later.
• Time complexity. The required time to perform an attack.
• Data complexity. The amount of ciphertext/plaintext that is required to
execute an attack.
The main focus of a cryptanalyst is to develop and find an attack approach
with the lowest possible complexity (memory, time and amount of data). In
general, there are trade-offs between these parameters. For example, TMTO
attack is a good example of a trade-off attack.
2.5.1 Attacking Models
Attacking models specify the type of information which can help an attacker
to break a stream cipher. The model describes the information that can be ac-
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cessed by an attacker. The attacking models for stream ciphers are based on
Kerckhoffs’ [69] and Shannon’s principles [92] where the description of ciphers
are publicly known and the secrecy depends on the secret key only. The attack-
ing models are classified into the following types based on which information is
known.
• Ciphertext-only attack. An attacker is able to access only the ciphertext
from a stream cipher.
• Known-plaintext attack. In this model, an attacker has some pairs of
plaintext-ciphertext that use the same secret key.
• Chosen-plaintext attack. An attacker is able to choose a random plaintext
to be encrypted in order to obtain the corresponding ciphertext. The secret
key is assumed to be unknown.
• Chosen-ciphertext attack. An attacker is able to decrypt a chosen cipher-
text to obtain the corresponding plaintext assuming the secret key is un-
known.
A stream cipher which is broken by a ciphertext-only attack is considered a
weak stream cipher. Due to the rapid development of technology, stream ciphers
should be continually under analysis to ensure that they are still secure or to
determine their limitation of application.
2.5.2 Aims of Attackers
Attackers may have one or more of the attacking aims or goals. These aims can
be classified as follows.
• Distinguishing attack [87]: Since the keystream sequence, which is an out-
put of a stream cipher, is claimed to be random for a specific period,
distinguishing attack is a generic attack that is used to determine which
stream cipher has been used. Distinguishing attack exploits some secu-
rity flaws to build a relationship between a keystream sequence and the
stream cipher used. Even though a distinguishing attack alone does not
reveal information about the secret key or the initial state (session key),
it demonstrates some weakness in the stream cipher. It may be a part of
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an attacking process. It may be used with another attack (may be generic
attack) to reduce the complexity of attacking or reveal information about
the secret key or the initial state. Therefore, most stream cipher design
prescribes the maximum number of keystream bits to be generated before
rekeying the system by a new IV. This determines the maximum possible
keystream that can be generated from a single key-IV pair to reduce the
possibility of any attack.
• State recovery attack [94]: The state recovery attack aims to recover the ini-
tial state of a stream cipher, which is known as session key recovery attack.
If an attacker is able to recover the initial state, then the entire keystream
for this session can be generated easily. Attacker needs to perform the at-
tacking process for each session key. Ciphers which are vulnerable for state
recovery attack are considered to be insecure.
• Key recovery attack [31, 93]: Key recovery attack is the main purpose of
attackers. If an attacker is able to recover the secret key, then keystream
can be generated for any known IV easily and the stream cipher is com-
pletely broken. Therefore, modern stream ciphers designers aim to make
key recovery attack hard from a given session key recovery attack. So, the
initialisation process plays a role like a security guard.
• Message recovery attack [40]: In this type of attack, an attacker may have
the ability to recover the message without any knowledge of the secret key.
It is based on the properties of the massage, such as the redundancy and
XORing of messages as shown in [40].
2.6 Generic Attacks on the Initialisation Pro-
cess
This section presents some generic attacks for stream ciphers that are used also
to attack the initialisation process of stream ciphers.
2.6.1 Brute Force Attack
For the initialisation process, we aim to find the secret key (master key). Brute
force attack is a naive attack on ciphers, where all possible secret keys are tried
42 Chapter 2. Background
until a secret key which produces the keystream is found. This is also known
as exhaustive search. However, most stream ciphers are designed so that it is
impractical to use the brute force attack due to the time required. In practice,
the average number of trials of brute force attack is half the size of the key space.
For example, if the secret key length is l then the total key space is 2l and half
of the key space is 2l−1.
Most attacks are claimed to be better than the brute force attack, that means
the time complexity of an attack is claimed to be less than the complexity of
the brute force attack. So, brute force attack is sometimes used to evaluate the
effectiveness of a new attack.
2.6.2 Time Memory Data Trade-Off Attack
Time-Memory Trade-off (TMTO) was introduced in 1980 by Hellman [62] as
a generic attack on block ciphers and applied to the Data Encryption Standard
(DES). TMTO is a general technique to invert the one-way function. The effort
required lies somewhere between exhaustive search of the search space and the
look-up table using two phases, a pre-computation phase and a real-time phase.
The pre-computation phase aims to build tables of random states xi and their
corresponding keystream sequences yi where f(x) = y, where xi represents either
the secret key or the internal state (as input), yi is the keystream (as output) and
f is the function that maps input to the output. This function f could be the
initialisation update function of the stream ciphers or the state update function
of the keystream generation and the output functions. These tables are sorted
into increasing order of the yi.
Time-Memory Trade-off (TMTO) has also been applied to stream ciphers. In-
dependent works by Golic´ [54] and Babbage [9] applied the TMTO to keystream
generators of stream ciphers to perform the internal state recovery attack. More-
over Biryukov and Shamir [23] applied the above works of Hellman and Golic´-
Babbage to stream ciphers to recover the internal state as well. In these three
independent analyses, the researchers recommended that the internal state size
should be at least double the size of the secret key.
The complexity of the time memory data trade-off attack can be described
in terms of the pre-computation and online parameters. The pre-computation
terms are as follows: P is the time that is required to construct the lookup table
(pre-computation time), and M is the size of memory required to construct and
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store the lookup table. During the attacking time (online phase), D is the amount
of keystream that is required to perform the TMTO attack, and T is the online
time that is required to search in the lookup table. From the above notation,
the attack complexity is based on both T and M , where P is pre-computation
time and the attacker is assumed to have unlimited time for preparation.
Now, we will focus on the treatment of initialisation processes in TMTO.
Hong and Sarkar [66, 67] revised the TMTO to be applied for stream ciphers.
They aimed to perform secret key recovery attack for stream ciphers that use
secret key and initial vector (IV). Hong and Sarkar used the Biryukov and Shamir
TMTO for a search space N = 2l+j, where l and j are the key and IV sizes in
bits, respectively.
T = M = 2
1
2
(l+j) with D = 2
1
4
(l+j) (2.2)
Thus, if an attacker has access to a keystream of length D = 2
1
4
(l+j), then
that attacker can recover a single (k, v) pair with time and memory complexity
of T = M = 2
1
2
(l+j). If j < l then the time and memory complexity is less than
the exhaustive search. In order to resist Hong and Sarkar’s TMTO attack, the
IV size should be at least equal to the key size.
Dunkelman and Keller [46] applied the TMTO attacks for stream ciphers to
recover the secret key. They assumed that the IVs are publicly known infor-
mation. They proposed to construct lookup tables based on the IVs. So, an
attacker waits for a set of IVs to capture the keystream to perform the attack
according to the following trade-off curve:
22(l+j) = TM2D2 (2.3)
There is no restriction for the parameters of the Dunkelman and Keller TMTO
attack such as T ≥ D2. If T = M = D then the complexity of the attack is less
than the exhaustive search as long as 22j < 23l. In order to resist this attack,
they recommended that the IV size should be at least 1.5 times the key size,
j ≥ 1.5l.
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2.6.3 Differential Attacks
A differential attack is a generic cryptanalysis method introduced in 1990 by
Biham and Shamir in an attack on block ciphers [21]. It was applied to stream
ciphers in 2004 by Muller [85]. The attacker considers multiple keystreams ob-
tained with a slight difference in the inputs (usually a difference in the IVs).
The differential attack on stream ciphers examines the behavior of the ini-
tialisation and keystream generation processes for a differential in the inputs. It
analyses how differences in the inputs (either the key or IV, or internal state) af-
fect the output (either internal state or keystream). Biham and Dunkelman [20]
describe three situations as follows:
1. A difference in the key or IV generates a difference in the internal state, S,
(∆k,∆v) −→ ∆S, with probability of p1.
2. A difference in the internal state, S, generates a difference in the internal
state after α clocks, ∆St −→ ∆St+α.
3. A difference in the internal state, S, generates a difference in the keystream,
Z, ∆S −→ ∆Z with probability of p2.
Considering these inputs to the keystream generator and combining steps (1)
and (2) in the above, we obtain the following:
• A difference in the key or IV generates a difference in the keystream,
(∆k,∆v) −→ ∆Z, with probability of p1 · p2.
For the keystream generators for stream ciphers an important attack scenario
to consider is where an attacker can access multiple keystreams formed using the
same secret key but with different known IVs; as (k, v) and (k, v′), for ∆v. Then
the difference in the two keystreams is ∆Z. When ∆v and ∆Z are known, then
the relationship between the two keystreams may reveal some information about
the secret key.
Differential cryptanalysis involves choosing two different inputs to a keystream
generator or cipher system and observing the difference between the outputs.
The difference may be used to distinguish the stream cipher or to reveal some
information about the secret key or the internal state. Stream ciphers can be
protected against differential attacks by designing the initialisation, keystream
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generation processes and the output carefully. The IVs should be mixed correctly
with the secret key. These processes should result in unpredictable differences in
the internal state or keystream. Muller [85] stated that the initialisation process
can provide protection against differential attacks by mixing nonlinear and linear
functions.
2.7 Flaws in the Initialisation Process
In the following section, we present some potential flaws in the initialisation
process of stream ciphers that can be used with some known generic attacks
to disclose information about the secret key or the encrypted message. These
flaws are state convergence and the existence of slid pairs and of weak Key-IV
combinations. These three flaws are discussed and investigated because they
happen commonly in shift register based stream ciphers. They occur due to
some common structural features and properties in the initialisation processes
functions. Flaws in the initialisation processes need more research and investi-
gation. Although this research focuses on these three common flaws, there may
be other flaws or new forms of attacks exploit a specific type of flaw (which
may be discovered in the future). Moreover, other stream ciphers that are not
based on shift registers may also have weaknesses related to the initialisation.
For example a widely used stream cipher, RC4, is a stream cipher based on a
dynamic table. The initialisation process of other types of stream cipher design
should be analysed carefully. In this thesis, we investigate only shift registers
based designs.
2.7.1 State Convergence
Modern stream ciphers take a secret key and an IV as input to the initialisa-
tion process of the keystream generator to produce an initial state (session key).
If the state size is equal to or larger than the total of the key and IV sizes, then
each key-IV combination should map to a distinct internal state. If the state size
is shorter than the key and IV sizes, then there is a reduction of key-IV space
(compression). However even if a cipher satisfies this state size condition, it can
still experience a reduction of the effective state size during either or both of the
46 Chapter 2. Background
initialisation and keystream generation processes. This effect is known as state
convergence.
State convergence occurs when two or more states are mapped to the same
state after α iterations for α > 0. That is, state convergence occurs when the
state update function is not one-to-one . State convergence may occur during
the initialisation process, during keystream generation, or both. This may reduce
the effective key-IV size and leave the stream cipher vulnerable to attacks such
as distinguishing attacks [87], time-memory-data trade-off attacks [23] or other
ciphertext-only attacks [40].
2.7.2 Analysis of State Convergence
State convergence can be investigated by examining the state update transition.
It may not be straightforward to decide whether the stream cipher experiences
state convergence or not. Therefore, in some cases more than one approach to
investigate the convergence is required. These approaches are described below:
Forward Direction
The forward direction follows the normal clocking operation (state update func-
tion) in the stream cipher initialisation process. This approach examines the
state space at time t + α, given the state space at time t, for α ≥ 1 iterations,
as shown in Figure 2.11a. If there are a number of states at time t that give
the same state at time t + α, then state convergence occurs. This approach is
applied for the investigation of state convergence during the initialisation and
keystream generation processes of the Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream
Cipher as outlined in Chapter 5.
Reverse Direction
This approach considers the inverse of the state update function, F−1, where F
denotes the state update function. If a state is given at time t, then the reverse
direction investigation examines the number of pre-images of this state at time
t − 1 (or more generally, t − α) as shown in Figure 2.11b. If the state update
function is one-to-one then there is only one pre-image for each state. If it is not
one-to-one then there could be none, one or multiple pre-images for some states.
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This approach is used to examine state convergence in the A5/1 stream cipher
in Chapter 3.
The theoretical analysis of state convergence contributes to determine the
relationship between the multiple states that result in the same state after α
iterations. Based on this relationship between these multiple states, it is possible
in some ciphers to identify the relationship between multiple key-IV pairs that
result in the same initial state (and same keystream). This analysis leads to
investigate the consequences of state convergence as shown later.
Internal state1
Internal state2
Internal state
Clock
Forward direction
Forwa
rd dir
ection
time = t+1
time = t
(a) Forward direction
Internal state1
Internal state2
Internal state
Clock
Reverse direction
Reve
rse di
rectio
n
time = t-1
time = t
(b) Reverse direction
Figure 2.11: Two states converge to one state
Experimental Work
Experimental work may be performed to investigate state convergence using
computer simulation for either the forward or reverse clocking. In most cases,
exploration of the entire state space or key-IV space is not feasible. Experimental
simulation gives an estimation of the number of distinct internal states for the
target cipher after a number of iterations (or distinct keystream sequences).
Simulation is performed using either randomly selected inputs to the real cipher
or exhaustive search over inputs of a scaled down version of the target stream
cipher.
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Simulation using the random inputs to the real ciphers requires a large ran-
dom number of inputs. For example, this approach has been used for 108 random
states of A5/1 to compute the number of distinct initial states obtainable after
100 iterations during the diffusion phase in [24] using the forward direction. Also,
it has been used previously in the reverse direction for 220 random states of the
MICKEY stream cipher, in [65].
The scaled down version of a cipher must represent most of the features and
properties of the target stream cipher. In this approach an exhaustive search
over all possible key-IV pairs is performed. This approach has been used for a
scaled version of the A5/1 stream cipher in [2].
Consequences of State Convergence
With respect to the key and IV used with the stream ciphers, there are three
cases of state convergence that can occur. These are as follows:
Case 1 Two input pairs have the same secret key but different IVs. During
initialisation sate convergence occurs and the pairs (K, IV) and (K, IV′)
produce the same initial state and consequently the same keystream.
Case 2 Two input pairs have different secret keys and different IVs. During
initialisation sate convergence occurs and the pairs (K, IV) and (K ′, IV′)
produce the same initial state and consequently the same keystream.
Case 3 Two input pairs have different secret keys but the same IV. During
initialisation sate convergence occurs and the pairs (K, IV) and (K ′, IV)
produce the same initial state and consequently the same keystream.
For an attacker the most beneficial of these is Case 1. The situation described
in Case 1 can occur between separate frames of a single message, particularly
on a frame based channel, where the same secret key is used with multiple IVs
in a communication between two parties. For practical attacks on synchronous
stream ciphers, Case 1 is the most important flaw, as it may leak information
about the secret key.
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2.7.3 Slid Pairs and Shifted Keystream
The slide attacks are known-plaintext attacks against iterative ciphers in
which successive iterations of the state update function are identical. This prop-
erty means that the applicability of this attack is independent of the number of
iterations used. This generic attack was specified for block ciphers by Biryukov
and Wagner in 1999 [25] and 2000 [26]. The attack is based on the related key
attack, which was introduced by Biham in 1994 [18]. The first step in this di-
rection of attack was by Grossman and Tuckerman in 1978 [56]. Slide attacks
have also been applied to stream ciphers that are based on block ciphers such
as LEX [106] and WAKE-ROFB [25] and more recently to other stream ciphers,
such as Grain [42, 73, 108] and Trivium [86]. In the stream ciphers’ application,
slide attacks are sometimes revered to as slid pairs attacks, resynchronisation
attacks [73,106] or related key chosen IV attacks [76].
In the case of stream ciphers, during initialisation a key-IV pair is loaded
into an internal state, to form a loaded state. The state is then updated for α
iteration(s) during the diffusion phase of the initialisation process. The state
update function of the initialisation process defines a cycle of transitions of the
internal state. Therefore, some (K, IV) pair represents a point on such a cycle.
If a state that is obtained from this process can also be obtained as a loaded
state for another key-IV pair then the two loaded states form a slid pair that are
in the same cycle. Consequently, different key-IV pairs can be found for stream
ciphers that sometimes produce phase shifted keystream [25,42,73,86,108], since
stream ciphers use finite state machines (with predefined state update functions)
to perform the initialisation and keystream generation processes.
Figure 2.12 illustrates the initialisation and keystream generation processes
resulting in two keystream sequences shifted by α bit(s). The relationship be-
tween the two keystreams z and z′ is given by Equation 2.4.
(K, IV) =⇒ z (2.4)
(K ′, IV′) =⇒ z′, where z′ = z   · α
where  is a positive constant that depends on the design of the output function
of the stream cipher. For bit based stream cipher,  = 1.
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Figure 2.12: Slid pairs and stream ciphers
The probability of obtaining a slid pair that results in a correspondingly
shifted keystream depends on three probabilities; P1, P2 and P3. These are as
follows. The probability of getting a legitimate loaded state with (K ′, IV′) pair
after α iterations of the initialisation process is P1. To obtain a shifted version of
the keystream from a given slid pair, the state updates for the final t2− (t1 +α)
clocks of diffusion phase with (K, IV) must give the same result as the first
t2 − (t1 + α) clocks with (K ′, IV′) with probability of P2. Likewise, the state
updates of the initialisation process of the last α iterations for the (K ′, IV′)
should be same as the state update function during the keystream generation
process for (K, IV) with probability of P3. Therefore, the total probability for
obtaining shifted keystream from a randomly chosen key-IV is the product of
these three probabilities, as shown in Figure 2.12. For most stream ciphers,
P2 = 1.
When a key-IV pair (K ′, IV′) produces a loaded state that can also be ob-
tained from another key-IV pair (K, IV) after a number of iterations α of the
initialisation state update function, we refer to these two states as a slid pair.
The keystream generated by the pair (K ′, IV′) may then be a phase-shifted ver-
sion of the keystream generated by (K, IV), shifted by  · α bits. This occurs
when the following properties hold for the initialisation process and key stream
generation:
a) Iterations of the initialisation process are the same as each other.
b) Iterations of the keystream generation process are the same as each other.
c) State update functions for both the initialisation and keystream generation
processes have a degree of similarity with one another.
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Most stream ciphers follow the (a) and (b) conditions above, but there is
a wide variety in the extent to which condition (c) applies. Slid pairs can be
expressed as (K, IV), (K ′, IV′), α}, where (K, IV) is a key-IV pair that pro-
duces another loaded state with key-IV pair (K ′, IV′) after α iterations of the
initialisation state update function.
2.7.4 Analysis of Slid Pairs and Shifted Keystream
Slid pairs may occur in stream ciphers. This can be investigated by exploring
the state update function using the forward or reverse directions as shown in
Figure 2.13.
Forward Direction:
For a given loaded state, the state update function is clocked (in the forward
direction) until the internal state is in the format required for a loaded state.
This new loaded state is generated after applying the clocking mechanism for
α ≥ 1 clock. If this occurs, the clocking for both loaded states must be further
examined to determine whether they give a shifted keystream. This type of
analysis should consider the similarity between the state update functions for
both the initialisation and keystream generation processes.
Reverse Direction:
In this analysis a bit shifted version of a keystream (shifted by one or more bits)
is given. Then the task is to clock the cipher in reverse direction to investigate
the corresponding loaded state. If the obtained state is a legitimate loaded state,
then the two pairs are slid pairs.
The theoretical analysis of slid pairs reveals the relationship between the
multiple key-IV pairs that generate slid pairs with a difference of α clocks (it-
erations). So, based on this analysis of slid pairs and shifted keystreams, it is
possible to identify the relationship between these multiple key-IV pairs that
result in shifted keystreams. This analysis leads to an investigation into the
consequences of slid pairs as outlined later.
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Experimental Work
The experimental work requires computer simulation for the initialisation and
keystream generation processes in either the forward or reverse clocking direction.
In most cases, simulation of the entire state space or key-IV space is not feasible.
Therefore, simulation can be applied using a large number of randomly selected
key-IV pairs. Experimental simulation gives a probabilistic estimation of the
actual number of slid pairs and shifted keystreams.
Consequences of of Slid Pairs
Slid pairs can be used as the basis of an attack on some stream ciphers. Similar
to the conditions for state convergence, there are three possible cases of key-IV
combinations that produce slid pairs in stream ciphers as follows:
Case 1 Two input pairs which have the same secret key but different IVs pro-
duce out-of-phase keystream sequences. That is (K, IV) and (K, IV′)
produce z and z′, respectively.
Case 2 Two input pairs which have different secret keys and different IVs pro-
duce out-of-phase keystream sequences. That is (K, IV) and (K ′, IV′)
produce z and z′, respectively.
Case 3 Two input pairs which have different secret keys but the same IV pro-
duce out-of-phase keystream sequences. That is (K, IV) and (K ′, IV)
produce z and z′, respectively.
where z′ = z  ·α, for some positive number  and α is the number of iterations
between the loaded states in the slid pairs.
Whenever slid pairs generate shifted keystream, the corresponding ciphertexts
can be combined to reveal some of the message content; for example, consider
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messages m1 and m2 where m1 is encrypted using z and a second message m2 is
encrypted using z′ to give encrypted frames, f1 and f2 respectively. Then:
(f1   · α)⊕ f2 = (m1   · α)⊕m2
As shown in [40], it is possible to attack an XOR combination of the form
(m1  α)⊕m2 using the redundancy of the plaintext. Furthermore, when this
occurs for Case 1 (same secret key with different IVs) this may leak information
about the common secret key. This is the case for A5/1 cipher, as shown in
Section 3.3. From a cryptographic perspective, Case 1 is the most important
flaw for attackers, because this situation can occur between separate frames of
a single message on a frame based channel such as GSM, where the same secret
key is used for each frame in a communication with different IV’s.
2.7.5 Weak Key-IV Combinations
For some stream ciphers, certain key-IV pairs may lead to internal states in
which one or more of the component registers have all zero contents. It may
lead to constant or distinguishable keystream as will be shown for A5/1. If this
occurs at the end of the initialisation process and the component is autonomous
during the keystream generation, then the component may remain in an all-zero
state. Then the complexity of keystream generation is effectively reduced. This
may in turn lead to serious security flaws. Such key-IV pairs are known as weak
key-IV pairs. This phenomenon has previously been observed in Grain v0, v1
and 128 [108] and we will consider it in Chapter 3 for the A5/1 cipher.
2.7.6 Analysis of Weak Key-IV Pairs
Weak key-IV pairs may occur in stream ciphers due to the impact of external
inputs or feedbacks to a shift register. This can be investigated by exploring the
influence of the external inputs using the forward or reverse directions.
Forward Direction
For a given loaded state, the state update function is clocked forward until the
external input is completed (where there is no more external input). This inves-
tigation may end in a state where one or more registers contain all-zero values.
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This result may be at the end of the loading phase or diffusion phase of the
initialisation process. If a key-IV pair results in one or more registers containing
all-zero values, then this key-IV pair can be considered as a weak pair.
Reverse Direction
Analysis in the reverse direction, either a loaded state or initial state is specified
with one or more registers containing all-zero values. Then the task is to perform
reverse clocking for the total number of iterations to obtain the candidate key and
IV. If the candidate key and IV are correct, the loaded state format is obtained.
Then the key-IV can be considered as a weak pair.
The theoretical analysis of weak key-IV combination results in the identifica-
tion of the relationship between secret key bits and IV bits that generate one or
more components of a cipher containing all-zero values. Based on this relation-
ship between the key and IV bits, it is possible in some ciphers to distinguish
keystreams produced from weak key-IV pairs and can be attacked. This analysis
leads to investigate the consequences of weak key-IV pairs as discussed later.
Experimental Work
As discussed for the previous flaws, the experimental work requires computer
simulation related to both forward and reverse clocking direction. This can be
performed using a number of random inputs, or a scaled down version of the real
cipher. Such simulations will result in the estimation of the probability of weak
key-IV pairs that result in one or more registers containing all-zero values.
Consequences of Weak Key-IV Pairs
Any change in the properties of the keystream may leave the keystream vulner-
able to some attacks, such as guess and determine attacks. This keystream is
considered a weak keystream sequence. Weak key-IV pairs result in an initial
state that produces a weak keystream sequence: one that is distinguished easily,
it can be attacked with low complexity. This may reveal some or all of the secret
key bits.
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2.8 Existing Attacks on Initialisation Processes
This section presents some existing analysis of the initialisation processes stream
ciphers described in Section 2.4. Some of these analyses or flaws are used with
other generic attacks such as Time-Memory-Data Trade-off attacks. This section
presents some examples that have been reported in the literature. Some of these
examples show serious security attacks and flaws, and others demonstrate an
undesirable feature in the initialisation process, but cannot be considered as
serious attacks.
2.8.1 RC4 Analysis
Mantin and Shamir [79] discussed some statistical weaknesses of RC4 using the
second output byte of the RC4 system. The second output word of RC4 is
biased to have a value 0 with an approximate probability of N = 2n−1 and the
probability is 1/128 for n = 8. Denoting the first permutation or round during
the pseudo random generator algorithm (PRGA) of S[x] as S0[x], then they
show that if the S0[2] = 0 and S0[1] 6= 2, then the second output byte is 0 with
a probability of 1. The authors advise that, for future implementation of RC4
the first two output words be discarded and they recommend discarding the first
N output words for more security. Later, Klein proved that an attack will work
even if the first 256 bytes of the secret key stream are not used [72].
Fluhrer et al. [52] presented several weaknesses in the key scheduling algo-
rithm (KSA) of RC4. From a small known number of secret key bits, a large
number of states and output bits can be recovered. Therefore, RC4 has an un-
acceptable property in that these weak secret keys affect a large number of the
output bits. Furthermore, a high correlation between some bits of the secret key
and some bits of the output stream illustrates the propagation of a weak part of
the key to some part of the output.
Another weakness related to the initialisation processes of some applications
of RC4 [52] is when a secret key and initialisation vector (IV) are concatenated
and used as a secret key for the RC4 stream cipher in a wired equivalent privacy
(WEP) application. If an attacker can obtain the first word output corresponding
to each IV, then the attacker can construct the secret key. Finally, Fluhrer et
al. [52] stated that the RC4 is completely broken and it is not secure in most
operation modes.
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Based on the weaknesses that have been reported by Fluhrer et al. [52],
Stubblefield et al. [99] tried to capture real encrypted packets to apply the attack.
They claimed that they were able to recover the 128-bit secret key of RC4 that
is used to protect a network (WEP application). Based on [52], Mantin [78]
achieves a practical recovery attack of secret key and IV on RC4 stream cipher
using fault injection, where the IV is concatenated with the secret key to generate
the keystream for WEP application.
2.8.2 Trivium Analysis
For Trivium, the same state update function is used during both the initialisation
and keystream generation processes. This function is invertible. Therefore, if an
attacker can obtain the internal state at any time point, then the state update
function can be inverted and the generator clocked back until the loaded state is
obtained. The secret key can be directly extracted from the loaded state. This
property implies that the state recovery attacks on Trivium are also key recovery
attacks. As De Canniere and Preneel [43] report, there is not currently an attack
which obtains the internal state from the keystream.
Hojs´ık and Rudolf [63] applied differential fault analysis to the Trivium stream
cipher. Based on the chosen-chiphertext attack scenario, they supposed that an
attacker can alter a random bit in the internal state to observe the difference in
the keystream. Each bit fault in the internal state reveals a number of equations
that can be solved. They showed that an injection of 43 bits in random position
of the internal state can disclose the content of the internal state, and then the
secret key can be obtained, as outlined above.
In an improvement to the previous work, Hojs´ık and Rudolf [64] applied the
floating model for Trivium to transform the polynomial equations to linear equa-
tions. They found that an attack requires 3.2 one-bit fault injections on average
to recover the internal state using 800 keystream bits. In the best scenario, 2
one-bit fault injections are enough to reconstruct the internal state, and conse-
quently to obtain the secret key. They claim that if they inject 5 bits, they can
reveal the internal state with a probability of success equal to one.
Priemuth-Schmid and Biryukov [86] investigated slid pairs for Trivium, and
found that for a key-IV pair, (K, IV), there exists a related (K ′, IV′) pair which
generates a 111-bit shifted keystream, for more than 239 key-IV pairs. They
found slid pairs and solved the system of equations for 111, 112, 113, 114 and
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115-bit shifted keystreams. (The Trivium padding pattern used in the loading
phase ensures a slid pair may not occur until after 111 clocks.) To find the slid
pairs, they generated a system of equations in terms of the key and IV variables.
This system of equations is solved by guessing some variables and then checking
the solutions.
2.8.3 Grain Analysis
Kuc¸uk [73] demonstrated a weakness of the Grain stream cipher by applying a
slide attack on Grain 1.0 (Grain with secret key size 80) and called it a slide
resynchronization attack. For any key-IV pair (K, IV) there exists a related
(K ′, IV′) pair which generates a 1-bit shifted keystream with probability of 2−2.
The similarities of the state update functions of initialisation and keystream
generation processes showed a weakness in the initialisation process. As Kuc¸uk
mentioned, this attack does not achieve an efficient key recovery attack for Grain
1.0; it may need more research to recover the secret key. The attack is based on
the construction of Grain 1.0 as follows. Firstly, the initialisation process and
keystream generator are similar to each other. Secondly, the initialisation process
is similar to the keystream generation, except the output of the initialisation
process is fed back and XORed to the input of both the LFSR and NFSR. This
paper shows that the internal state of the LFSR and NFSR after one clock will be
equal to the previous states with a shift of one bit for both the LFSR and NFSR
if b1600 ⊕h(x) = 0, where b1600 is content of b0 of the NFSR after 160 clocking steps
of the initialisation process and h(x) is the value of the output function at the
same clocking steps (160) .
Lee et al [76] extended the work of Kuc¸uk [73] to attack Grain v1 and Grain-
128. This attack is performed for secret key recovery with 222.59 chosen IVs,
226.29 keystream and complexity of 222.90 for Grain v1. For Grain-128, the secret
key recovery attack requires 226.59 chosen IVs, 231.39 keystream and complexity
of 227.01.
De Cannie`re et al [42] reported a general form of the probability of slid pairs
for Grain stream cipher for a key-IV pair, (K, IV), there exists a related (K ′, IV′)
pair which generates an n-bit shifted keystream with probability of 2−2n. They
analysed Grain 1.0 using a generic differential attack. This analysis recovers one
key in 29 keys using two related keys and 255 chosen IV pairs.
Zhang and Wang [108] demonstrated some sliding weak key-IV combination
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that apply to Grain v0 [58], Grain v1 [59] and Grain-128 [60]. They define
weak key-IVs, that result in zeros for all the stages of the LFSR, during the
initialisation process. A reverse direction is used during the initialisation process
to examine the existence of weak key-IVs. The process starts from the initial
state (with LFSR contains zeros) and clocks backward using a specific algorithm
(it is called Algorithm 1) to find the loaded state at time t = 0. They used the
weak key-IVs to perform a distinguishing attack using 264, 264 and 296 weak key-
IVs, with 212.6, 244.2 and 286 keystream bits, and 215.8, 247.5 and 2104.2 operation,
respectively for Grain v0, Grain v1 and Grain-128. Then, they apply algebraic
attack with weak key IVs to recover the secret key for all of Grain v0, Grain v1
and Grain-128.
Bjørstad [27] uses Time-Memory/Data Trade-Off (TMTO) to attack Grain
with an internal state of 160 bits and secret key size of 80 bits. Due to this choice
of state size and key size, it is infeasible to apply the standard time-memory trade-
off directly to Grain v1. Firstly, Grain has a large complexity resistance against
TMTO and the computation complexity is not lower than the exhaustive search
O(280). Bjørstad incorporates the advantages of both the Biryukov, Shamir and
Wagner (BSW) [24] sampling and the properties of output function h(·). The
nonlinear function h(·) is computed and masked with seven bits from the NFSR.
The paper utilizes the distance between the two masking bits of the NFSR,
which are ni+10 and ni+31, to derive that the sampling resistance of Grain is
2−18. It shows that the TMTO recovers the state of Grain v1 in online time
and memory complexity O(271), precomputation complexity O(2106.5) and used
known keystream complexity O(253.5). These results show the precomputation
complexity is greater than the exhaustive secret key search complexity; however,
the complexity of the online computation is less than the complexity of the
exhaustive search.
Banik et al [10] reported some results on the related key-IV pairs (slid pairs)
on Grain v1 [59], Grain-128 [60] and Grain-128a [1]. They reported an algorithm
to find a related key-IV pair (K ′, IV′) given a key-IV pair (K, IV).
There are two recent papers: the first paper by Ding and Guan [45] has
shown a related key attack on Grain-128a [1]. Their result requires a complexity
of 296.322, 296 chosen IVs and 2103.613 keystream bits. As they reported, the
probability of success of this attack is 0.632. In a second paper by Banik et
al [11] demonstrated slid pairs in Grain-128a, which may occur after 32 clocks,
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which is expected, where the padding is all ones except one bit is zero. They
presented a key recovery attack with γ · 232 related keys and γ · 264 chosen IVs
to generate 32 · γ nonlinear equations, where γ can be estimated to be 28.
2.8.4 Dragon Analysis
The initialisation process and keystream generation use the F function with S-
boxes, H and G functions for ease of implementation, efficiency and high nonlin-
earity. Dragon has an internal state space of 1088 bits (which is the combination
of 1024-bit internal state and 64-bit memory) for high security [32, 39]. The
expected upper bound of the period is 2512+64 = 2576 and the lower bound is
264. The maximum interval of the keystream before rekeying is 264. Therefore,
Dragon’s design prevents collision attacks [32,39] as mentioned by the authors.
From the F function and its components, during the initialisation process,
four words from the output of the F function updates the internal state, and
two words form the memory value. During keystream generation, two words are
used to produce a 64-bit word of keystream. The F function using H and G
functions with 16 iterations gives high diffusion and prevents high probability of
differentials. [32, 39].
The size of the internal state is larger than double the secret key size; hence,
the TMTO is infeasible [49]. Dragon has been designed with consideration given
to the initialisation process. It uses a secret key with different IVs producing
different keystreams using 16 rounds and the nonlinear function F .
Since the F function is used during the initialisation and keystream generation
processes, there is a number of studies that tried to linearise the F function.
These studies tried to distinguish the Dragon stream cipher [33, 34, 49]. This is
the only analysis that is related to the initialisation process of Dragon stream
cipher. It is an attractive area for future work.
2.8.5 MICKEY Analysis
Hong and Kim reported a state entropy loss in the MICKEY v1 stream cipher
which is state convergence [65]. They report that the state update function is not
one-to-one and experimented with 220 randomly chosen states (which is based
on the C-language rand()) to find only about 70.63% have pre-images after one
clock. So, after one clock, there may be zero, one, two or four pre-images for any
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state. They did the examination for two consecutive clocks and they found that
about 56.17% have pre-image after two clocks.
Helleseth et al [61] continued the work of Hong and Kim [65] on MICKEY
v2 [8] and MICKEY-128 v2 [7] and examined the existence of slid pairs in
MICKEY v2. They performed reverse clocking to MICKEY v2 and MICKEY-
128 v2 to calculate the number of backward states for 0 to 15 clocks. They
demonstrated two key-IV pairs that generate shifted keystreams (shifted by 1
bit). Based on this analysis, they presented two scenarios of attack based on
some assumptions. For more details see [61].
2.8.6 LILI-II Analysis
Biham and Dunkelman [20] reported minor multiple Key-IV pairs result in one
loaded state during the loading phase in the initialisation process (which is Key-
IV compression). The operation of the loading phase is only XORing the secret
key and the IV as specified previously to produce the loaded state of the two
registers LFSRd and LFSRc, which is pure linear function. Based on this loading
process, Biham and Dunkelman [20] noted that if two key-IV pairs (K, IV) and
(K ′, IV′) that satisfy the relationship K⊕K ′ = IV⊕ IV′ = {1}128, then these two
key-IV pairs will produce the same loaded state for registers LFSRd and LFSRc
and consequently will result in the same keystream. Recently, Teo [100] reported
that state convergence does not exist in the LILI family of stream ciphers.
2.9 Tools
This section describes the tools used to implement the stream ciphers and to
investigate the flaws discussed in Section 2.7. In this thesis both the C program-
ming language and MAGMA software package are used as tools for computer
simulation and exploration.
C Programming Language
C programming or C-code is a computer language that is used to implement
many stream ciphers, such as the ciphers that were submitted to eSTREAM
project [50] and NESSIE project [68]. In this research, we make use of the
software implementations published by the authors of these ciphers. Additional
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software in C has been created for simulation and analysis to identify and demon-
strate particular flaws.
Analysis of the flaws may require specific inputs to the stream cipher, or
to some components, to study the impact on the internal state or keystream
sequence. Therefore, we have adapted some codes to enable examination of
specific key-IV pairs or internal states. This adaptation does not change the main
function or purpose of the stream cipher algorithm. Computer simulation is also
used for statistical analyses as a technique to study or monitor the behaviour of
the analysed ciphers under varying conditions.
MAGMA Package
Another tool that is used in this research is a computer algebra system known
as MAGMA [28]. MAGMA is a powerful tool for implementing the ciphers, gen-
erating systems of equations and solving the system of equations. As part of the
process of investigation, the computer simulations using the MAGMA computa-
tional algebra system require the support of the High Performance Computing
(HPC) facility at QUT due to the resources required to perform the computer
simulations.
2.10 Summary
Recently, specification of the initialisation process has became an essential part of
any stream cipher design. During the eSTREAM project, one of the requirements
for stream cipher submission is that the use of the IV as essential input to the
cipher [50]. In contrast, there are some traditional stream ciphers that include
initial value (IV) and initialisation process as part of the keystream generator
such as A5/1 and CSA-SC stream ciphers.
Initialisation process can introduce significant problems in stream cipher ap-
plications. This process may leak some information or be exploited by attackers.
It may make stream ciphers vulnerable by revealing some information about the
secret key. From the literature review, it is clear that the initialisation process
of stream ciphers have not yet been thoroughly studied. It is desirable to have a
secure and efficient initialisation process that resist at least the known attacks.
The initialisation process should possess desirable properties that make them
simultaneously secure and efficient.
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As mentioned above, there are three stream ciphers for which the initialisation
process will be discussed, and analysed in later chapters, as follows: Chapter 3
investigates the initialisation process of A5/1 stream cipher. Chapter 4 analyses
the initialisation process of Sfinks stream cipher. Chapter 5 considers the initial-
isation process of the Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSA-SC).
Following that, Chapter 6 provides recommendations for the initialisation pro-
cess based on the three cases and previous analyses of initialisation processes of
stream ciphers.
Chapter 3
Analysis of A5/1 Stream Cipher
Initialisation Process
The privacy of mobile telephone communications is protected by the A5/1 stream
cipher. A5/1 is used by about 130 million customers in Europe. A general
structure of A5/1 was leaked in 1994 and the exact design was revealed in 1999,
when it was reverse engineered by Briceno [30]. Therefore, A5/1 has received
the attention of cryptographers and has been analysed in several papers such
as [12,19,24,53–55] but mainly looking at keystream generation rather than the
initialisation process.
A5/1 stream cipher is a bit-based cipher that takes a 64-bit secret key and
22-bit IV (frame number) as inputs into a 64-bit internal state (in three shift
registers). Each telephone conversation uses one secret key with multiple IVs.
Each IV is used to generate a 228-bit keystream. Then the initialisation process
(rekeying) is repeated with another IV to generate another 228-bit keystream
sequence. The telephone converstion is sent as a sequence of frames every 4.6
milliseconds. Each frame (228-bit keystream) represents the communication be-
tween two parties A and B, so each keystream frame consistes of 114 bits to
communicate from A to B and another 114 bits to communicate from B to A.
In Section 2.7, some aspects of the security flaws of initialisation process for
stream ciphers have been demonstrated theoretically. This chapter investigates
these flaws in A5/1; a cipher which uses a linear state update function during
loading phase and the same nonlinear state update function for both diffusion
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phase and keystream generation. The output function as well is a purely linear
function, namely the XOR function. The nonlinearity of the keystream is de-
rived from the nonlinear state update function during the diffusion phase and
keystream generation.
The initialisation process of A5/1 [30] is analysed with respect to the occur-
rence of the following problems: State convergence, slid pairs and weak key-IV
pairs. The results of these investigations are presented. Although some of these
problems also occur during keystream generation, the keystream generation pro-
cess is beyond the scope of this research.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the specification of
A5/1 and its initialisation process. Section 3.2 presents the analysis of the state
convergence during the initialisation process of A5/1. Section 3.3 shows the slid
pairs and synchronisation attacks in the A5/1 and presents results and examples
to support the theoretical analysis. Weak key-IV pairs are described with details
in Section 3.4. This chapter is summarised in Section 3.5 and presents the
security impact of this analysis.
3.1 Specification of A5/1 Stream Cipher
A5/1 [24, 30, 54] is a bit based stream cipher which uses three binary feedback
shift registers, denoted A, B and C, with lengths of 19, 22 and 23 bits respec-
tively, giving a state size of 64 bits. Each shift register has a primitive feedback
polynomial. Let S denote the internal state of A5/1 and let SA, SB and SC
denote the internal states for each register A, B and C, respectively. Let sia,t
denote the content of ith stage of register A at time t, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 18, sib,t denote
the content of ith stage of register B at time t, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 21 and sic,t denote the
content of ith stage of register C at time t, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 22.
A secret key of 64 bits is used for all frames in a given conversation, and a
22-bit frame number is used as the IV for each frame. Let ki denote the secret
key bit for 0 ≤ i ≤ 63 and vi denote the IV bit for 0 ≤ i ≤ 21. The three registers
are regularly clocked during loading of the key and IV (frame number), while a
majority clocking mechanism is used for the diffusion phase and for keystream
generation. The use of majority clocking implicitly introduces nonlinearity to
the keystream sequence. This is the only nonlinear operation performed.
To implement the majority clocking scheme, each register has a clocking tap:
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stages s8a,t, s
10
b,t and s
10
c,t. The contents of these stages determine which registers
will be clocked for the next iteration at time (t + 1): those registers for which
the clock control bits agree with the majority value are clocked. For example, if
s8a,t = 0, s
10
b,t = 1 and s
10
c,t = 0, then the majority value is 0 and registers A and
C are clocked at time (t + 1). Thus, either two or three registers are clocked
at each step. Overall, each register is clocked with probability of 3
4
. Figure 3.1
shows a pictorial diagram of the A5/1 stream cipher, with the clocking taps and
feedback functions indicated for each register.
Clocking tap
Clocking tap
Clocking tap
Register  A
Register  B
Register  C
Figure 3.1: A5/1 stream cipher
3.1.1 Initialisation Process
The initialisation process transfers the 64-bit secret key and 22-bit frame
number (IV) into the internal state and performs 100 iterations to produce the 64-
bit initial register state. Once this initial state is obtained, keystream generation
can begin. The initialisation process is performed in two phases, which we refer
to as loading and diffusion phases.
Loading Phase
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At the beginning, all stages of the three registers are set to zero. Each linear
feedback shift register is regularly clocked 64 times as each key bit, ki, is XORed
with the register feedback to form the new value of stages s0a, s
0
b and s
0
c . Following
this, each register is regularly clocked 22 times as the IV is loaded in the same
manner [24]. At the end of the loading phase, the registers are in the loaded
state. Note that the state update function during the loading phase is entirely
linear. That is, the contents of each stage in each register are independent linear
combinations of key and IV bits.
Diffusion Phase
The diffusion phase involves performing 100 iterations of the initialisation
state update function using the majority clocking scheme. At the end of diffusion
phase the cipher is in its initial state and is ready for keystream generation.
3.1.2 Keystream Generation
Keystream generation comprises 228 iterations using the same majority clock-
ing rule used during the diffusion phase. In each iteration, the keystream bit is
obtained by XORing the output bit of the three registers zt = s
18
a,t ⊕ s21b,t ⊕ s22c,t.
The analysis of the A5/1 stream cipher is based on the behaviour of the
majority clocking schema. The following sections show three cryptographic flaws
in the initialisation process of the A5/1.
3.2 State Convergence
The A5/1 stream cipher has a 64-bit internal state and uses a 64-bit secret
key and a 22-bit IV to form a loaded state. So, there are 264 possible internal
states. Since the loading phase is linear, it is clear that each loaded state can be
obtained from multiple key-IV pairs.
As the total size of the secret key and IV for A5/1 (64+22 = 86 bits) exceeds
the 64 bit state size, a degree of key-IV space reduction occurs during the loading
phase of initialisation. In fact, as the state-update function is linear during the
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clock
Figure 3.2: A5/1 pre-image of Golic´’s cases
loading phase, it can be shown that there are 222 key-IV pairs corresponding
to each possible loaded state. In addition to this issue, state convergence also
occurs during the diffusion phase and keystream generation process.
3.2.1 Previous Analysis
Few previous analyses of A5/1 focussed specifically on the effect of state con-
vergence during initialisation. Two papers that deal with this topic as part
of a broader analysis are Golic´ [55] (based on [54]) and Biryukov, Shamir and
Wagner [24].
Golic´ [55] considered the inverse mapping for the majority clocking function
and identified some states with no pre-image and which therefore cannot be
reached from any loaded state in a single iteration. He demonstrated that these
states comprise 3
8
of the loaded states of the system. Thus, the usable state
space shrinks by a factor of 5
8
(from 264 to 5× 261 ≈ 263.32) at the first iteration
of the diffusion phase. Golic´ also identified some states with unique pre-images
and others with up to four pre-image states. Figure 3.2 presents a graphical
summary of the six cases identified by Golic´. In this figure, (Ri, Rj, Rk) is any
permutation of the set {A,B,C} of registers and the shaded stage in each register
is its clocking tap. The symbol × represents either 0 or 1, while # represents the
complement of ×; a blank square represents a bit which can take either value.
The proportion of loaded states for each case in Figure 3.2 is presented in
Table 3.1, along with the corresponding number of pre-images. Note that the
case identified as (i) cannot be clocked back to any valid state. That is, states
of this form cannot be reached after the first iteration of the initialisation state
update function.
Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner [24] also provide convergence estimates when
exploring the efficiency of their attack. They report that, of 108 randomly chosen
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Table 3.1: Proportions of states in each of Golic´’s cases
Case (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Proportion of states 3
8
3
8
1
32
3
32
3
32
1
32
Number of pre-images 0 1 1 2 3 4
states, only about 15% can be clocked back 100 times. That is, 85% of states
could not be reached by a 100 iteration forward clocking process.
Alhamdan [2] performed an exhaustive experimental evaluation for a scaled-
down version of the A5/1 stream cipher with three LFSRs and a majority clocking
arrangement, but only a 15-bit internal state (LFSR lengths of 4, 5 and 6 bits
were used). This scaled-down version uses a 15-bit secret key and a 5-bit IV
(as frame number) and is loaded in the same as manner A5/1 with majority
clocking performed for 100 iterations during the diffusion phase. All possible
loaded states were used and the number of remaining distinct states for each
iteration in the diffusion phase was recorded. The first three lines in Table 3.2
show the summary of the three previous works; Golic´ [55], Biryukov, Shamir and
Wagner [24] (labelled as BSW) and Alhamdan [2]. The table also includes figure
for two other analyses that are discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Table 3.2: Comparison between the analysis of inaccessible states
Cumulative proportion of state reduction
No of clock 1 2 3 4 5 6 10 100
Golic´? [55] 0.375 - - - - - - -
BSW◦ [24] - - - - - - - 0.85
Alhamdan• [2] 0.375 0.422 0.439 - 0.466 - 0.524 0.81
KT? [71] 0.375 0.578 0.689 0.767 0.826 - - -
This work? 0.375 0.422 0.439 0.453 0.466 0.479 - 0.953
? Theoretical analysis
◦ based on 108 randomly simulated states
• Exhaustive search for a scaled-down version
3 based on exponential extrapolation
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3.2.2 Extension of Existing Work
In A5/1, nonlinear operations in the state-update function are introduced during
the diffusion phase via majority clocking. However, this majority clocking in-
troduces state convergence. Although this convergence continues into keystream
generation, in this research the focus is on the initialisation process only. As
noted above, this effect was reported by Golic´ [54,55] and quantified to some ex-
tent by Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner [24]. This research extends these results
to a larger number of iterations.
Golic´’s results demonstrate that the majority clocking process is not one-to-
one and that state convergence can occur in one iteration. This work extends
Golic´’s logic to identify the states which cannot be reached after each of the first
six iterations of the diffusion phase. It shows that state convergence continues
with each iteration, though not uniformly at each iteration, contrary to Golic´’s
assumptions [55]. Some of the inaccessible states we identified for multiple it-
erations are presented in Figure 3.3. This work will use the previous notations
(Ri, Rj, Rk) is any permutation of the set {A,B,C} of registers in Figure 3.1 and
the shaded stage in each register is its clocking tap. The symbol × represents
either 0 or 1, while # represents the complement of ×; a blank square represents
a bit which can take either value.
Now, the reasoning used to identify states that are inaccessible after two
iterations is sketched. The term “downstream” is referred to the stages in Fig-
ure 3.2 and 3.3 that are to the left of the clocking stages. By reversing the logic
of the majority clocking process, the following conditions apply when we invert
an iteration:
1. A state obtained by clocking a pair of registers must have the contents of
the stages immediately downstream of the clocking bit in these registers
identical in value to one another, and different in value from the clocking
bit of the third register.
2. A state obtained by clocking all three registers must have the contents of
the stages immediately downstream of the clocking tap identical in all three
registers.
For Figure 3.2, we note that Condition 1 applies to Case (ii), Condition 2 applies
to Case (iii), both conditions apply to cases (iv), (v) and (vi), but neither applies
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1 step (        ) 2 steps 3 steps
clock
Figure 3.3: Inaccessible states for various numbers of iterations (steps)
to Case (i). In cases (iv), (v) and (vi), Condition 1 applies to different numbers
of the three possible pairs of registers.
Applying this logic to the pattern labelled “2 steps” in Figure 3.3 shows that
such a state can arise only by clocking a combination of registers that includes
register Rk in Figure 3.3. But this implies that any previous state belongs to Case
(i) of Figure 3.2 (possibly with additional values specified among the clocking
bits). Since Case (i) cannot be reached by the first clocking step, this “2 steps”
state cannot be reached at the subsequent clocking step. (Note: it can, however,
be reached by the first clocking step, since Case (i) is a valid loaded state.)
This pattern is the only inaccessible pattern at this step. Any state which is
inaccessible after two iterations must clock back only to states that were inacces-
sible after the first step. So all such states must be contained in the image space
(under clocking) of Case (i) above. This image space can be found by completing
the unspecified values in Case (i) in all possible ways and applying the clocking
rule to each (see Figure 3.4a). When this is done, we find that many of the
image states are accessible, as they have multiple pre-images, some of which are
accessible (see Figure 3.4b for an example). If we discard these states and retain
those which can clock back only to Case (i), we find that the pattern presented
above is indeed the only new inaccessible pattern at the second step.
A similar process can be followed to identify inaccessible patterns after α
iterations. There is a branching tree of patterns for these inaccessible states: as
well as the two “3 step” patterns presented in Figure 3.3, there are five distinct
patterns at the fourth iteration, 17 at the fifth iteration and many more at each
subsequent iteration. Table 3.3 presents the cumulative proportion of inaccessible
states (out of all possible loaded states) after each of the first six iterations,
together with the corresponding proportion and number of accessible states.
The process that is used to identify inaccessible patterns for α = 2 iterations
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clock
pattern: image:
(a) Results of clocking Case (i) forwards
pre-images: image:
(b) Possible pre-images for one of these results
Figure 3.4: Determining inaccessible states at the second step
Table 3.3: Proportion of available states after α iterations
α (number of iterations) 1 2 3 4 5 6
new proportion 3
8
3
64
9
512
57
4096
423
32768
6453
524288inaccessible
cumulative proportion
0.375 0.422 0.439 0.453 0.466 0.479
inaccessible
proportion accessible 0.625 0.578 0.561 0.547 0.534 0.521
number of accessible
263.322 263.209 263.165 263.129 263.094 263.061
states
is to clock the inaccessible pattern (i) in Figure 3.2 by one clock forward. This
will result in four states, then examine these four states for which one cannot
be obtained from another accessible pre-image. The state that has only one pre-
image ended with pattern (i) of Figure 3.2 will be inaccessible state at this clock
α = 2. This process is applied for any number of α to determine the inaccessible
patterns. Figures 3.5a and 3.5b show the inaccessible patterns for α = 4 and 5
respectively.
The number and complexity of the patterns obtained so far indicates that
obtaining a general expression for the number of accessible states after a given
number of iterations is not a simple task for large values. Extrapolating from
the known values in Table 3.3 provides an approximation. Using an exponential
extrapolation based on the proportion of accessible states as reported above
for 2–6 iterations, we obtain an approximation of the proportion of accessible
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clock
(a) For α = 4
clock
(b) For α = 5
Figure 3.5: Inaccessible patterns
states after 100 iterations of around 5% of the number of loaded states. The
extrapolation is based on a linear regression fit to the logarithm of the proportion
accessible [4]. Figure 3.6 presents the exponential extrapolation for the 100 steps
and the actual results for 0–6.
As a result of the extended work, for small numbers of iterations, Alhamdan’s
work for scaled-down version of A5/1 [2] aligns very closely with those reported
for this work on the acutal A5/1 cipher. Table 3.2 shows a summary of the pre-
vious works and the current work. As reported by Alhamdan [2], the proportion
of distinct states after 100 iterations is 19.2% of the original loaded state. This
is close to the experimental result of Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner’s which is
15% [24]. Our extrapolation based on the results in Table 3.3 for the proportion
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Figure 3.6: Exponential extrapolation for the proportion of accessible states after
100 steps
of accessible states is 5%.
Another Recent Work
A recent paper by Kiselev and Tokareva [71] analysed the reduction of key space
during the state-update function of A5/1 for additional clocks. They reported
on the reduction of the key space over up to 8 clocks. They tried to extend
Golic´’s [55] work to determine the effective key space reduction in each of the
first 8 clocks. Their results are also reported in Table 3.2 (labelled as KT). Their
results for the number of inaccessible states after the first clock are consistent
with previously reported results, but the results for further clock steps do not
match the results presented above. Their results of further steps overestimate the
number of inaccessible states compared to the available results. This discrepancy
arises because these authors have assumed that any state accessible from the
first inaccessible state is also inaccessible, whereas many of these states can
actually be reached by clocking from other accessible states as well from the
inaccessible states. Thus, these authors have included many accessible states
in their claimed list of inaccessible states, for each clock step beyond the first
one. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.7, where state (a) is a sub-case of one
of Kiselev-Tokareva templates (the top left template of their Figure 4). This
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state can be obtained by clocking from the inaccessible state (b), as would be
expected from Kiselev-Tokareva construction. However, it can also be obtained
by clocking from the accessible state (c) (which corresponds to Figure 3.2 (v)).
Thus, state (a) is clearly accessible after 2 clocks and should not be counted in
their estimate of the number of inaccessible states after 2 clocks.
1 1
1 1
00 1
clock
(a) (b) (c)
11
11
10 0
11
11
00 1
Figure 3.7: Example of Kiselev and Tokareva’s template
3.3 Slid Pairs and Synchronisation Attacks
For stream ciphers, it is sometimes possible to find different key-IV pairs that
produce phase shifted keystream [42, 86, 108]. This is clearly the case for A5/1.
As the number of possible internal states is the same as the number of loaded
states, it is clear that any internal state obtained after any number of iterations
α, is also a legitimate loaded state. That is, for any key-IV pair and any α > 0,
it is always possible to find a second key-IV pair such that the loaded state from
the second pair can be obtained from the loaded state of the first pair by applying
α iterations of the (diffusion) state update function. That is, the loaded states
corresponding to these two key-IV pairs from a slid pair separated by α clocks.
Further, since the update functions during diffusion and keystream generation of
A5/1 are identical, this slid pair will always produce keystream sequences which
are out of phase by α bits.
Recall the operation of GSM system and A5/1 stream cipher, which use a sin-
gle secret key and up to 222 different IV’s for each conversation. The initialisation
process (rekeying process) is performed every 4.6 milliseconds with each initial
state then used to generate a 228-bit keystream. As noted in Section 2.7.3, slid
pairs can occur in three ways; the same secret key with distinct IVs, for distinct
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secret keys with distinct IVs, and for distinct secret keys with the same IV. For
a practical attack, the most important case is that with the same secret key and
multiple IVs, as this applies for a single conversation. Therefore, we restrict our
analysis to that; we look for slid pairs in which two loaded states were generated
from the same secret key but necessarily with different IV’s. From analysis of
this case, we show that it may be possible to perform a practical attack on A5/1
to determine the secret key used in encrypting the targeted conversation.
3.3.1 Analysis of Slid Pairs
During the Loading Phase
As the operation of the LFSRs during the loading phase is linear, it can easily be
represented in terms of matrix operations . An analysis of the matrices involved
then enables us to identify the conditions under which a slid pair can occur.
The autonomous operation of each LFSR can be described in terms of a
matrix equation [77] as follows. Suppose that the stages of the register are
denoted as s0, s1, . . . sd, the update coefficient are c0, c1, . . . cd and that the update
function can be represented as
s0t+1 = c0s
0
t ⊕ c1s1t ⊕ . . . cdsdt
sjt+1 = s
j−1
t 1 ≤ j ≤ d
Putting S = [s0 s1 . . . sd]ᵀ, the register update (clocking) operation can be
represented by the equivalent matrix equation
St+1 = TSt where T =

c0 c1 . . . . . . cd−1 cd
1 0 . . . . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . . . .
...
...
0 0 . . . . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . . . . 1 0

is the state transition matrix of the register.
During the loading of the key into the register, the register state update
function is given by
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St+1 = TSt ⊕ σkt (3.1)
where σ = [1 0 . . . 0]ᵀ indicates that the new key bit is XORed into the feedback
of the LFSR. If we take t = τ to indicate the register state before loading
commences and iterate this process several times, from t = τ to t = τ + l (where
l denotes the key length), we have
Sτ+1 = TSτ ⊕ σk0
Sτ+2 = T (TSτ ⊕ σk0)⊕ σk1 = T 2Sτ ⊕ Tσk0 ⊕ σk1
...
Sτ+l = T
lSτ ⊕ T l−1σk0 ⊕ T l−2σk1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Tσkl−2
⊕ σkl−1
= T lSτ ⊕NK
where N = [T l−1σ T l−2σ . . . Tσ σ] and K = [k0 k1 . . . kl−2 kl−1]ᵀ.
The above analysis can be extended easily to cases such as A5/1, which have
three LFSRs, by denoting the states of the three registers as SA, SB and SC ,
and their state transition matrices as TA, TB and TC , and defining the state
transition matrix of the combined system in matrix block form as
T =
 T
A 0 0
0 TB 0
0 0 TC
 acting on S =
 SASB
SC

Likewise, denoting the σ and N matrices of each register as σA, σB, σC and
NA, NB, NC , the combined σ and N matrices for the whole system can be
defined as
σ =
 σ
A
σB
σC
 and N =
 N
A
NB
NC

With these modifications, the equation above, Sτ+l = T
lSτ ⊕ NK, is also valid
for the combined system. Noting that Sτ = [0 0 . . . 0]
ᵀ for the registers of A5/1,
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this equation reduces to Sτ+l = NK.
A similar analysis can also be undertaken for loading the IV bits into the
LFSRs. For a 64-bit key and a 22-bit IV, we have
Sτ+64 = NK
Sτ+86 = T
22NK ⊕MV (3.2)
where M = [T 21σ T 20σ . . . Tσ σ] and V = [v0 v1 . . . v20 v21]
ᵀ.
During the Diffusion Phase
Now set τ = −86, so that S0 represents the loaded state of the system, and
consider the behaviour of A5/1 during the diffusion phase. During this phase,
the registers of A5/1 are clocked using a majority clocking rule, so for a single
iteration, there are four different cases to be considered. These are:
Case 1 All registers are clocked
Case 2 Registers A and B are clocked
Case 3 Registers A and C are clocked
Case 4 Registers B and C are clocked
For each of these cases, there will be a different state transition matrix (Tx
say) for the system, as follows:
for Case 1: Tx = T , as defined previously
for Case 2: Tx = Tab =
 T
A 0 0
0 TB 0
0 0 I

for Case 3: Tx = Tac =
 T
A 0 0
0 I 0
0 0 TC

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for Case 4: Tx = Tbc =
 I 0 00 TB 0
0 0 TC

Now suppose that we are looking for slid pairs with a slide distance of α = 1
in which both loaded states arise from the same secret key. We have
S1 = TxS0 with S0 = T
22NK ⊕MV
Now if S1 is also a loaded state for the same key K and different IV, V
′ , we
have
S1 = T
22NK ⊕MV ′
and hence
MV ⊕MV ′ = S0 ⊕ S1
or M∆ = (I ⊕ Tx)S0
= (I ⊕ Tx)(T 22NK ⊕MV ) (3.3)
where ∆ = V ⊕ V ′ = [δ0 δ1 . . . δ21]ᵀ.
For each of these cases, we can use Equation 3.3, together with the conditions
guaranteeing the relevant type of clocking, to determine a set of conditions on
the various bits of ∆, K and V that must be satisfied in order for a slid pair to
occur in the manner described above.
The state transition matrices form the new state contents of the three reg-
isters after α iteration(s) as shown by the following equations. There are 4
possible state transition matrices to transfer from the current state to the next
one. Therefore, the total number of possible state transition matrices from the
beginning of diffusion phase at t = 0 to the required number of iteration(s) α
can be determined as 22α.
For α = 1, M∆ = (Tx ⊕ I)S0
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where Tx can be T , Tab, Tac or Tbc for each of the four different cases respectively.
For α = 2, M∆ = (TxTy ⊕ I)S0 (3.4)
where each of the Tx and Ty can be T , Tab, Tac or Tbc, resulting in 16 cases
For α = 3, M∆ = (TxTyTz ⊕ I)S0
where each of the Tx, Ty and Tz can be T , Tab, Tac or Tbc, resulting in 64 cases
Equation 3.3 is analysed using Gaussian Elimination to find the conditions
mentioned above. We start with a matrix (M) with dimension (64 × 22) and a
vector (∆) of 22 elements in the left side and in the right side a matrix (T 22N ||M)
with dimension (64 × 86) and a vector (K||V ) of 86 elements. Gaussian Elimi-
nation is applied to the M matrix to determine the relationship between deltas
{δ0, δ1 . . . δ21} and the key-IV bits as shown in Appendix A.1. This is obtained
from the top 22 rows. This relationship forms the second IV′. The last 42 rows
are the bases of the conditions that are required to get slid pairs. It consists of
42 equations of 86 variables, with each equation equal to zero.
The following process was used to obtain the results presented below:
• Use MAGMA to generate the relationship between key bits and IV bits
(system of equations) that result in slid pairs and shifted keystreams, as
discussed above.
• Identify a single secret key and some of the corresponding IVs that result in
slid pairs and shifted keystream by 1 and 2 bits (can be applied for another
shifted bits)
• Use the A5/1 cipher to generate the keystreams using this secret key and
the corresponding IVs to demonstrate the practical shifted keystreams.
3.3.2 Result of Analysis
This section focuses on finding slid pairs of A5/1 for α = 1 and 2 only. The
analysis is performed by examining Equation 3.3 for each clocking case. For
each clocking case, we find slid pairs for the same secret key (where the secret
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key is fixed for both slid pairs) with different IV’s and describe the relationship
between the first IV and second IV′. This relationship is key dependent. In
addition, the secret key is expressed as a relationship between some key bits and
other bits from both the key and the first IV.
For α = 1
Keystream sequences shifted by one bit can be obtained from two different key-
IV pairs (same key with different IV’s). Based on the analysis of Equation 3.3
described above, Table 3.4 shows the number of key and IV bits that must be
specified to form a 64-bit secret key that results in 1-bit shifted keystream for
each of the four cases. Table 3.5 shows two examples of slid pairs (in hex) for
a secret key with two different IV’s that generate keystream sequences that are
shifted by one bit. Note: the bits {0} and {1} are the shifted bits (in binary)
between these two keystream sequences in each case. Note also that the final
byte of keystream only contains three or four bits, and that these are treated
as MSBs in each case. The keystream length is 228 bits and due to the one bit
shift, the two sequences contain a common 227-bit sequence.
Table 3.4: Slid pairs after 1 clock
cases 1 2 3 4
free key bits 20 22 21 20
Involved IV bits 4 22 22 22
Table 3.5: Two keystreams shifted by 1 bit generated from the same secret key
and different IVs
key 0x2D37B6F7292DFFFB
IV1 0x200000
IV2 0xE05A00
Keystream1 {0}0x5E449A6F3414F3CD76F567275D31CFE1A4F4AE4F4D3C954D3CB124D9A
Keystream2 0x5E449A6F3414F3CD76F567275D31CFE1A4F4AE4F4D3C954D3CB124D9A
key 0xF77832CC89EFFFFB
IV1 0x200000
IV2 0x4001A4
Keystream1 {1}0xF798818F32A6B4772F5B2E55B8808541301E49CA76B11BC46F65C1494
Keystream2 0xF798818F32A6B4772F5B2E55B8808541301E49CA76B11BC46F65C1494
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For Case 1, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 20 free key bits (k42, k44, k45,
k47 to k63) and 4 IV bits (v0, v3, v11 ⊕ v13). These 24 bits specify the remaining
44 key bits using the equation in Appendix A.1. The rest of the IV bits are free
to be chosen and do not affect the secret key. Therefore, by choosing all possible
values for the 20 free key bits and the 22 IV bits, the total number of slid pairs
for Case 1 is 242 and the probability that a randomly chosen key satisfies these
equations for a given IV is 2−44.
The total number of slid pairs in each of Cases 2, 3 and 4 can be calculated
similarly, and the total numbers of slid pairs are 244, 243 and 242 respectively.
Therefore, the total number of slid pairs after 1 clock (for the 4 cases combined) is
245. Likewise, the probability that a randomly chosen key satisfies the equations
for any of these cases (for a given IV) is found to be 2−41.
For α = 2
Keystream sequences that are shifted by two bits can again be obtained from
two different key-IV pairs (same key with different IV’s). We determine the
conditions under which this occurs by analysing Equation 3.4. As discussed
above, there are 16 possible alternatives for the term Tx Ty in Equation 3.4: we
denote the corresponding cases in the analysis by i j, where i refers to the case
associated with Ty (the first clock step) and j refers to the case associated with
Tx (the second clock step).
Based on the analysis of Equation 3.4, Table 3.6 shows the number of key
and IV bits that must be specified to form a 64-bit secret key that results in a
2-bit shifted keystream for each of these 16 cases. Table 3.7 shows an example of
a slid pair in hex for a secret key with two different IV’s that generate sequences
which are shifted by two bits. Note: the bits {01} are the shifted bits (in binary)
between these 2 keystream sequences. The keystream length is 228 bits and due
to the shift of two bits, the two keystream sequences contain a common 226 bit
sequence.
Table 3.6: Slid pairs after 2 clocks
cases 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4
Free key bits 18 18 18 18 18 22 18 18 18 18 21 18 18 18 18 21
Involved IV bits 7 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
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Table 3.7: Two keystreams shifted by 2 bit generated from the same secret key
and different IVs
key 0x1DCCC463432BFFFB
IV1 0x200000
IV2 0xC36D70
Keystream1 {01}0x916F6D486AF626F3247A77C97846CAED1D6D35B95D712F89B6B11EEB0
Keystream2 0x916F6D486AF626F3247A77C97846CAED1D6D35B95D712F89B6B11EEB1
Slid pairs after 2 clocks can occur in 16 different cases as shown in Table 3.6.
Numbers of slid pairs can be calculated in a manner similar to that used for
α = 1. We found that the total number of slid pairs for α = 2 (for the 16 cases
combined) is 225+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 244+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 243+ 240+
240+ 240+ 240+ 243 ≈ 245.46. Likewise, the probability that a randomly chosen
key satisfies the equations for any of these cases (for a given IV) is found to be
2−40.54.
Similarly, this work can be extended for a greater number of iterations to
analyse the occurrence of the slid pairs in the A5/1 cipher such as for α = 3, 4, . . ..
The number of cases to be analysed increases as the value of α increases to 22α
as mentioned in Section 3.3.1.
3.3.3 Attack Procedure
Since A5/1 has a 64-bit key and a 64-bit internal state, it is not feasible
to simply guess the whole secret key that generates the keystream and check
whether the guess is correct or not. However, if it is possible to identify the
occurrence of a slid pair, the resulting relationship can be used to reduce the
number of key bits that need to be guessed, forming the basis for an attack. We
outline the procedure for such an attack.
For each conversation there is a secret key and a series of IV’s (frame num-
bers). Initialisation with a new IV (rekeying) is performed after every 228 bits
of keystream, that is, every 4.6 milliseconds. The total time elapsed to use all
222 possible frame numbers is around 5 hours and 22 minutes. The first example
in Table 3.5 shows that a slid pair for that specific secret key occurs after 2.51
minutes.
For the attack, we focus on the most useful attack scenario for an attacker:
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ciphertext-only. This scenario assumes the attacker is able to get enough en-
crypted speech (ciphertext) and also that the IV’s (frame numbers) are known.
We describe the algorithm for one bit shifted versions of keystream. However,
it can be extended to other shifts as well. The algorithm depends on identifying
where an unknown key K is used for two encrypted frames with known IV’s, IV
and IV′, such that the resulting keystreams are shifted versions of one another.
We want to identify this from knowledge of encrypted frames alone. If we XOR an
encrypted frame and a one-bit shifted version of a second encrypted frame where
the two keystreams are out of phase by one, the result is the XOR combination
of two plaintext frames. The XOR combination of plaintext frames can be easily
identified due to the redundancy of plaintext [40]. This is critical in Step 2 of the
four step algorithm presented below. Note that our aim is to find the secret key
rather than to decrypt an individual frame. The attack algorithm is as follows:
Attack Algorithm
Step 1: Divide the encrypted speech (ciphertext) into separate frames. Each
ciphertext frame corresponds to a different IV.
Step 2: Obtain fi ⊕ (fj  1) for every available pair of frames for 0 ≤ i 6=
j ≤ 222 and use the redundancy of speech to determine whether a one bit
shifted keystream is present, where fi and fj are the i
th and jth encrypted
frame respectively.
• If so, note the IV’s of the relevant frames.
• If not, the algorithm fails for α = 1 for the entire conversation.
Step 3: If shifted keystream has been identified, find a candidate key, k∗, by
guessing and checking each possible key, as follows:
For each of cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 do:
• Guess the free key bits in the relevant set of equations in Appendix A.1.
• Use these free key bits and the known IV’s to obtain the remaining
key bits using the equations of Appendix A.1.
• Use the candidate keyK∗ with any available IVs to generate keystreams
for several frames using the A5/1 algorithm.
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• Try to decrypt the frames from the previous step using the generated
keystreams.
– If decryption is successful, the candidate key for this conversation
is equivalent to the actual key.
– If not, repeat the process for another guess.
Step 4: Use the secret key with known IV’s to decrypt the entire intercepted
ciphertext.
Comments on algorithm:
In Step 2 : it is possible that multiple pairs of frames will be identified due
to the state convergence in A5/1.
In Step 3 : if two encrypted frames have been identified as shifted keystream,
then the guessing process should cover the four Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 to find the
correct secret key. As shown in Table 3.4, it requires guessing 20, 22, 21, 20 bits
for Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. For each guess, the guessed key bits should
be substituted into the relevant equations in Appendix A.1 to find the remaining
key bits. At this time, it is not clear whether the candidate key is correct or not.
The proposed key must be verified by decrypting an encrypted frame. Random
frames are chosen with known IVs to generate keystreams using the proposed
secret key. If the keystreams decrypt the frames correctly then the candidate key
is correct, if not use another guess until the correct key is found or all candidates
are exhausted.
Note that the above algorithm is for 1-bit shifts. If this fails, then it is possible
to try for α = 2 or greater. The process is the same with a slight modification
in Step 2 only, so that fi ⊕ (fj  α)
Attack Complexity
For Step 2 : The complexity of our attack depends essentially on the num-
ber of comparisons required in Step 2. If there are N frames in the targeted
conversation, then up to N · (N − 1) comparisons must be performed and each
comparison must be done in both directions (fi⊕ (fj  1)) and ((fi  1)⊕ fj).
For a conversation involving all 222 possible IVs (222 frames ≈ 5 hours 22
minutes), there will be up to 222(222 − 1) ≈ 244 comparisons and the success
probability (the probability that the secret key used in this conversation forms a
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slid pair using two of these IVs) is approximately 2−19. For a shorter conversation,
the probability that a slid pair will occur among the available frames decreases
in proportion to the number of comparisons performed, so with N frames of
conversation the probability of success will be approximately N · (N − 1) · 2−63.
Table 3.8 gives some examples of the number of comparisons and the probability
of success for various lengths of conversation.
For Step 3 : If Step 2 of the attack is successful in finding a slid pair of the
kind we are seeking, then Step 3 will require up to 44 × 223 ≈ 228.46 additional
calculations to find the correct secret key.
Table 3.8: Complexity of various length of conversation
No of Comparison Probability Guessing
frame time complexity of success required
214 1min 16sec 228 2−35 228.46
216 5min 2sec 232 2−31 228.46
218 20min 6sec 236 2−27 228.46
220 1h 21min 240 2−23 228.46
222 5h 22min 244 2−19 228.46
Similarly for α = 2, the probability that the secret key used in this conversa-
tion forms a slid pair using one of the 222 possible IVs is approximately 2−18.51.
For shorter conversation, the probability that a slid pair may occur among the
available frames is approximately N · (N − 1) · 2−62.51.
In a known-plaintext attack [47], the attacker has a number of plaintext and
ciphertext pairs, and the keystream sequences are known, z = m⊕ f . Therefore,
the attacker can check directly for the presence of shifted keystream instead of
using the redundancy property of the messages and Step 3 is unchanged. The
total complexity is almost the same as the ciphertext-only attack scenario, except
for the time for checking redundancy.
3.4 Weak Key-IV Combinations
The keystream generator of A5/1 can be considered to operate nonautonomously
during the loading phase, where the value of the new bit of each register during
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the loading phase depends on both the feedback and an external value (which
is the key or IV bit). During the diffusion phase and keystream generation pro-
cess, the operation can be considered as an autonomous operation, as there is
no external input to the shift registers. The nonautonomous operation during
the loading phase is the most crucial operation for this analysis. However, con-
sidering the operation of each register, they operate independently during the
loading phase. Therefore, they operate dependently during the diffusion phase
and keystream generation, where each register is clocked depending on the value
in the register clocking tap and the majority value for the clocking tap values of
the three registers.
After completing the loading phase, the loaded state may have one or more
registers which are all-zero values. If two or three registers contain all-zero values,
then the generated keystream during this specific initialisation will be constant
either zeros or ones. This flaw results in sending a message in clear text if the
keystream is zeros or the complement of the message if the keystream is all ones.
In the case where exactly one register is all-zero values, this will reduce the
effective size of state space. This section thoroughly analyses the flaw of having
one or more registers which are all-zero values to give the relationships between
key and IV and the probability of recovering the secret key.
Recalling Equation 3.2, we can set τ = −86, so that S0 represents the loaded
state of the system, and consider the behaviour of the loading phase of A5/1.
The terms T 22NK and MV are XORed together. So, they can be represented
by concatenating T 22N and M and multiplying by a new vector KV , where
KV = [k0 k1 . . . k62 k63 v0 v1 . . . v20 v21]
ᵀ as follows
S0 = [T
22N ||M ]KV (3.5)
We can apply Equations 3.2 and 3.5 to each register of the A5/1. Let SA, TA,
NA and MA represents the required matrices for register A. Similarly, matrices
can be written for registers B and C as follow SB, TB, NB, MB and SC , TC , NC ,
MC respectively. The new equations for each register can be written as follows:
3.4. Weak Key-IV Combinations 87
SA,τ+86 = T
22
A NAK ⊕MAV
SB,τ+86 = T
22
B NBK ⊕MBV
SC,τ+86 = T
22
C NCK ⊕MCV
and
SA,0 = [T
22
A NA||MA]KV
SB,0 = [T
22
B NB||MB]KV
SC,0 = [T
22
C NC ||MC ]KV
This analysis investigates the effect on the security when the loading phase
results in a loaded state with one or more registers containing all-zero values. If
the contents of any register is all-zero after the loading phase, it will remain so
for the whole of the diffusion and keystream generation phases since the register
has no external input during these phases. Thus, the register contents will not be
changed until the next rekeying. This leads us to consider three scenarios: three
registers containing all-zeros values, two registers containing all-zeros values and
one register containing all-zeros values, as discussed later. As a result, for each
scenario, the relationships between keys and IVs are identified to obtain the weak
key-IV pairs.
The procedures used to obtain the following result are:
• Use MAGMA to generate the relationship between key bits and IV bits
(system of equations) that result in one, two and three registers that contain
all-zero values at the end of the loading phase.
• Identify a secret key and one of its corresponding IVs that result in one,
two and three registers that contain all-zero values
• Use the real A5/1 cipher to generate the loaded, initial states, and keystream
sequence to illustrate the practical impact of the weak key-IV in the con-
tents of registers and the keystream sequences.
3.4.1 Three Registers all Zeros
This section focuses on the situation of three registers containing all-zero
values after completing the loading phase. These three registers will be clocked
and produce all zero keystream bits continuously until the next rekeying. Thus
the output keystream bit obtained by XORing these three zeros will also be zero.
From Equation 3.5, the behaviour of these three registers is expressed in three
terms T 22A NA||MA, T 22B NB||MB and T 22C NC ||MC . Under the assumption that
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these three registers will have all-zero contents in each stage after performing the
loading phase, we analyse the system of equations. Equation 3.5 is analysed using
Gaussian Elimination to find the conditions mentioned above. We start with
assuming these three terms (T 22A NA||MA, T 22B NB||MB, T 22C NC ||MC) are equal to
zeros. This process generates the relationship between key and IV bits that result
in freezing the three cipher’s registers. We have 64 equations with 86 variables,
and hence 22 variables can be chosen freely.
Based on the analysis of Equation 3.5, Table 3.9 shows an example of weak
key-IV that produces fixed keystream which contains all-zeros, where the keystream
is presented in hex. The three registers A, B and C contain all-zero values af-
ter performing the loading phase due to the nonautonomous operation. The
conditions and the probability of the weak key-IV’s depend on the 22 IV free
bits.
Table 3.9: Example of weak key-IV (to freeze three registers)
key 0010000000100000100111001101110110000001001101111001000000100011
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
A 64-bit secret key, which results in freezing the three registers, is formed
from 22 IV free bits (v0, v1 to v21). These 22 IV free bits specify the 64 key
bits using the system of equations in Appendix A.2. Therefore, by choosing all
possible values of the 22 IV free bits, the total number of weak key-IV pairs is
222 and the probability that a randomly chosen key satisfies these equations (for
a given IV) is 2−64 (For a set of 222 IVs, the probability is 2−42).
Attack Procedure
Since A5/1 has a 64-bit key and a 64-bit internal state, it is not feasible
to simply guess the whole secret key that generates the keystream and check
whether the guess is correct or not. However, if it is possible to identify the
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occurrence of a weak key-IV where the three registers are zeros, this enables an
attacker to calculate the exact secret key directly from the known IV. Note that
this procedure focuses on finding the secret key rather than on decrypting an
individual frame.
In the attack scenario, we focus on the most useful attack which is ciphertext-
only attack. This scenario requires getting enough length of the encrypted speech
(ciphertext) and assuming the IV’s (frame numbers) are known. The following
algorithm represents the attacking procedure for this scenario of the weak key-IV
of the A5/1.
Attack Algorithm
When the initial state of the three registers are all-zeros, the keystream is all
zeros as well. For this type of keystream, the required steps to identify the secret
key are as follows:
Step 1: Divide the encrypted speech (ciphertext) into separate frames. Each
ciphertext frame corresponds to a single IV.
Step 2: If any encrypted frame is intelligible and seems to be a plaintext, this
indicates that the keystream is all zeros.
Step 3: Run the following algorithm on this frame, assuming that the keystream
is generated by three registers containing all-zeros values.
• Use the known IV to calculate the potential secret key using the equa-
tions in Appendix A.2 for three registers containing all-zeros. In this
scenario there is no guessing.
• Use the potential secret key with other IV’s to generate keystreams
for the corresponding frames using the A5/1 algorithm.
• Combine the generated keystreams with decrypt the encrypted frames
that correspond to the IV’s.
– If the encrypted frames are decrypted successfully, then the secret
key has been identified, and can be used with the known IV’s to
decrypt the entire intercepted ciphertext.
– If not, apply the attack procedure outlined in Section 3.4.2, this
applies when two registers contain all-zero values.
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Attack Complexity, if the three registers contain all-zeros, then it is pos-
sible to directly calculate the secret key from the given IV using equations in
Appendix A.2 for three registers contain all-zeros. The probability of occurrence
of this type of keystream is 2−64.
3.4.2 Two Registers all Zeros
This section focuses on the situation in which two registers contain all-zero
values after performing the loading phase. As the clocking stage in each of these
two registers will contain a zero, the majority value will be zero. Hence, these
two registers will be clocked every time. The third register will be clocked until
the content of its clocking stage has value “1”. Since the diffusion phase consists
of 100 clocking steps before producing any keystream bits and the largest register
has only 23 stages, this process will ensure that the third register will be in its
steady state before the keystream generation begins.
The keystream bit z is obtained by XORing the contents of the left most
stage of each registers s18a , s
21
b and s
22
c for registers A, B and C respectively as
zt = s
18
a,t ⊕ s21b,t ⊕ s22c,t. The left most stage of the non-zero register will be fixed,
and could contain either 0 or 1, while the other two registers contain only zeros.
The value in this stage is the value of the key stream bit. Thus the keystream
has constant value for the entire frame.
Considering the operation of the LFSR during the loading phase is linear and
non-autonomous where the new bit depends on both the feedback and key or IV
bit, it is easy to relate the contents of the three registers after the loading phase
to the key and IV bits that were loaded into these registers. From Equation 3.5,
the behaviour of these three registers is expressed in three terms T 22A NA||MA,
T 22B NB||MB and T 22C NC ||MC . Our analysis is conducted under the assumption
that we are looking for two registers which have zeros as content in each stage of
these two registers after performing the loading phase. Specifically in the three
cases:
Case 1 Registers A and B contain all-zeros
Case 2 Registers A and C contain all-zeros
Case 3 Registers B and C contain all-zeros
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Equation 3.5 is analysed using Gaussian Elimination to find the conditions
mentioned above. We start with the terms (T 22A NA||MA, T 22B NB||MB), (T 22A NA
||MA, T 22C NC ||MC) and (T 22B NB||MB, T 22C NC ||MC). Setting each term equal to
zeros and applying Gaussian Elimination will give us the conditions and rela-
tionships between key and IV bits that apply to these weak key-IV’s. For the
three scenarios, we have 41, 42, 45 equations respectively with 86 variables, and
hence 45, 44 and 41 variables can be chosen freely.
Conditions and probabilities of the weak key-IV pairs depend on the number
of available free bits. Table 3.10 shows the number of key and IV free bits that
must be chosen to form a 64-bit secret key that results in a weak key-IV. This
type of weak key-IV freezes two registers and produces fixed keystream for the
entire frame.
Table 3.10: Number of free bits for weak key-IV of each case of two register
all-zero
cases 1 2 3
key free bits 23 22 19
Involved IV bits 22 22 22
Case 1: It is possible to obtain a weak key-IV pair for A5/1 by freezing two
registers A and B. Based on the analysis of Equation 3.5 described above, Ta-
ble 3.11 shows two examples of weak key-IV that produce fixed keystream (either
zeros or ones) where the keystream is presented in hex. The two registers A and
B contain all zeros after performing the loading phase due to the nonautonomous
operation. The keystream bits are formed as a copy from the output bit (last
bit) of the register C. Note that the bold and underlined bits are the clocking
control bits and the output bits respectively of the content of registers A, B and
C.
For Case 1, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 23 key free bits (k41, k42, k43
to k63) and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v20, v21). These 45 bits specify the remaining 41
key bits using the system of equations in Appendix A.2. Therefore, by choosing
all possible values for the 23 key free bits and the 22 IV bits, the total number
of weak key-IV for Case 1 is 245 and the probability that a randomly chosen key
satisfies this system of equations (for a given IV) is 2−41. (For a 222 IVs, the
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Table 3.11: Two examples of weak key-IV (Case 1)
key 0110100101000010100110111011101001001011011111111111111111111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11111110110010110111001
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11111111011001011011100
Keystream 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
key 1000001000101110111010101011001101100110111111111111111111111001
IV 1100000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11101101110111110100111
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 01110110111011111010011
Keystream 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
probability is 2−19).
Case 2: Similarly to Case 1, it is possible to freeze another pair of two registers
A and C. So, it is possible to obtain a weak key-IV pair for A5/1 from this
condition. Based on the analysis of Equation 3.5 described above, Table 3.12
shows two example of weak key-IV that produces fixed keystream either zeros or
ones, where the keystream is presented in hex. The two registers A and C became
zeros after performing the loading phase due to the nonautonomous operation.
The keystream bits are copied from the output bit of register B. Note that the
bold bits are the clocking tap and the underlined bits are the output bits.
For Case 2, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 22 key free bits (k42, k43 to
k63) and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v21). These 44 bits specify the remaining 42 key
bits using the system of equations in Appendix A.2. Therefore, by choosing all
possible values for the 22 key free bits and the 22 IV bits, the total number of
weak key-IV for Case 2 is 244 and the probability that a randomly chosen key
satisfies this system of equations (for a given IV) is 2−42. (For a range of 222 IVs,
the probability is 2−20).
Case 3: Similarly to Case 1 and 2, it is possible to freeze the last combination
of two registers B and C to obtain a weak key-IV. Based on the analysis of
Equation 3.5 described above, Table 3.13 shows two examples of weak key-IV
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Table 3.12: Two examples of weak key-IV (Case 2)
key 0101100010011111010111110101111001010101001111111111111110111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0101010101110110001000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0101010101110110001000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
key 0111111010110100000001110001110110001110101111111111111110111001
IV 1100000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0001101100100110101011
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0001101100100110101011
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
pairs that produce fixed keystream either zeros or ones, where the keystream
is presented in hex. The two registers B and C became zeros after performing
the loading phase due to the nonautonomous operation. The keystream bits are
formed from the output bit of the register A. Note that the bold bits are the
clocking tap and the underlined bits are the output bits.
Table 3.13: Two examples of weak key-IV (Case 3)
key 1011100011000000100000011000111111010011111111111111110111111001
IV 1100000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0100000100010000001
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 1010000010001000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
key 1010011010110011010110100000010110000010010011111111110111111001
IV 1111000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 1011100001111110100
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 1100101110000111111
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
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For Case 3, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 19 key free bits (k45, k46 to
k63) and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v21). These 41 bits specify the remaining 45 key
bits using the system of equations in Appendix A.2. Therefore, by choosing all
possible values for the 19 key free bits and the 22 IV bits, the total number of
weak key-IV for Case 3 is 241 and the probability that a randomly chosen key
satisfies these equations (for a given IV) is 2−45. (For 222 IVs, the probability is
2−23).
As mentioned above, the number of weak key-IV pairs for each of cases 1, 2
and 3 are 245, 244 and 241 respectively. Therefore, the total number of weak key-
IV pairs, when two registers contain all-zeros, is 245.64. Likewise, the probability
that a randomly chosen key satisfies the equations for any of these cases (for
a given IV) is found to be 2−40.36. (For a set of 222 IVs with fixed key, the
probability is 2−18.36).
Attack Procedure
As described in Section 3.4.1, if a specific operation of A5/1 can be identified,
this reduces the required effort of attacking to obtain the secret key. This section
analyses when a keystream sequence is either all zeros or all ones. When a
keystream sequence is all zeros, it may be generated by either all three registers
are zeros or only two registers are zeros. Section 3.4.1 discussed the situation of
three registers are zeros. To remind the reader, the attacking algorithm assumes
the ciphertext-only attack to recover the secret key.
Attack Algorithm
The following algorithm can be applied when a keystream sequence is either
all zeros or all ones. When it is all zeros, firstly apply the algorithm presented
in Section 3.4.1, if it fails, apply the following algorithm.
Step 1: Divide the encrypted speech (ciphertext) into separate frames. Each
ciphertext frame corresponds to a single IV.
Step 2: If any encrypted frame is intelligible (seems to be plaintext) and fails
to the previous algorithm in Section 3.4.1, or if the complement of any
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encrypted frame is intelligible and seems to be plaintext, this indicates
that the keystream is all ones, then:
Step 3: Guess and check for each possible key of cases 1, 2 and 3 as follows:
• Guess the free key bits in the relevant set of equations in Appendix A.2
for two registers contain all-zeros.
• Use these guessed free key bits and the known IV to calculate the
remaining key bits using these equations in Appendix A.2.
• Use the generated potential secret key with other IV’s to generate
keystreams using A5/1 algorithm.
• Try to decrypt the encrypted frames using the generated keystream.
– If the encrypted frames are decrypted successfully, then the secret
key has been identified.
– If not, repeat the process for another guess.
Use the secret key with known IV’s to decrypt the entire intercepted ciphertext.
Attack Complexity : For the two registers contain all-zeros where the
keystream is either all zeros or all ones, it requires calculation up to 223.64 to
obtain the secret key. The probability of success for this type of keystreams is
2−40.36.
3.4.3 One Register all Zeros
It is possible to find key and IV pairs such that exactly one register contains
all-zero values after the loading phase. Whether this register is clocked or not
during the keystream generation, the contribution to the keystream bit form this
register is zero. In this situation at least one of the other two registers will be
clocked. The value of the keystream bits actually depends only on the content
of the last bit of these other two registers.
For the scenario where one register contains all-zeros, considering the opera-
tion of the LFSR during the loading phase is linear and non-autonomous where
the new bit depends on both the feedback and key or IV bit, it is easy to re-
late the contents of the three registers after the loading phase to the key and
IV bits that were loaded into these registers. From Equation 3.5, the behaviour
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of these three registers is expressed in three terms T 22A NA||MA, T 22B NB||MB and
T 22C NC ||MC . Our analysis is conducted under the assumption that we are looking
for a register which has zero contents in its stages after performing the loading
phase as shown in the three cases:
Case 4 Register A contains all-zero values
Case 5 Register B contains all-zero values
Case 6 Register C contains all-zero values
Equation 3.5 is analysed using Gaussian Elimination (GE) to find the con-
ditions mentioned above. We start with the term (T 22A NA||MA) which is equal
to zero to find the relationship between key and IV bits. This process is applied
for the other two terms (T 22B NB||MB) and (T 22C NC ||MC). This process generates
the relationship between key and IV bits that result in freezing a register after
performing the loading phase. For the three cases (4, 5 and 6), we have 19, 22,
23 equations respectively. For each case, there are 86 variables, and hence 67, 64
and 63 variables can be chosen freely.
If a register contains all zeros at the end of the loading phase, it will remain
all-zero for the entire frame. The conditions and the probabilities of the weak
key-IVs depend on the number of free bits. Table 3.14 shows the number of key
and IV free bits that must be chosen to form a 64-bit secret key that results in
a weak key-IV that makes one register have all-zero values for the entire frame.
Table 3.14: Number of free bits for weak key-IV of each case of one register
containing all-zeros
cases 4 5 6
key free bits 45 42 41
Involved IV bits 22 22 22
Case 4: Based on the analysis of Equation 3.5 described above to freeze register
A, Table 3.15 shows an example of weak key-IV that makes register A contains
all-zero values until the next rekeying. The keystream is presented in hex and
depends only on two registers B and C. Register A contains all-zero values after
performing the loading phase due to the nonautonomous operation.
3.4. Weak Key-IV Combinations 97
Table 3.15: Example of weak key-IV (Case 4)
key 1001111011001000001111111111111111111110011111111111111111111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0100000111000111010100
C 11010011010111101110110
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 1011101101100100100111
C 11011011011011100110011
Keystream 0x507802ACC6711F53C436082322478AE8CB842631EA9CB9CC6869D6FCA
For Case 4, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 45 key free bits (k19, k20 to
k63) and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v21). These 67 bits specify the remaining 19 key
bits using the system of equations in Appendix A.2. Therefore, by choosing
all possible values for the 45 and 22 key and IV free bits respectively, the total
number of weak key-IV pairs for Case 4 is 267 and the probability that a randomly
chosen key satisfies these equations (for a given IV) is 2−19.
Case 5: Similarly to Case 4, it is possible to freeze register B. Based on the
analysis of Equation 3.5, Table 3.16 shows an example of weak key-IV that pro-
duces a keystream (in hex) from only two effective registers A and C. Register
B contains all-zero values after performing the loading phase due to the nonau-
tonomous operation.
Table 3.16: Example of weak key-IV (Case 5)
key 1000010110000110010111111110111101111110011111111111111111111001
IV 1110100000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0001110101010110110
B 0000000000000000000000
C 01111000000000100101011
initial
state
A 0111101111111010110
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11011010101110111010111
Keystream 0x22832052674272A5FE39A39A530A861AD7672C4976B4B4EBE5A3C7413
For Case 5, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 42 key free bits (k22, k23 to k63)
and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v21). These 64 key-IV bits specify the remaining 22 key
bits using the system of equations in Appendix A.2. Therefore, by choosing all
possible values for the 42 key free bits and the 22 IV free bits, the total number
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of weak key-IV for Case 5 is 264 and the probability that a randomly chosen key
satisfies these equations for a given IV is 2−22.
Case 6: Similarly to Case 4 and 5, it is possible to freeze the third register C.
Based on the analysis of Equation 3.5 as described above, Table 3.17 shows an
example of weak key-IV that produces a keystream (in hex) using two effective
registers A and B. Register C contains all-zero values after performing the
loading phase until the next rekeying due to the nonautonomous operation during
the loading phase.
Table 3.17: Examples of weak key-IV (Case 6)
key 0011110000100011100000111111111111111110011111111111111111111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 1001100111001111111
B 1011111011111010101110
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000101101110000000
B 1000011100111100110000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x0F162408D5ACED21E25C9CD1B78E0E0A687BCE90F2643E52E99013206
For Case 6, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 41 key free bits (k23, k24 to k63)
and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v21). These 63 bits specify the remaining 23 key bits
using the equation in Appendix A.2. Therefore, by choosing all possible values
for the 41 key free bits and the 22 IV free bits, the total number of weak key-IV
pairs for Case 6 is 263 and the probability that a randomly chosen key satisfies
these equations for a given IV is 2−23.
As mentioned above, the number of weak key-IV pairs for each of cases 4,
5 and 6 are 267, 264 and 263 respectively. Therefore, the total number of weak
key-IV’s that result in freezing one register of A5/1 is 267.25 that means there are
245.25 weak keys. Likewise, the probability that a randomly chosen key satisfies
the equations for any of these cases (for a given IV) is 2−18.75.
Statistical analysis
From the above analysis, the complexity of recovering the secret key using
a keystream sequence which is generated by a weak key-IV such that a single
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register contains all-zeros is close to exhaustive search and the probability of
success is 2−18.75. The rest of the section focuses on statistical analyses to dis-
tinguish a keystream generated by two non-zero registers only (while the third
register contains all-zero values) from another keystream generated by non-zero
three registers.
A number of statistical tests available for testing randomness, see for ex-
ample Gustafson [57] and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [90]. We use three of these tests to check the randomness of sequences
generated by the above cases. These three tests are Balance, Runs tests and Lin-
ear Complexity to assess the randomness. Balance test measures the proportion
of zeros and ones for an entire sequence. The number of zeros and ones for a given
sequence should meet the conditions of the randomness test. So, the probability
is P (0) = P (1) = 1
2
. Runs test focuses on the total number of runs in a sequence.
Runs is an uninterrupted sequence for specific patterns of bits whether zeros or
ones. Linear Complexity determines the smallest LFSR that can generate the
whole keystream over the finite field Fn2 using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [83].
Frames are generated for different scenarios of the targeted operation of the
A5/1 cipher as follows
• None of the registers A, B or C contain all-zero values (A, B and C all
participate to form the keystream bits)
• Register A contains all zeros (B and C participate to form the keystream
bits)
• Register B contains all zeros (A and C participate to form the keystream
bits)
• Register C contains all zeros (A and B participate to form the keystream
bits)
For each scenario, 100,000 228-bit frames are generated from 100,000 random
loaded states. The Balance and Runs test are applied for these generated frames.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates the Balance test for each scenario. Table 3.18 shows the
result of the Runs test. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the result of Linear Complexity
of A5/1 for frame length 228 bits and 2000 bits respectively.
From the above tests, the bits’ distributions and bit balancing for all scenarios
are alike. So we have not been able to distinguish a keystream generated by
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2 registers (while the third register contains all-zeros) using Balance, Runs or
Linear Complexity tests. Since we have not determined a way to distinguish
such keystreams, we will not discuss further any method of attacking A5/1 in
this scenario.
3.5 Summary and Security Impact
This chapter examined the initialisation process of the A5/1 stream cipher. A5/1
has an internal state of 64 bits, that is shorter than the combined key-IV length
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Table 3.18: The average counts from the runs test for 4 scenarios based on 105
randomly simulated states
Runs A,B,C B,C A,C A,B
1 57.471 57.504 57.509 57.497
2 28.592 28.621 28.634 28.621
3 14.255 14.261 14.237 14.255
4 7.091 7.087 7.103 7.115
5 3.532 3.523 3.532 3.529
6 1.767 1.759 1.752 1.756
7 0.874 0.875 0.872 0.869
8 0.437 0.437 0.438 0.437
9 0.219 0.216 0.217 0.214
10 0.109 0.110 0.109 0.108
11 0.053 0.055 0.054 0.053
12 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.027
13 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013
14 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
15 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
16 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
17 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.001
18 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001
19 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
21 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
22 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
23 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
24 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(64+22) of 86 bits. This leads to an effective reduction in the key-IV space
during the initialisation process. The initialisation process of A5/1 loads the
secret key and IV using a linear function, while the diffusion phase and keystream
generation both use the same nonlinear state update function. In this chapter
investigations into three flaws in the A5/1 initialisation process were described:
state convergence, slid pairs and weak key-IV pairs. These problems have been
discussed in detail in this chapter.
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A5/1 uses a majority clocking operation during both the diffusion phase and
keystream generation process to introduce non-linearity to the state update func-
tion. However, this results in an update function which is not one-to-one. As
previously shown by Golic´ in [54, 55], this leads to state convergence during the
diffusion phase of the A5/1 initialisation process (and similarly during keystream
generation, although that is beyond the scope of this research). This work ex-
tends Golic´’s research [54, 55] from one step to six clocking steps. These results
show that the number of inaccessible patterns for each clocking step increases
non-uniformly, while the proportion of inaccessible states for each clocking step
decreases non-uniformly. The non-uniform rate makes it hard to analyse for
large value of α. During the first six iterations of the diffusion phase, the total
number of distinct internal states of A5/1 is reduced to approximately half of the
number of loaded states. As the number of iterations, α, increases then the num-
ber of distinct states decreases. After 100 iterations of the initialisation process,
the total number of distinct internal states is extrapolated, based on regression
analysis, to be 5% of the number of loaded states. So, there are effectively only
259.59 distinct initial states, and therefore less than 259.59 distinct keystreams can
be produced. This may make A5/1 more vulnerable to attacks such as TMTO
attack, where the distinct internal states are decreased.
Concurrent investigation as reported in Kiselev and Tokareva [71] also anal-
ysed extending the number of clocks. Their results disagree with the results
presented in this thesis. However, as shown in Section 3.2.2 these results are not
correct due to a logic error in their counting procedure.
As there is no specific format for the loaded state of A5/1 and the inter-
nal state is not larger than the key-IV space, every internal state is a legitimate
loaded state and hence forms a slid pair with any of its pre-images under repeated
iterations of the state update function. Thus, slid pairs occur ubiquitously during
the diffusion phase of initialisation process of A5/1. The state update functions
for both diffusion phase and keystream generation are identical, therefore, slid
pairs for A5/1 always lead to shifted keystream sequences. A particular case of
slid pairs which arise from the use of the same secret key and multiple IV’s was
investigated. This is a common scenario in real time applications, and only re-
quires access to frames from a single conversation, so can be used for a practical
secret key recovery attack. A ciphertext-only attack on A5/1 based on the redun-
dancy of the plaintext property and known IV’s was presented. Table 3.8 gives
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a summary of the required ciphertext, complexity and the probability of success
for this attack. This attack (ciphertext-only) can reveal the secret key using
approximately 5 minutes of conversation with comparison complexity of 232 and
probability of success 2−31. Consequently, this problem leaves A5/1 vulnerable
for ciphertext-only attack to recover the secret key.
The nonautonomous loading phase of A5/1 also generates weak key-IV pairs.
Weak key-IV pairs result in one or more registers containing all zeroes at the end
of the loading phase. This chapter described three scenarios of the weak key-IV
pairs. These three scenarios are described as follows: Firstly, all three registers
containing all-zero values occurs with probability of 2−64. In this scenario, the
secret key can be derived directly from a given IV based on the ciphertext-only
attack. Secondly, the scenario where exactly two registers contain all-zeros can
also be attacked using ciphertext-only attack to retrieve the secret key with an
average probability of success 2−40.36. This requires guessing up to 23 bits to
calculate the remaining secret key bits, with complexity of 228.36. The last sce-
nario is where only one register contains all-zeros which occurs with probability
of 2−18.75. However, we have not determined a distinguisher for the keystream
in this case. Thus, we did not discuss any attack method for this case. Thereby,
A5/1 is vulnerable to ciphertext-only key recover attacks using both the first and
second scenarios. Equations relating the values of key bits and IV bits in case of
these scenarios are discussed in Section 3.4 and presented in Appendix A.2.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Sfinks Stream Cipher
Initialisation Process
The Sfinks stream cipher was submitted to the eSTREAM project ; the ECRYPT
call for stream cipher proposals, in April 2005 [29]. Sfinks is a bit-based stream
cipher that takes an 80-bit secret key and 80-bit IV as inputs and has a 256-
bit internal state. Sfinks is categorized as PROFILE 2A, suitable for hardware
applications and associated authenticated encryption.
The Sfinks stream cipher was attacked by Courtois [36] using basic and fast
algebraic attacks. These algebraic attacks exploit the state update function used
during keystream generation, but do not make use of the initialisation process.
Courtois found that Sfinks can be broken with complexity of 271 computations
using 243 keystream bits, which is faster than the claimed security level of 280.
As noted above, the Sfinks stream cipher is broken as a keystream generator.
The purpose of this research is to investigate the strategy used for initialisation
process. We note that the state update functions are different during initial-
isation and keystream generation precesses. Using a modified version of the
keystream generation state update function during initialisation may produce
some security benefits. The objective of this chapter is to consider specifically
the properties of the initialisation process, rather than keystream generation, and
to consider interactions between these two processes that may result in security
flaws.
As shown in Chapter 3, the A5/1 internal state size is shorter than the sum
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of the sizes of the key and IV, the state update function is not one-to-one and the
state update functions during initialisation and keystream generation processes
are identical functions. This leads to some security flaws. In contrast, Sfinks has
internal state size larger than twice the size of the secret key, and the individual
components of the state update functions are one-to-one. As well, the state
update functions during initialisation and keystream generation processes are not
similar. In the following sections we show that despite this, state convergence
still occurs in the initialisation process and that slid pairs can occur and lead to
shifted keystream sequences.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 describes the specification of
the Sfinks stream cipher. An analysis of state convergence during the initialisa-
tion process is presented in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, slid pairs are presented
with some examples and an attacking procedure. Section 4.5 summarises this
chapter and presents the security impact of this analysis..
4.1 Specification of Sfinks Stream Cipher
The Sfinks stream cipher [29] has two main components: a shift register, S, and
a nonlinear one-to-one inversion function INV , as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
During the initialisation, it also uses a pipeline (memory) to delay the output of
the INV function before combining this output with the shift register content.
Additionally, another memory is used during keystream generation to delay the
output bit of the shift register by 7 clocking steps before combining it with a
specific bit of the INV function to generate a new keystream bit.
Let sit denote the contents of register stage i at time t, where i = 0, 1, . . . , 255
and t ≥ 0. Sfinks uses an 80-bit secret key k = k0, . . . , k79 and 80-bit initial value
v = v0, . . . , v79. The linear feedback function is described as follows.
(4.1)s
255
t+1 = s
212
t ⊕ s194t ⊕ s192t ⊕ s187t ⊕ s163t ⊕ s151t ⊕ s125t ⊕ s115t
⊕ s115t ⊕ s107t ⊕ s85t ⊕ s66t ⊕ s64t ⊕ s52t ⊕ s48t ⊕ s14t ⊕ s0t
The nonlinear function INV can be considered as a 16×16 bit S-box. The in-
version function is used during both initialisation and keystream generation, but
in different ways in each case. Let xt and y6,t denote the 16-bit input and output
of INV respectively at time t, where xt = (x
16
t , . . . , x
1
t ) and y6,t = (y
15
6,t, . . . , y
0
6,t).
Let xit denote the i-th bit of the input of the S-box, yj,t denote the j-th word of 16
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bits (j = 0, 1, . . . , 6) in the pipeline (memory) and yij,t denote the i-th bit of yj,t,
all at time t. INV is an invertible function, F216 → F216 that calculates the in-
verse of the 16-bit input, modulo the primitive polynomial X16+X5+X3+X2+1.
The 16 input bits are taken from 16 register stages at time clock t as follows.
(x16t , . . . , x
1
t ) =(s
255
t , s
244
t , s
227
t , s
193
t , s
161
t , s
134
t , s
105
t , s
98
t , s
74
t , s
58
t ,
s44t , s
21
t , s
19
t , s
9
t , s
6
t , s
1
t ) (4.2)
The output word y6,t is delayed to become y0,t. The delayed version of the 16-
bit S-box output, y0,t, is treated as 16 bit values as y0,t = (y
15
0,t, . . . , y
0
0,t). During
the initialisation, these bits are fed back to specified stages of the shift register.
During keystream generation, only one bit of the output of the INV is used, and
this bit contributes to the formation of the keystream bit.
During initialisation, the output of the S-box is stored in a pipeline (memory),
yj,t for 0 ≤ j ≤ 6, to manage the delay of 7 clocking steps. The total required
memory to store seven 16-bit output bits is 112 memory bits. Consequently, the
total effective state size during the initialisation process is the sum of shift register
size and the number of memory bits: 368 bits. During keystream generation, a
memory of only 7 bits, mi for 0 ≤ i ≤ 6, is used to perform a delay of 7 clocking
steps to stage s0 that is used to generate a new keystream bit, zt. The memory
stages, y0j,t are also used to delay y
0
6,t for this purpose, but the remaining 15
bits of S-box from y1j,t to y
15
j,t for 0 ≤ j ≤ 6 are not used during the keystream
generation. Therefore, the total effective state size during keystream generation
is 270.
4.1.1 Initialisation Process
The initialisation process takes as input the 80-bit key and 80-bit IV and
performs 128 iterations to produce the 368-bit initial state. Once this initial
state is obtained, keystream generation can begin. The initialisation process is
performed in two phases, which we refer to as loading and diffusion.
Note: the reference implementation of Sfinks [29,75] uses t = −128 to denote
the start of the diffusion process but, for simplicity, we will use t = 0 to denote
this time point.
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Figure 4.1: Keystream generator of Sfinks stream cipher
Loading Phase
Firstly, all of the register stages are set to zero. Then the 80-bit key and
80-bit IV are transferred to specified register positions s96+i0 = ki, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79,
and s176+i0 = vi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 79. The register stage s950 = 1 and the remaining
si0 = 0, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 94. The output of the S-box is set to all-zero for the first
seven 16-bit outputs, yij,0 = 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ 6 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 (the initial value of
the pipeline). In [29] this process is described as necessary to clear the pipeline
stages in the hardware implementation and to provide the initial values of the
output of the S-box to allow for the delay of 7 clocking steps.
When both the secret key and IV have been transferred and the rest of
the state bits (the rest of shift register and the memory cells) are fixed to the
designated values, the Sfinks stream cipher is in its loaded state. Following this,
the diffusion phase begins.
Diffusion Phase
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The diffusion phase consists of 128 iterations of the initialisation state-update
function. Each iteration can be considered as a function which maps the state
space to itself. After the diffusion phase is completed, the keystream generator
is said to be in its initial state.
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Figure 4.2: Initialisation processes of Sfinks stream cipher
The state update function for the diffusion process uses Equation 4.1 and
the output of the nonlinear S-box function. The S-box output feeds back into
16 specified stages of the shift register with a time delay of 7 clocking steps
as detailed below. Figure 4.2 gives a general overview of state update function
during the diffusion phase of the Sfinks stream cipher.
sit = s
i+1
t−1 ⊕ yi mod 160,t−1 (4.3)
for i = {11, 17, 41, 52, 66, 80, 111, 118, 142, 154, 173, 179, 204, 213, 232, 247}.
All other bits are shifted normally, i.e. sit = s
i+1
t−1 for all other i’s. At each
iteration, the shift register is clocked and then the INV function is called to
calculate the inverse of the 16-bit input to the S-box. This is stored as the S-
box output in the memory where the first input is the first output. The 16-bit
output of the memory is XORed with the contents of the 16 specified stages of
the shift register to form the contents of another 16 stages of the shift register.
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The S-box function is the only nonlinear component in the initialisation process.
A complete description of the state update function during diffusion phase is:
sit =

si+1t−1 for i = {0, 1, . . . , 254} except {11, 17, 41, 52, 66, 80,
111, 118, 142, 154, 173, 179, 204, 213, 232, 247}
si+1t−1 ⊕ yi mod 160,t−1 for i = {11, 17, 41, 52, 66, 80, 111, 118, 142, 154,
173, 179, 204, 213, 232, 247}
⊕
j s
j
t−1 for i = 255
for j = {0, 14, 48, 52, 64, 66, 85, 107, 115, 125, 151,
163, 187, 192, 194, 212}
yj,t =

yj+1,t−1 for j = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
INV (x16, . . . , x1) for j = 6
(x16, . . . , x1) = (s255t , s
244
t , s
227
t , s
193
t , s
161
t , s
134
t ,
s105t , s
98
t , s
74
t , s
58
t , s
44
t , s
21
t , s
19
t , s
9
t , s
6
t , s
1
t )
4.1.2 Keystream Generation
At t = 128, the Sfinks stream cipher has completed the initialisation processes
and is ready for keystream generation. A memory component of 7 stages is used
to apply a delay of 7 clocking steps to the rightmost bit in the shift register s0t .
During keystream generation, the output of the INV function is not fed back to
shift register, S, and so the register feedback is linear. The rightmost bit in the
shift register s0t is shifted to a memory stage m
6
t at time t. The least significant
bit of the 16-bit output value of the S-box, y00,t is XORed with the value of stage
m0t to produce each keystream bit zt. The output equation is, zt = m
0
t−1⊕ y00,t−1.
where
mit =

mi+1t−1 for i = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
s0t−1 for i = 6
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4.2 State Convergence
State convergence occurs when two or more states at time t are mapped
to the same state after α iterations (at time t + α), for some α > 0 and the
states do not diverge after this point. That is state convergence occurs when
the state update function is not one-to-one. State convergence may occur during
the initialisation process and/or keystream generation. This may reduce the
effective key-IV size and leave the stream cipher vulnerable to attacks such as
distinguishing attacks [87] or time-memory-data trade-off attacks [23].
Analysis of the Sfinks stream cipher initialisation process is complicated by
the delay of 7 clocking steps in feeding the S-box output back into the register.
However we observe that the correspondence between this delay of seven steps
and the difference between certain input and output taps leads to state conver-
gence as shown below. In the remainder of this section, we refer to stages of S
which provide inputs to the S-box as input stages and stages of S which receive
outputs from the S-box as output stages, respectively.
From Figure 4.2, note that the distance between some input and output stages
is equal to the delay time. Specifically, there is one case where sit is an output
stage and si+7t−7 is an input stage. In this case, recall from Equation 4.3 that
sit = s
i+1
t−1 ⊕ yi mod 160,t−1 , and note that if we complement both si+1t−1 and yi mod 160,t−1
then the same value of sit will be obtained. However, s
i+1
t−1 = s
i+7
t−7 under regular
clocking, and the S-box output yi mod 160,t−1 depends on the contents of the input
stage si+7t−7. That is,
sit = s
i+7
t−7 ⊕ yi mod 160,t−1 = si+7t−7 ⊕ yi mod 160,t−1 (4.4)
where s and y represent the complements of s and y respectively.
It is possible that complementing the contents of the input stage si+7t−7 may
cause the required change in the S-box output bit yi mod 160,t−1 . This situation pro-
vides the basis of a search for states which converge.
4.2.1 States Which Converge
An examination of the Sfinks register shows there is only one input stage with a
distance to the next output stage equal to 7 clocking steps. That input stage is
s161 and the output stage is s154. The contents of s161 correspond to the S-box
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161 154 161 154
S-Box
Clock
Figure 4.3: Input and output stages have 7 steps delay
input x12, and the S-box output y100 is fed back to s
154. Specifically, s161t−7 = x
12
t−7
and s154t = s
155
t−1 ⊕ y100,t−1. According to Equation 4.4, the value of s154t will not
be changed if complementing the input bit s161t−7 = x
12
t−7 results in the output bit
y100,t−1 being complemented as well. Therefore, we look for pairs of S-box inputs
(x16, . . ., x1) which differ only in bit x12 and for which the corresponding pair of
outputs (y150 , . . ., y
0
0) differ in bit y
10
0 .
Consider firstly the input pair for which the output pair differs only in y100 ,
as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Such a pair of S-box inputs (and corresponding
output) exists, and is presented in Table 4.1. For emphasis, x12 is underlined
and bold font, as is y100 . Table 4.2 gives an example of two 256-bit register states
SAt−7 and S
B
t−7 which converge to the same state after 7 iterations. For efficient
presentation the hex representation of the 256-bit binary state is given. Note
that all register stages except s161 are the same. SAt−7 and S
B
t−7 both converge to
St.
Since the register S is 256 bits long, and there are 16 stages used as input to
the S-box, if we fix the contents of these 16 stages to the pattern given in Table
4.1, we are free to choose any values for the remaining 240 stages. Therefore,
there are 2240 pairs of states which converge after 7 iterations. One such pair is
presented in Table 4.2.
For the S-box pair in Table 4.1 discussed in the illustration above the inputs
differed only in position x12 and the outputs differed only in position y100 . In
general, however, it is not necessary to apply such a strict condition on the
output bits. Referring to Equation 4.3, and considering 6 consecutive steps of
regular clocking, we have sit = s
i+1
t−1 ⊕ yi mod 160,t−1 = si+7t−7 ⊕ yi mod 160,t−1 for any output
bit. If complementing the input bit s161t−7 (which is x
12
t−7) causes y
i mod 16
0,t−1 to be
changed, it may be possible to complement si+7t−7 to obtain a second state that
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Table 4.1: A special S-box pair which differ in x12 and y100 only
Input Output
S-box sequence x16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x1 y150 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . y
0
0
Stage No. 25
5
2
4
4
2
2
7
1
9
3
1
6
1
1
3
4
1
0
5
9
8
7
4
5
8
4
4
2
1
1
9
9 6 1 1
1
1
1
4
2
1
7
3
2
0
4
1
1
1
5
4
4
1
2
3
2
2
4
7
1
1
8
2
1
3
5
2
1
7
9
6
6
1
7
8
0
1st value 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
2nd value 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Table 4.2: Two states (hex) differing only in stage s161 which converge
SAt−7 F19B7E15AF4FF1338DDF0800AD8C56A42913E4B90CBEEFD3A4075AFD3351E5C1
SBt−7 F19B7E15AF4FF1338DDF0802AD8C56A42913E4B90CBEEFD3A4075AFD3351E5C1
St BBE336FC2B7E9FE2671B9E10055B58AD481227C972187DDFA7580EB5FA66ABCB
gives the same value for sit. Recall that 16 stages of the shift register S receive
the output of the S-box at each iteration of the state update function. Of these
16 output stages, there are only six (s11t−7, s
17
t−7, s
41
t−7, s
52
t−7, s
80
t−7, s
111
t−7) which
directly or indirectly affect an input stage during the six consecutive clocks. For
example, the output y90 of the S-box is fed back to s
41 and there is an input to
the S-box within the delay time at stage s44. Allowing this bit to change, may
result in divergence in later steps. Note also that if an input bit of the shift
register feedback is complemented at time t − 7, we also need the stage s0t−7 to
be complemented to assure that the new bit s255t−6 will not be changed. Therefore,
when considering pairs of inputs and outputs of the S-box for which convergence
occurs the values of the six S-box outputs (y00, y
1
0, y
4
0, y
9
0, y
11
0 and y
15
0 ) must be
fixed. Therefore, we look for pairs of the S-box inputs which differ only in x12
and for which the output bits differ in y100 and possibly in any bit of y
2
0, y
3
0, y
5
0,
y60, y
7
0, y
8
0, y
10
0 , y
12
0 , y
13
0 and y
14
0 .
We used an exhaustive computer search to look for pairs of S-box inputs that
satisfy the conditions described above, and found 273 pairs of the S-box inputs
(and corresponding outputs) with such patterns. Table 4.3 gives three different
examples of these S-box input and output pairs. Note that the only difference in
each input pair is the underlined bold bit x12. In the output pair, the underlined
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bold bits are the bits which differ in each pair (which must include y100 ) and the
bits y00, y
1
0, y
4
0, y
9
0, y
11
0 and y
15
0 (shown in italics) should be the same in each pair.
For each pair in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 provides an example of two states based on
that pattern that converge to the same state after 7 iterations.
Table 4.3: Examples of complying pairs of S-box inputs and outputs
Input Output
S-box sequence x16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x1 y150 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . y
0
0
Stage No. 25
5
2
4
4
2
2
7
1
9
3
1
6
1
1
3
4
1
0
5
9
8
7
4
5
8
4
4
2
1
1
9
9 6 1 1
1
1
1
4
2
1
7
3
2
0
4
1
1
1
5
4
4
1
2
3
2
2
4
7
1
1
8
2
1
3
5
2
1
7
9
6
6
1
7
8
0
1
st
p
a
ir 1st value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2nd value 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
2
n
d
p
a
ir
1st value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
2nd value 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
3
rd
p
a
ir
1st value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
2nd value 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Table 4.4: Three examples; each two states which converge to the same state
1
st
p
a
ir SA1t−7 318B7E15AF4FF1318DDF0800ADAC56A42913E4B90CBEEFD3A0075AFD3351E7C3
SA2t−7 718BFE15BF4FF1318DDF0802AD8C56A40913E4B90CBEEFD3A0075AFD3351E7C2
St BAE316FC2B5E9FE2631BBE10055B18AD485227C972197DDFA7500EB5FA64A3CF
2
n
d
p
a
ir SB1t−7 718B7E15AF4FF1318DCF0800AD8C56A42913E4B90CBEEFD3A4075AFD3359E7C1
SB2t−7 718B7E15AF4FF1318DDF0802AD8C56A42913E4B90CBEEFD3A4075AFD3359E7C1
St 7E6317FC2B5E9FE26313BE10055B18AD481227C972187DDBA7480CB5FA64B3CF
3
rd
p
a
ir SC1t−7 318B7E15AF4FF1318DCF0800ADAC56A42913E4BD0CBEEFD3A0074AFD3379E5C3
SC2t−7 718BFE15AF47F1318DDF0802AD8C56A42913E4BD0CBEEFD3A0074AFD3379E5C3
St FAE316FC2B7E9FE2631BBE10055B18AD4812A7C97A187DDFA7500E95FA66FBCB
From above, there are 273 pairs of S-box inputs satisfying the convergence
conditions out of the 215 possible input pairs. If we assume the possible values
for the S-box input bits are distributed randomly and independently, this state
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convergence has a probability of 273
215
= 2−6.9.
4.2.2 State Convergence Across the Initialisation Process
Recall from the loading phase Section, that the loaded state of Sfinks has a
defined format, with s950 = 1 and s
i
0 = 0 for i = 0, . . . , 94. This slightly reduces
the occurrence of state convergence for the first few iterations of the diffusion
process but does not prevent it altogether.
According to the reference implementation of Sfinks [75], the S-box first re-
ceives live inputs from the input stages at t = 1 (after the first clock of the shift
register). Convergence cannot occur until 7 clocking steps after this, at t = 8.
Based on the general case discussed above, however, state convergence can
occur immediately after these 7 iterations. All that is required to impose the
additional condition that y2 also remain unchanged when x12 is complemented.
Table 4.5 shows a pair of input and output bits of the S-box that can occur
after the first iteration and converge after 7 iterations. This pair satisfies the
condition discussed above, and therefore will lead to convergence after 7 clocking
steps at t = 8. A pair of converging states based on this pattern is presented as
an example in Table 4.6.
Table 4.5: A pair of S-box inputs and outputs that can occur at t = −120
Input Output
S-box sequence x16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x1 y15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . y0
Stage No. 25
5
2
4
4
2
2
7
1
9
3
1
6
1
1
3
4
1
0
5
9
8
7
4
5
8
4
4
2
1
1
9
9 6 1 1
1
1
1
4
2
1
7
3
2
0
4
1
1
1
5
4
4
1
2
3
2
2
4
7
1
1
8
2
1
3
5
2
1
7
9
6
6
1
7
8
0
1st value 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2nd value 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Thus, we see that state convergence can occur throughout the diffusion pro-
cess of Sfinks cipher. There are 120 iterations that may carry a state convergence
during the initialisation. Based on the probability of convergence detemined
above, an approximate estimate for the proportion of distinct states remaining
after 128 iterations is (1 − 2−6.9)120 = 0.9963. Thus, the number of reachable
distinct states is approximately (1 − 2−6.9)120 × 2160 = 2158.55. This can be re-
garded as an approximate upper bound as there may be other mechanisms of
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Table 4.6: Two states (hex) which converge to the same state at t = −120
SA−127 319B7E15AF4FF13189DF0800ADAC56A40913E4B90CBEEBD3A0074AFD3351E580
SB−127 719B7E15AF4FF1318DCF0802AD8C56A42913E4B90CBEEBD3A0074AFD3351E581
S−120 3EE336FC2B7E9FE2631BBE10015B18AD485227C972187DD3A7500C95FA64A3CB
convergence in addition to these we have identified.
4.3 Slid Pairs and Synchronisation Attacks
As discussed in Chapter 3, for stream ciphers, it is sometimes possible to
find different key-IV pairs that produce phase shifted keystreams [25, 42, 73, 86,
108]. The state update function for the initialisation process defines a cycle of
transitions of the internal state. Therefore, each (K, IV) pair represents a point
on such a cycle. If it is possible to find a second loaded state generated by a pair
(K ′, IV′) as a slid pair of the key-IV pair (K, IV) after a number of iterations,
α, then, the (K ′, IV′) pair is in the same cycle as the (K, IV) pair. As discussed
previously, the probability of obtaining shifted keystream sequences from such
a pair depends on the distance between (K ′, IV′) and (K, IV) and the degree
of similarity of the state update functions used during the initialisation process
and the keystream generation process.
4.3.1 Slid Pairs Using Sfinks
The main purpose of this analysis is to identify conditions under which a slid
key-IV pair of the Sfinks cipher is obtained from a specific loaded key-IV after
a number of iterations α. Comparing the properties listed in Section 2.7.3 with
the Sfinks cipher, we note that properties (a) and (b) apply, but the state up-
date functions during the initialisation and keystream generation processes are
somewhat different. The format of the loaded state is specified. For a given
particular key-IV pair, the task is to identify when the next loaded state may
occur during the initialisation process. Moreover, it is important to determine a
relationship between the original loaded key-IV pair (K, IV) and the next slid
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key-IV pair (K ′, IV′), which is derived from the original key-IV after a given
number of iterations α.
Analysis of the Sfinks stream cipher initialisation process is complicated by
the delay of 7 clocking steps in feeding the S-box output back into the shift
register, S. However, we observe that the correspondence between the content
of stage s95 = 1 and the next output feedback stage from the S-box s80 may lead
to slid pairs after a number of iterations α.
Some conditions need to be met for loaded state of Sfinks to produce a slid pair
after α iterations. Slid pairs can occur after α iterations if the content of the stage
s95α is 1 and the stages from s
94
α to s
0
α are all zeros (to follow the Sfinks’ loading
format). The input bits to the S-box from (x10t to x
1
t ) should be zeros except
some cases as shown below. The output of the S-box (y110,t, y
9
0,t, y
4
0,t, y
2
0,t, y
1
0,t, y
0
0,t)
should also be zeros except y00,15 at t = 15 and other special cases as shown later.
The content of stage s95−αα can become 0 by flipping the content of the stage
s950 to 0 during the α iterations. The content of the stage s
95
α should be 1. These
can be achieved by two steps. Firstly, the content of the stage s950 can be flipped
after 15 iterations, due to the next output stage of the S-box s8015. That requires
that the S-box output y00,15 = 1, so that s
80
15 ⊕ y06,15 = 0. Secondly, to ensure the
content of stage s95α is 1 after α iterations, the content of the stage s
95+α
0 should
be 1. The content of stages s95+α−10 to s
96
0 should be zeros and the output stages
that lie between s95 and s0 should be maintained to meet the required contents,
zeros, during the α iterations. Based on these requirements, it is impossible to
get slid pairs before t < 15.
For α ≥ 15 iterations, it may be possible that slid pairs occur. If α = 15,
then the content of stage s1100 should be 1 as it will be shifted to s
95
15 after 15
iterations. Note that this value of 1 will pass the input stages s105 at t = 5 and
s98 at t = 12. The input stage s105 should be considered where the output stages
(y116,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) are zeros. The content of the input stage s
98 will be
1 at t = 12 and its output will feed back at t = 19. This is after getting the
required slid pair but will affect the content of the pipeline.
We applied exhaustive search over the inputs and outputs of the S-box to find
appropriate inputs and outputs to meet the required conditions. For α = 15,
there is no input value to the S-box with (x9t , . . . , x
1
t ) = (0, . . . , 0) and x
10
t = 1
that gives (y116,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) = (0, . . . , 0). Therefore more iterations are
required to obtain a slid pair. Additionally, the only input to the S-box that
118 Chapter 4. Analysis of Sfinks Stream Cipher Initialisation Process
satisfies the condition (x10t , . . . , x
1
t ) = (0, . . . , 0) is the 16 zeros (0, . . . , 0) inputs
that gives 16 output of zeros (0, . . . , 0) at any time t. So, this type of input cannot
flip the content of s80. Likewise, it is not possible to satisfy the conditions for a
slid pair to occur at t = 16.
However, for α ≥ 17 iterations, slid pairs are possible using specific conditions
between the outputs of the S-box. In this case we look for two output stages with
the shortest distance between them, namely s11 and s17. These conditions are
applied to the input and output of the S-box during the α iterations. According
to the Sfinks’ format pattern, the input of the S-box (x10t , . . . , x
1
t ) must be zeros
(0, . . . , 0) during the affected iterations (from 0 ≤ t ≤ (α − 7) except some
iterations). For example, the content of the input stage s105α−10 will be 1, which
is the input bit of S-box x10α−10 = 1. These conditions of the input of the S-box
apply up to t = α − 7. The output of the S-box during the α iterations should
maintain the Sfinks’ pattern at t = α. Therefore, the output bit of the S-box
(y110,t, y
9
0,t, y
4
0,t, y
2
0,t, y
1
0,t, y
0
0,t) should be zeros. There are some exceptions for these
conditions. For example, at time t = 15 the y00,15 should have 1 to flip the value
of s8015 to 0. As well, it may be required to flip some bits and flip them again to 0
during the α iterations. This process is according to the available input-output
pairs of the S-box that follow the required conditions as shown later.
The new-bit of the shift register s255t is an input of the S-box, x
16
t . Therefore, it
introduces another condition for the linear feedback function of the shift register.
If the required new-bit of the shift register is 0 and the real new-bit is 1, there
is freedom to flip any tap-bit of the linear feedback function to get the required
bit without changing any other condition.
The cases α = 17, 18 and 19 are investigated in the following section. A
general method of generating slid pairs can be applied until α = 23 (by fixing
56 key bits and 45 IV bits). After that, the situation becomes more complicated
because the interaction between the linear feedback function and the S-box out-
put stages is more complex. Another method may be required to identify slid
pairs for higher values of α.
Limitations of this work. The analysis above considered only the contents
of the shift register, S, and neglected the content of the pipeline. However the
format for the loaded state of Sfinks includes the pipeline that contains all zeros.
It is impossible to obtain a slid pair with all zeros in the pipeline. To clarify this
issue, note that if a slid pair occurs at t = α then s95 must be 1 at t = α and
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hence s98 will be 1 at t = α − 3. However, the stage s98 is an input stage for
S-box, and therefore, the S-box output at t = α− 3 cannot be all zeros. Thus at
least one entry in the pipeline at t = α must be non-zero.
4.3.2 Analysis of Slid Pairs
Procedures
This section describes the procedures used to obtain the first occurrence of slid
pairs, and the simulation of the Sfinks cipher to obtain slid pairs at time α = 17,
18 and 19. This simulation requires an exhaustive search over the inputs and
outputs of the S-box. The procedures used to obtain the following result are:
• Use the published C source code of Sfinks [75] to identify the required
inputs and outputs of the S-box to satisfy the conditions for α = 17, 18
and 19, as shown later.
• Based on the output of the previous point, generate the two internal state
with difference of α steps.
• Based on the output of the previous point, determine the specifc values of
the the first key-IV pair, (K, IV).
• Generate the relationship between the first key-IV, (K, IV), and second
key-IV, (K ′, IV′), pairs.
slid pair at α = 17.
As described above the first slid pair can occur at α = 17. The following steps
and processes are required to obtain the second pair.
• A specific input is applied to the S-box at t = 1 to obtain y16,1 = 1. So, the
input to the S-box satisfies (x101 , . . . , x
1
1) = (0, . . . , 0) and the output must
have (y116,1, y
9
6,1, y
4
6,1, y
2
6,1, y
0
6,1) = (0, . . . , 0) and y
1
6,1 = 1. This will flip s
17
8 to
1.
• For 2 ≤ t ≤ 6, the input to the S-box must satisfy (x10t , . . . , x1t ) = (0, . . . , 0)
and give (y116,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) = (0, . . . , 0).
• The value of s178 = 1 will be shifted to s1114 after 6 iterations.
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• At time t = 7, a specific input to the S-box is required so that its output will
flip the value of s1114 to 0 at t = 14 with the input to the S-box (x
9
7, . . . , x
1
7) =
(0, . . . , 0) and x107 = 1 and the output (y
9
6,7, y
4
6,7, y
2
6,7, y
1
6,7, y
0
6,7) = (0, . . . , 0)
and y116,7 = 1. This output will result in flipping the s
11
14 to 0.
• At t = 8, the input to the S-box should be specified to be (x18, . . . , x108 ) =
(0, . . . , 0). This input must result in the output (y116,8, y
9
6,8, y
4
6,8, y
2
6,8, y
1
6,8) =
(0, . . . , 0) and y06,8 = 1. At t = 15, it will flip the value of s
80
15 to 0.
• For 9 ≤ t ≤ 10, the following input to the S-box is applied to insure
(x10t , . . . , x
1
t ) = (0, . . . , 0) that should result in (y
11
6,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) =
(0, . . . , 0).
• After t = 10, it is not important to restrict the input to the S-box.
• To maintain the new-bit, s255t for t ≥ 1, it requires 10 tap-bits of the linear
feedback function to be manipulated as necessary. The tap-bits are chosen
to be s1250 to s
134
0 that carry k29 to k38, respectively.
Table 4.7 shows an exhaustive search of the required input/output pairs of
the S-box that satisfy the above procedure. The c1, c2, c3, b1 and b2 are for later
reference in the next section.
Table 4.7: Input/output of the S-box to get the slid pairs at α = 17
Input Output
time Value time Value
1 0011110000000000 =⇒ 8 0110000100000010
7
c1 = 0001101000000000
=⇒ 14
0000110001101000
c2 = 1010111000000000 1000110011000000
c3 = 1100111000000000 0011110100100000
8
b1 = 1000000000000000 =⇒ 15 1010000101101001
b2 = 0111100000000000 0011000010000001
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slid pair at α = 18.
As presented above for the slid pairs at α = 17, it is possible to obtain other slid
pairs at α = 18. The following steps and processes are applied to get the slid
pair.
• From t = 1, the following input to the S-box is applied to insure the
(x101 , . . . , x
1
1) = (0, . . . , 0) that will insure (y
11
6,1, y
9
6,1, y
4
6,1, y
2
6,1, y
1
6,1, y
0
6,1) =
(0, . . . , 0).
• Specific inputs are applied to the S-box at t = 2 to obtain y16,2 = 1, at
t = 9 the input to the S-box is (x10t , . . . , x
1
t ) = (0, . . . , 0) and the output is
(y116,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
0
6,t) = (0, . . . , 0) and y
1
6,t = 1. This will flip s
17
9 to 1.
• The value of s179 = 1 will be shifted to s1115 after 6 iterations.
• For 3 ≤ t ≤ 7, the following inputs are applied to the S-box to insure
(x10t , . . . , x
1
t ) = (0, . . . , 0) to obtain (y
11
6,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) = (0, . . . , 0).
• At time t = 8, a specific input to the S-box is required so that its output
will flip the value of s1115 and s
80
15 to 0 at t = 15 with the input to the S-box
(x98, . . . , x
1
8) = (0, . . . , 0) and x
10
8 = 1 and the output (y
9
6,8, y
4
6,8, y
2
6,8, y
1
6,8) =
(0, . . . , 0) y06,8 = 1 and y
11
6,8 = 1. This output will result in flipping s
11
15 and
s8015 to 0.
• For 9 ≤ t ≤ 11, the following input is applied to the S-box to insure
(x10t , . . . , x
1
t ) = (0, . . . , 0) that will result in (y
11
6,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) =
(0, . . . , 0).
• After t = 11, it is not important to restrict the input to the S-box.
• To maintain the new-bit, s255t for t ≥ 1, it requires 11 tap-bits of the linear
feedback function to be manipulated as necessary. The tap-bits are chosen
to be s2120 to s
222
0 that carry v36 to v46, respectively.
Table 4.8 gives a result of an exhaustive search of the required input/output
pairs of the S-box that satisfy the above procedure.
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Table 4.8: Input/output of the S-box to get the slid pairs at α = 18
Input Output
time Value time Value
2 0011110000000000 =⇒ 9 0110000100000010
8
d1 = 1011011000000000 =⇒ 15 1000100000001001
d2 = 0000111000000000 1010100101001001
slid pair at α = 19.
This case is similar to the slid pair at α = 17 with some difference in the tap
positions. It is possible to obtain slid pairs at time α = 19 as follow.
• For 1 ≤ t ≤ 2, the zeros inputs are applied to the S-box to insure (x10t , . . . , x1t ) =
(0, . . . , 0) to obtain (y116,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) = (0, . . . , 0).
• A specific input is applied to the S-box at t = 3 to obtain y16,3 = 1. So
, the input to the S-box is (x103 , . . . , x
1
3) = (0, . . . , 0) and the output is
(y116,3, y
9
6,3, y
4
6,3, y
2
6,3, y
0
6,3) = (0, . . . , 0) and y
1
6,3 = 1. This will flip s
17
10 to 1 at
time t = 10.
• For 4 ≤ t ≤ 7, the zeros inputs are applied to the S-box to insure (x10t , . . . , x1t ) =
(0, . . . , 0) to obtain (y116,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) = (0, . . . , 0).
• At t = 8, the input to the S-box should be specified to be (x18, . . . , x108 ) =
(0, . . . , 0). This input will result in the output (y116,8, y
9
6,8, y
4
6,8, y
2
6,8, y
1
6,8) =
(0, . . . , 0) and y06,8 = 1. At t = 15, it will flip the value of s
80
15 to 0.
• The value of s1710 = 1 will be shifted to s1116 after 6 iterations.
• At time t = 9, a specific input to the S-box is required so that its output
will flip the value of s1116 to 0. The input to the S-box are (x
9
9, . . . , x
1
9) =
(0, . . . , 0) and x109 = 1 and the output (y
9
6,9, y
4
6,9, y
2
6,9, y
1
6,9, y
0
6,9) = (0, . . . , 0)
and y116,9 = 1. This output will result in flipping s
11
16 to 0 at time t = 16.
• For 10 ≤ t ≤ 12, the zeros input is applied to the S-box to insure that
(x10t , . . . , x
1
t ) = (0, . . . , 0) to get (y
11
6,t, y
9
6,t, y
4
6,t, y
2
6,t, y
1
6,t, y
0
6,t) = (0, . . . , 0).
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• After t = 12, it is not important to restrict the input to the S-box.
• To maintain the new-bit, s255t for t ≥ 1, it requires 12 tap-bits of the linear
feedback function to be manipulated as necessary. The tap-bits are chosen
to be s2120 to s
223
0 that carry v36 to v47, respectively.
As shown above, Table 4.9 shows all the possible input/output values to the
S-box using an exhaustive search of the required of the S-box that satisfy the
above procedure.
Table 4.9: Input/output of the S-box to get the slid pairs at α = 19
Input Output
time Value time Value
3 0011110000000000 =⇒ 10 0110000100000010
8
b1 = 1000000000000000 =⇒ 15 1010000101101001
b2 = 0111100000000000 0011000010000001
9
e1 = 0001101000000000
=⇒ 16
0000110001101000
e2 = 1010111000000000 1000110011000000
e3 = 1100111000000000 0011110100100000
4.3.3 Findings and Results
This section focuses on the result of the analysis of slid pairs according to the
previous procedures that are applied to the Sfinks cipher. The findings of slid
pairs are presented after different number of iterations at t = 17, 18 and 19.
At each specific number of iterations, the slid pairs have specific conditions and
relationship between these slid key-IV pairs. To remind the reader, yij,t denotes
the i-th bit of j-th word of the memory at time t, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15}.
slid pair at t = 17.
The slid pair is found for a key-IV with conditions. These conditions to get
another key-IV pair at α = 17 are to have specific values for some key-IV bits.
There are 40 key bits and 30 IV bits respectively which should have specific
values as shown below.
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ki = 0, i ∈ {75, 74, 71, 70, 69, 68, 67, 48, 47, 46, 44, 43,
42, 41, 40, 19, 18, 17, 15, 14, 13, 12, 11,
10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
ki = 1, i ∈ {72, 66, 39, 16}
(k73, k45) =

(0, 0) for x8 = b1 and x7 = c1
(0, 1) for x8 = b1 and x7 = c2
(0, 1) for x8 = b1 and x7 = c3
(1, 0) for x8 = b2 and x7 = c1
(1, 1) for x8 = b2 and x7 = c2
(1, 1) for x8 = b2 and x7 = c3
vi = 0, i ∈ {78, 77, 74, 73, 72, 71, 70, 69, 61, 60, 57, 56,
55, 54, 53, 27, 26, 23, 22, 21, 20, 19}
vi = 1, i ∈ {52, 18}
(v76, v75, v59, v58, v25, v24) =

(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) for x8 = b1 and x7 = c1
(0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) for x8 = b1 and x7 = c2
(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) for x8 = b1 and x7 = c3
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1) for x8 = b2 and x7 = c1
(1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) for x8 = b2 and x7 = c2
(1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) for x8 = b2 and x7 = c3
There are 40 and 50 free key and IV bits respectively as shown below.
ki, i ∈ {79, 78, 77, 76, 65, 64, 63, 62, 61, 60, 59, 58, 57, 56,
55, 54, 53, 52, 51, 50, 49, 38, 37, 36, 35, 34, 33,
32, 31, 30, 29, 28, 27, 26, 25, 24, 23, 22, 21, 20}
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vi, i ∈ {79, 68, 67, 66, 65, 64, 63, 62, 51, 50, 49, 48, 47, 46,
45, 44, 43, 42, 41, 40, 39, 38, 37, 36, 35, 34, 33, 32,
31, 30, 29, 28, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7,
6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
There are 6 possibilities of the input to the S-box to satisfy the required
condition to get slid pairs at t = 17. The second key-IV, (K ′, IV′), pair can be
expressed in the form of the first key-IV, (K, IV), pair as follow. Note: Terms
printed in boldface are known bits, the values of which depend on the input of
the S-box as shown in Table 4.10.
v′79 = v52 ⊕ y56,8 ⊕ v34 ⊕ v32 ⊕ v27 ⊕ v3 ⊕ k71 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k5
v′78 = v51 ⊕ y56,7 ⊕ v33 ⊕ v31 ⊕ v26 ⊕ v2 ⊕ k70 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k4
v′77 = v50 ⊕ v32 ⊕ v30 ⊕ v25 ⊕ v1 ⊕ k69 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k3
v′76 = v49 ⊕ v31 ⊕ v29 ⊕ v24 ⊕ v0 ⊕ k68 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k2
v′75 = v48 ⊕ v30 ⊕ v28 ⊕ v23 ⊕ k79 ⊕ k67 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k1
v′74 = v47 ⊕ v29 ⊕ v27 ⊕ v22 ⊕ k78 ⊕ k66 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k0 ⊕ 1
v′73 = v46 ⊕ v28 ⊕ v26 ⊕ v21 ⊕ k77 ⊕ k65 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k21 ⊕ 1
v′72 = v45 ⊕ v27 ⊕ v25 ⊕ v20 ⊕ k76 ⊕ k64 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k20 = 0
v′71 = v44 ⊕ v26 ⊕ v24 ⊕ v19 ⊕ k75 ⊕ k63 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k19 ⊕ 1 = 0
v′70 = v43 ⊕ v25 ⊕ v23 ⊕ v18 ⊕ k74 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k18 = a1
v′69 = v42 ⊕ v24 ⊕ v22 ⊕ v17 ⊕ k73 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k17 = a2
v′68 = v41 ⊕ v23 ⊕ v21 ⊕ v16 ⊕ k72 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k24 ⊕ 1 = 0
v′67 = v40 ⊕ v22 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v15 ⊕ k71 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k15 = 0
v′66 = v39 ⊕ v21 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v14 ⊕ k70 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k14 = 0
v′65 = v38 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v13 ⊕ k69 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k21 ⊕ k13 = 0
v′64 = v37 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v12 ⊕ k68 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k20 ⊕ k12 = 0
v′63 = v36 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v11 ⊕ k67 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k19 ⊕ k11 = 0
v′62 = v79
v′61 = v78 = 0
v′60 = v77 = 0
v′59 = v76
v′58 = v75
v′57 = v74 = 0
v′56 = v73 = 0
v′55 = v72 = 0
v′54 = v71 ⊕ y86,8
v′53 = v70 ⊕ y86,7
v′52 = v69 = 0
v′51 = v68
v′50 = v67
v′49 = v66
v′48 = v65
v′47 = v64 ⊕ 1
v′46 = v63
v′45 = v62
v′44 = v61 = 0
v′43 = v60 = 0
v′42 = v59
v′41 = v58
v′40 = v57 = 0
v′39 = v56 = 0
v′38 = v55 = 0
v′37 = v54 = 0
v′36 = v53 = 0
v′35 = 1⊕ y56,8
v′34 = v51 ⊕ y56,7
v′33 = v50
v′32 = v49
v′31 = v48
v′30 = v47
v′29 = v46
v′28 = v45
v′27 = v44
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v′26 = v43 ⊕ y126,8
v′25 = v42 ⊕ y126,7
v′24 = v41
v′23 = v40
v′22 = v39
v′21 = v38
v′20 = v37
v′19 = v36
v′18 = v35
v′17 = v34
v′16 = v33
v′15 = v32
v′14 = v31
v′13 = v30
v′12 = v29
v′11 = v28
v′10 = v27 = 0
v′9 = v26 = 0
v′8 = v25
v′7 = v24
v′6 = v23 = 0
v′5 = v22 = 0
v′4 = v21 = 0
v′3 = v20 = 0
v′2 = v19 = 0
v′1 = 1⊕ y36,8
v′0 = v17 ⊕ y36,7
k′79 = v16
k′78 = v15
k′77 = v14
k′76 = v13
k′75 = v12 ⊕ 1
k′74 = v11 ⊕ y136,7
k′73 = v10
k′72 = v9
k′71 = v8
k′70 = v7
k′69 = v6
k′68 = v5 ⊕ 1
k′67 = v4
k′66 = v3
k′65 = v2
k′64 = v1
k′63 = v0
k′62 = k79
k′61 = k78
k′60 = k77
k′59 = k76
k′58 = k75 = 0
k′57 = k74 = 0
k′56 = k73
k′55 = k72 ⊕ 1 = 0
k′54 = k71 = 0
k′53 = k70 = 0
k′52 = k69 = 0
k′51 = k68 = 0
k′50 = k67 = 0
k′49 = k66 = 1
k′48 = k65
k′47 = k64
k′46 = k63
k′45 = k62
k′44 = k61
k′43 = k60
k′42 = k59
k′41 = k58
k′40 = k57
k′39 = k56
k′38 = k55
k′37 = k54 ⊕ 1
k′36 = k53
k′35 = k52
k′34 = k51
k′33 = k50
k′32 = k49
k′31 = k48 = 0
k′30 = k47 = 0
k′29 = k46 = 0
k′28 = k45
k′27 = k44 = 0
k′26 = k43 = 0
k′25 = k42 = 0
k′24 = k41 = 0
k′23 = k40 = 0
k′22 = k39 = 1
k′21 = k38
k′20 = k37 ⊕ y66,8
k′19 = k36 ⊕ y66,7
k′18 = k35
k′17 = k34
k′16 = k33
k′15 = k32
k′14 = k31
k′13 = k30 ⊕ y156,8
k′12 = k29 ⊕ y156,7
k′11 = k28
k′10 = k27
k′9 = k26
k′8 = k25
k′7 = k24
k′6 = k23
k′5 = k22
k′4 = k21
k′3 = k20
k′2 = k19 = 0
k′1 = k18 = 0
k′0 = k17 = 0
Note that 32 bits of v′ and 23 bits of k′ are fixed by the above relations.
slid pair at α = 18.
For slid pair at α = 18, the conditions to get another key-IV pair are to have
specific values for some key-IV bits at t = 0. There are 43 and 33 bits of key and
IV respectively which must have fixed values as shown below.
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Table 4.10: Six alternative inputs and outputs to the S-box at α = 17
Conditions Input
x8 x7 a1 v76 v59 v25 k73 a2 v75 v58 v24 k45
b1 c1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
b1 c2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
b1 c3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 . . .
b2 c1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
b2 c2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
b2 c3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
Output
y56,8 y
8
6,8 y
12
6,8 y
3
6,8 y
6
6,8 y
15
6,8 y
5
6,7 y
8
6,7 y
12
6,7 y
3
6,7 y
13
6,7 y
6
6,7 y
15
6,7
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
. . . 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
ki = 0, i ∈{76, 75, 74, 72, 71, 70, 69, 68, 66, 49, 48, 47, 45, 44,
43, 42, 41, 39, 20, 19, 18, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10,
9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
ki = 1, i ∈{67, 46, 40, 17}
k73 =
{
0 for x8 = d1
1 for x8 = d2
vi = 0, i ∈{79, 78, 77, 76, 75, 74, 73, 72, 71, 70, 69, 62, 61, 60
58, 57, 56, 55, 54, 52, 28, 27, 26, 24, 23, 22,
21, 20, 18}
vi = 1, i ∈{53, 19}
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(v59, v25) =
{
(1, 1) for x8 = d1
(0, 0) for x8 = d2
There are 37 and 47 free key and IV bits respectively as shown.
ki, i ∈ {79, 78, 77, 65, 64, 63, 62, 61, 60, 59, 58, 57, 56, 55, 54,
53, 52, 51, 50, 38, 37, 36, 35, 34, 33, 32, 31, 30, 29, 28,
27, 26, 25, 24, 23, 22, 21}
vi, i ∈ {68, 67, 66, 65, 64, 63, 51, 50, 49, 48, 47, 46, 45, 44, 43,
42, 41, 40, 39, 38, 37, 36, 35, 34, 33, 32, 31, 30, 29, 17,
16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
There are two possibilities of the input to the S-box to satisfy the required
conditions to get a slid pair at α = 18. The second key-IV pair, (K ′, IV′), can
be expressed in term of the first key-IV, (K, IV), as follow. Note: terms printed
in boldface are known bits, the values of which depend on the input of the S-box
as shown in Table 4.11.
v′79 = v53 ⊕ v35 ⊕ v33 ⊕ v28 ⊕ v4 ⊕ k72 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k6
v′78 = v52 ⊕ v34 ⊕ v32 ⊕ v27 ⊕ v3 ⊕ k71 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k5
v′77 = v51 ⊕ v33 ⊕ v31 ⊕ v26 ⊕ v2 ⊕ k70 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k4
v′76 = v50 ⊕ v32 ⊕ v30 ⊕ v25 ⊕ v1 ⊕ k69 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k3
v′75 = v49 ⊕ v31 ⊕ v29 ⊕ v24 ⊕ v0 ⊕ k68 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k2
v′74 = v48 ⊕ v30 ⊕ v28 ⊕ v23 ⊕ k79 ⊕ k67 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k1 ⊕ 1
v′73 = v47 ⊕ v29 ⊕ v27 ⊕ v22 ⊕ k78 ⊕ k66 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k0
v′72 = v46 ⊕ v28 ⊕ v26 ⊕ v21 ⊕ k77 ⊕ k65 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k21 ⊕ 1 = 0
v′71 = v45 ⊕ v27 ⊕ v25 ⊕ v20 ⊕ k76 ⊕ k64 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k20 = 0
v′70 = v44 ⊕ v26 ⊕ v24 ⊕ v19 ⊕ k75 ⊕ k63 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k19 = 0
v′69 = v43 ⊕ v25 ⊕ v23 ⊕ v18 ⊕ k74 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k18 = a3
v′68 = v42 ⊕ v24 ⊕ v22 ⊕ v17 ⊕ k73 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k17 ⊕ 1 = 0
v′67 = v41 ⊕ v23 ⊕ v21 ⊕ v16 ⊕ k72 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k16 = 0
v′66 = v40 ⊕ v22 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v15 ⊕ k71 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k15 = 0
v′65 = v39 ⊕ v21 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v14 ⊕ k70 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k14 = 0
v′64 = v38 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v13 ⊕ k69 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k21 ⊕ k13 = 0
v′63 = v37 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v12 ⊕ k68 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k20 ⊕ k12 = 0
v′62 = v36 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v11 ⊕ k67 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k19 ⊕ k11 = 0
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v′61 = v79 = 0
v′60 = v78 = 0
v′59 = v77 = 0
v′58 = v76 = 0
v′57 = v75 = 0
v′56 = v74 = 0
v′55 = v73 = 0
v′54 = v72 = 0
v′53 = v71 ⊕ y86,8
v′52 = v70 = 0
v′51 = v69 = 0
v′50 = v68
v′49 = v67
v′48 = v66
v′47 = v65 ⊕ 1
v′46 = v64
v′45 = v63
v′44 = v62 = 0
v′43 = v61 = 0
v′42 = v60 = 0
v′41 = v59
v′40 = v58 = 0
v′39 = v57 = 0
v′38 = v56 = 0
v′37 = v55 = 0
v′36 = v54 = 0
v′35 = v53 = 1
v′34 = v52 = 0
v′33 = v51
v′32 = v50
v′31 = v49
v′30 = v48
v′29 = v47
v′28 = v46
v′27 = v45
v′26 = v44
v′25 = v43
v′24 = v42
v′23 = v41
v′22 = v40
v′21 = v39
v′20 = v38
v′19 = v37
v′18 = v36
v′17 = v35
v′16 = v34
v′15 = v33
v′14 = v32
v′13 = v31
v′12 = v30
v′11 = v29
v′10 = v28 = 0
v′9 = v27 = 0
v′8 = v26 = 0
v′7 = v25
v′6 = v24 = 0
v′5 = v23 = 0
v′4 = v22 = 0
v′3 = v21 = 0
v′2 = v20 = 0
v′1 = v19 = 1
v′0 = v18 ⊕ 1 = 1
k′79 = v17
k′78 = v16
k′77 = v15
k′76 = v14
k′75 = v13
k′74 = v12 ⊕ y136,8
k′73 = v11
k′72 = v10
k′71 = v9
k′70 = v8
k′69 = v7
k′68 = v6 ⊕ 1
k′67 = v5
k′66 = v4
k′65 = v3
k′64 = v2
k′63 = v1
k′62 = v0
k′61 = k79
k′60 = k78
k′59 = k77
k′58 = k76 = 0
k′57 = k75 = 0
k′56 = k74 = 0
k′55 = k73
k′54 = k72 = 0
k′53 = k71 = 0
k′52 = k70 = 0
k′51 = k69 = 0
k′50 = k68 = 0
k′49 = k67 = 1
k′48 = k66 = 0
k′47 = k65
k′46 = k64
k′45 = k63
k′44 = k62
k′43 = k61
k′42 = k60
k′41 = k59
k′40 = k58
k′39 = k57
k′38 = k56
k′37 = k55 ⊕ 1
k′36 = k54
k′35 = k53
k′34 = k52
k′33 = k51
k′32 = k50
k′31 = k49 = 0
k′30 = k48 = 0
k′29 = k47 = 0
k′28 = k46 = 1
k′27 = k45 = 0
k′26 = k44 = 0
k′25 = k43 = 0
k′24 = k42 = 0
k′23 = k41 = 0
k′22 = k40 = 1
k′21 = k39 = 0
k′20 = k38
k′19 = k37 ⊕ y66,8
k′18 = k36
k′17 = k35
k′16 = k34
k′15 = k33
k′14 = k32
k′13 = k31
k′12 = k30 ⊕ 1
k′11 = k29
k′10 = k28
k′9 = k27
k′8 = k26
k′7 = k25
k′6 = k24
k′5 = k23
k′4 = k22
k′3 = k21
k′2 = k20 = 0
k′1 = k19 = 0
k′0 = k18 = 0
Note that 43 bits of v′ and 25 bits of k′ are fixed by the above relations.
slid pair at α = 19.
For the slid pair at α = 19, there are 47 and 36 bits of key and IV respectively
which must take fixed value as follow.
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Table 4.11: Two alternative inputs and outputs to the S-box at α = 18
Condition Input Output
x8 a3 v59 v25 k73 y
13
8 y
8
8 y
6
8
b1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
b2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
ki = 0, i ∈{77, 76, 75, 74, 72, 71, 70, 69, 67, 66, 50, 49, 48,
46, 45, 44, 43, 42, 40, 39, 21, 20, 19, 17, 16, . . . , 0}
ki = 1, i ∈{68, 41, 18, 17}
(k73, k47) =

(0, 0) for x8 = b1 and x9 = e1
(0, 1) for x8 = b1 and x9 = e2
(0, 1) for x8 = b1 and x9 = e3
(1, 0) for x8 = b2 and x9 = e1
(1, 1) for x8 = b2 and x9 = e2
(1, 1) for x8 = b2 and x9 = e3
vi = 0, i ∈{79, 78, 76, 75, 74, 73, 72, 71, 70, 69, 63, 62, 61, 58,
57, 56, 55, 53, 52, 29, 28, 27, 24, 23, 22, 21, 19, 18}
vi = 1, i ∈{54, 20}
(v77, v76, v60, v59, v26, v25) =

(0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) for x8 = b1 and x9 = e1
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) for x8 = b1 and x9 = e2
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) for x8 = b1 and x9 = e3
(0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) for x8 = b2 and x9 = e1
(0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) for x8 = b2 and x9 = e2
(1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) for x8 = b2 and x9 = e3
As for the cases α = 17 and 18, expressions can again be determined for (K ′,
IV′) in terms of (K, IV). These are not reported in this thesis.
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All the slid pairs are obtained using computer simulation for all possible
inputs and outputs of the S-box. As shown previously, slid pairs occur according
to specific conditions at time t ≥ 17. Slid pairs occur with a limitation, where
the pipeline cannot be reset to all zeros.
Shifted Keystream
We now consider the additional constraints which must be satisfied in order for
slid pair (K, IV) and (K ′, IV′) to generate shifted keystream sequences. These
constraints depend on the degree of the similarity between the state update
functions during the initialisation and keystream generation processes.
To obtain a shifted keystream from the slid pairs at α = 17, all the output
of the S-box for the last 17 iterations of the initialisation process (from t = 111
to t = 128) should be all zeros to get the linear feedback during these iterations
of the initialisation process. Therefore, the input of the S-box from t = 104 to
t = 121 should be zeros. To ensure all the relevent input bits are zeros, there
are 187 bits which should be fixed and another 17 bits to be fixed for the linear
feedback function. The total fixed bits are 204 bits. The probability of satisfying
204 independent constraints is 2−204. In this case, the free bits at the loaded state
are 90 bits. Hence, there are 290 possible slid pairs and the probability of slid
pair gives an out of phase keystream is 2−204. Therefore, the expected number
of shifted keystream sequences from these slid pairs = 2−204× 290 = 2−114. So, it
seems extremely unlikely that any shifted keystream will result from any of the
slid pairs.
Similarly, for the slid pairs at α = 18 and 19, the last 18 and 19 outputs of
the S-box should be zeros respectively. The total fixed bits in these cases are 211
and 218 bits. The probability of satisfying 211 and 218 independent constraints
are 2−211 and 2−218 respectively. In this case, the free bits at the loaded state
are 84 and 79 bits. Therefore expected number of keystream out of phase shifted
by 18 and 19 bits from any of the relevant slid pairs are 2(−211+84) = 2−127 and
2(−218+79) = 2−139.
4.3.4 Attack Procedure
Since Sfinks has an 80-bit key and a 256-bit shift register, it is not feasible
to simply guess the whole secret key and then generate the keystream to check
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whether the guess is correct. However, if it is possible to identify the occurrence of
a slid pair (extremely unlikely as discussed previously), this enables us to use the
resulting relationship to reduce the number of key bits that need to be guessed,
forming the basis for an attack on the cipher. The attack presented in this
research uses the properties of the slide attacks. We assume a known-plaintext
attack scenario. The following algorithm outlines the attacking procedure.
This algorithm is described for 17-bit shifted versions of keystream. How-
ever, it can be extended to other shifts as well. The algorithm depends on two
keystreams with unknown secret keys and known IV’s such that the resulting
keystreams are shifted versions of one another. Note that we are interested here
to find the secret keys.
Recalling the specification of the loading phase of Sfinks in Section 4.1, it is
impossible to find two shifted keystreams generated by a secret key with different
IV’s. Therefore, in this case, we are focusing on two keystreams generated by
diferent key-IV pairs, (K, IV) and (K ′, IV′). (K, IV)
Attacking Algorithm
Inputs: Pairs of plaintext and ciphertext.
Step 1: From the known-plaintext-ciphertext attack, XOR the plaintext with
the corresponding ciphertext to get the keystream sequence.
Step 2: Divide each keystream sequence into separate keystreams. Each keystream
corresponds to a different key-IV combination based on the rekying process.
Step 3: Check the similarity of keystreami and keystreamj  17 for every
available key-IV pair, using keystreami ⊕ keystreamj  17.
• If identical, note the key-IV pairs (K, IV) and (K ′, IV′).
• If not, the algorithm fails for this 17-bit shift.
Step 4: If shifted keystream has been identified, guess and check each possible
key, as follows
• Using the relevant equations for t = 17 as shown above, where the
IV’s (IV and IV′) are known.
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• Due to the slid pairs, there are 40 and 23 bits of the K and K ′ are
known and fixed,
• Guess the 40 free key bits of K in the relevant set of equations as
shown above.
• Use these free key bits and the known IV’s to calculate the remaining
key bits of K ′ using the related equations as shown above.
• Use the generated secret keyK ′ with the corresponding IV′ to generate
its keystream using the Sfinks algorithm.
• Compare between the generated keystream and the known keystream.
– If they are identical, the secret keys K and K ′ have been found.
– If not, repeat the process for another guess of K and calculate
the K ′.
Step 5: Use the secret key K and K ′ with known IV’s to decrypt the entire
related ciphertexts.
Outputs: The secret keys K and K ′.
Comments on algorithm:
In Step 3, if two keystreams have been identified as shifted keystream by 17
bits, then the guessing process should cover the 40 free key bits instead of the 80
key bits. For each guess, it requires to substitute the guessed key bits into the
relevant equations as mentioned above to find the secret key K ′. At this time, it
is not clear whether the guessed key is correct or not. The proposed key must be
verified by generating a keystream that should be same as the known keystream.
If the generated keystream is identical to the known keystream then the
secret key is correct, if not use another guess. Note that the above algorithm is
for 17-bit shifts. If it fails, then it is possible to try for 18-bit shifts or more.
Attack Complexity: In Step 3, the comparison depends on the available
length of the plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext. If an attacker has
enough plaintext-ciphertext pairs, it is possible to check the shifted keystreams.
As mentioned previously, the probability of obtaining shifted keystreams from a
given slid pair is 2−204, and the total number of possible slid pairs is 290. Then
the expected number of shifted keystreams from slid pairs is 2−114. Thus this
cipher appears to be secure against slid attacks, but the presence of slid pairs is
still a concern.
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4.3.5 Analysis of Sfinks with Slight Modification
This section analyses a slightly modified version of Sfinks, where the modifi-
cation is applied to the padding format of Sfinks during the loading phase. This
analysis shows that the effect of a minor change in the padding increases the
probability of occurrence of slid pairs and the probability of obtaining shifted
keystreams from given slid pairs.
In this modification, we change the pattern of the padding to be zeros for all
stages (s95 to s90). In other words, we set the content of stage s95 to 0 instead
of 1. The slid pairs may now occur after only one clock under two conditions.
Firstly, the 16-bit input to the S-box must be zero at time t = 1. This requires
us to fix the values of 8 stages (s2551 ,s
244
1 , s
227
1 , s
193
1 , s
161
1 , s
134
1 , s
105
1 , s
98
1 ) to be
zeros to ensure that the pipeline is still in the initial condition to having a zero
pipeline (this avoid the limitation in the analysis of actual design of Sfinks). The
last seven of these stages can be expressed in terms of key and IV bits as (k66,
k39, k10, k3, v69, v52, v18). In addition, since s
255 = x16 must be zero, the linear
feedback function imposes a condition that the XOR of the following bits must
be zero: (k68, k56, k30, k20, k12, v34, v19, v17, v12), so that s
255
1 = 0. Secondly, the
content of s960 must be similar to the padding, that is s
96
0 = s
95
0 = 0.
Thus, a slid pair with a zeroed pipeline can be obtained by fixing 9 bits out of
the 160 key-IV bits. Therefore, the proportion of valid key-IV pairs which leads
to these slid pairs is 2−9. Hence there are 2160−9 = 2151 slid pairs for α = 1.
A slid pair can lead to an out-of-phase keystream by fixing another 16 bits
to ensure that the last iteration of the initialisation process at t = 128 is linear.
Specifically, we require that all 16 input bits of the S-box at time t = 121 should
be zeros. The probability of satisfying these 16 independent constraints is 2−16.
Therefore, the expected proportion of Key-IV pairs that leads to phase shifted
keystream with 1 step is 2−9 × 2−16 = 2−25 and the expected number of out of
phase keystream sequences is 2151 × 2−16 = 2135.
We see that a small change in the padding format during the loading phase of
the initialisation has hugely increased the probability of obtaining both slid pairs
and corresponding shifted keystream. Moreover, the condition of maintaining a
zero pipeline is also satisfied in the modified version. As expressed in this section
and the analysis of slid pairs of Sfinks stream cipher, there are 2151 and 290 out
of 2160 possible slid key-IV pairs for the modified version and current cipher
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respectively. The probabilities of a slid pair that gives a shifted keystream are
2−16 and 2−204 for these versions respectively.
4.4 Weak Key-IV Combinations
Sfinks stream cipher transfers the secret key and IV into the internal state
simultaneously and applies a specific padding format. The padding pattern sets
stages not filled by key and IV bits to zeros except one specific stage (which is set
to one). Therefore, the loaded state will start with a non-zero state. Because of
this format, we argue that the probability of obtaining an all-zero internal state
(including the memory pipeline) will be very small. In particular, the one in stage
s950 cannot be cancelled until it reaches s
80
15, by which time it will have passed s
85
10
and contributed to the feedback to s25511 . In order to cancel s
80
15, y
80
14 must equal
1, as there must be at least one non-zero input xi7 for some i = 1, . . . , 16. But
the input stage which contains a one at that time will also need to be canceled
by the S-box output at some late time. Although this argument is not exact, it
clearly shows that any conditions which lead to an all-zero state in Sfinks must
be complex and the likelihood of this occurring must therefore be very low. An
exact analysis of this problem is left for future work.
4.5 Summary and Security Impact
This chapter examined the initialisation process of the Sfinks stream cipher.
Sfinks uses a 256-bit internal state which is larger than the key-IV size (80+80 =
160 bits). The initialisation process of Sfinks loads the secret key and IV into
specific stages and fills the remaining stages with pre-determined values. The
key-IV is diffused across the entire internal state through a 128 iterations (clocks)
using the nonlinear state update function. During this process, each iteration
updates the contents of 17 stages of the internal state. During the keystream
generation process, the state update function is the linear feedback shift register
only, and the output function is nonlinear using one bit from the shift register and
another bit from the S-box to form a keystream bit. This chapter investigated
two flaws in the Sfinks initialisation process: state convergence and slid pairs.
These problems have been discussed in detail in this chapter and are summarized
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below.
The individual components of the state update function of Sfinks are one-
to-one but their combination is not, which results in state convergence during
the initialisation process. State convergence occurs during the diffusion phase
of Sfinks as a result of the combination of the delay in feeding the S-box output
back to the shift register and the shift register tap spacing. Specifically, this
is caused by the correspondence between the 7-clock feedback delay and the
distance of 7 clocking steps between certain input and output stages of the S-
box. The combination of these components of the state update function results
in an initialisation state update function that is not one-to-one and leads to
state convergence. These results show that the state convergence can occur after
the first seven iterations of initialisation and the probability of obtaining state
convergence is estimated to be 2−6.9.
Sfinks is designed for use with an 80-bit key and 80-bit IV with specific
pattern of loaded state. As the state size (256 bits) is greater than the sum of
the key and IV size, it seems reasonable to assume that 2160 different keystream
could be produced. However, the state converges problem demonstrated in this
chapter reduces the number of distinct keystream. We estimate the number of
distinct keystream is less than 2158.55. Although the impact of this convergence
on the security of Sfinks is minor (an approximate reduction of 1.45 bit after 128
iterations), it can be avoided entirely by more careful design.
The similarity of iterations of state update function during initialisation pro-
cess and the format of the loaded state results in slid pairs in the internal state.
Although the state update functions of the initialisation and keystream genera-
tion processes are different, slid pair which do occur, although with low probabil-
ity. Thus, slid pairs occur during the diffusion phase of the initialisation process
of Sfinks. The padding pattern and the format of the state update function defer
the first slid pair to 17 iterations (α = 17). A known-plaintext attack is applied
when α = 17 by fixing 70 bits out of 160 key-IV bits with proportion of valid
key-IV pairs is 290 out of 2160. The expected probability of shifted keystream
sequences from 290 slid pairs (for α = 17) is 2−114. Similar result also apply for
α = 18 and α = 19. For the current design of Sfinks, the security impact of
slid pairs and shifted keystream is negligible. However, we have shown that the
design of padding is essential to achieve this result.
We have also shown that the format specified for the loaded state of cipher
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can have a strong impact on the probability of obtaining slid pairs and shifted
keystreams. Specifically, we considered a minor variation of Sfinks in which the
padding used in the loaded state consists entirely of zeros. Note that this format
only differs from the actual specification for Sfinks in one bit position. Using this
modified loading format, we showed that genuine slid pairs (with a zero pipeline)
can occur after one clock, the probability of obtaining a slid pair increases to 2−9
and the corresponding probability of obtaining shifted keystream increases to
2−16 for a given slid pair. Thus, a small change in the loading format leads to
a huge increase in susceptibility to slid pairs compared to the actual version.
Therefore, the padding format may result in a dramatic security impact on the
cipher.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of CSA-SC Initialisation
Process
The Digital Video Broadcasting Common Scrambling Algorithm (DVB-CSA)
is specified by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [51].
It has been used for scrambling and encrypting the MPEG-2 transport stream
(digital television) since 1994. The algorithm specification was initially protected
by a non-disclosure agreement from the ETSI. However, in 2002 the CSA was
reverse-engineered and published on the Internet.
The Common Scrambling Algorithm consists of a cascade of block and stream
ciphers. To encrypt, the block cipher is applied first followed by the stream
cipher. To decrypt, the stream cipher is applied first followed by the block cipher.
Both block and stream ciphers use the same 64-bit key. The scope of this research
is limited to the initialisation process of the stream cipher. The stream cipher
component of the Digital Video Broadcasting Common Scrambling Algorithm is
referred to as CSA-SC [16].
The CSA-SC has been described in several different ways, with equivalent
representations having different internal state sizes. In Simon’s patents [15–17]
the internal state consists of 107 bits. Weinmann and Wirt [104] reduced the
CSA-SC to a 103-bit internal state by cutting down a memory by 4 bits. Simpson
et al [96] presented a model with an 89-bit internal state, by shifting the positions
of the inputs to the S-boxes by 1 stage, to remove additional redundant storage
memories. All of these models are functionally equivalent. In this research, we
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use the 89-bit model described in [96].
Analysis of the Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA) has been presented
in a number of papers; some analysed the block cipher [74, 101, 105] and others
analysed the stream cipher [96, 104]. Weinmann and Wirt [104] presented an
attack based on their reduced model and claimed the complexity of 244 to find
the value of the register A. Simpson et al [96] analysed the keystream generation
process and showed that the state update function during this phase is invertible
and that there exist distinct state cycles for the register A. Their results con-
tradict the claim in [104] and they state directly “the complexity of that state
recovery attack is not around 245, as claimed, but in fact worse than exhaus-
tive key search” with a revised estimate for Weinmann and Wirt approach of
266.7. Simpson et al [96] then applied the generic Time-Memory trade-off attacks
to the 89-bit state representation and demonstrated state recovery attacks with
complexity of O(250) and key recovery attacks with complexity of O(253).
The previous analyses are conducted on the keystream generation process
alone and do not analyse the initialisation process. By contrast, this analysis
considers the initialisation process of the CSA-SC. In this chapter, we investigate
two aspects of the initialisation process of the CSA-SC: state convergence and
slid pairs.
This chapter is outlined as follows. Section 5.1 describes CSA-SC and its
initialisation process, based on the 89-bit state representation given in [96]. Sec-
tion 5.2 presents the analysis of the initialisation process of CSA-SC and also
investigates state convergence during both the initialisation and keystream gen-
eration processes. Analysis of slid pairs is discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.5
summarises this chapter and presents the security impact of this analysis.
5.1 Specification of CSA-SC
The CSA-SC [44,84,96,104] keystream generator uses word based registers (with
a 4-bit word size) and bit based state update functions. The structure consists of
two feedback shift registers (FSRs) denoted A and B, a combiner with memory
formed from memory stages denoted E, F and c and 7 S-boxes. Registers A
and B have ten stages each, and each stage stores a nibble (4-bit word). The
combiner memories E and F each store a 4-bit word, and c stores only 1 bit.
For analysis at the bit level, the 7 S-boxes and a modular addition operation
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which updates memories F and c are the only nonlinear functions used during
the initialisation and keystream generation processes. Figure 5.1 illustrates the
CSA-SC during the keystream generation and the initialisation process (dashed
lines are used only during initialisation).
Let Ati and B
t
i denote the i
th stage of registers A and B respectively, for
i ∈ {0, . . . , 9}, at time t. Let ati,j and bti,j represent the content of the jth bit of
the ith stage at time t for registers A and B, respectively, for i ∈ {0, . . . , 9} and
j ∈ {0, . . . , 3}. Let Et, F t and ct represent the contents of the memory stages E
F and c at time t respectively. Let eti and f
t
i represent the i
th bit of the memories
E and F at time t.
CSA-SC uses a 64-bit secret key K = k0, . . . , k63, where ki is the i
th key bit,
and a 64-bit initial value IV = v0, . . . , v63, where vi is the i
th IV bit. During
the initialisation process these key-IV values are spread across the entire internal
state. Let I tA and I
t
B denote 4-bit words taken from the IV, and used at time
t as input to registers A and B respectively (details are given in the following
section). Let itA,j represent the j
th bit of I tA for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and similarly itB,j
represent the jth bit of the I tB for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
In the previous representations of the CSA-SC, seven nonlinear S-boxes are
used during both the initialisation and keystream processes. Each S-box takes 5
bits as input from register A and produces 2 output bits. The total number of
distinct input and output bits of the S-boxes are 35 and 14, respectively. In this
analysis, we treat these seven S-boxes as 14 Boolean functions, so the analysis of
14 Boolean functions is easier than the previous representation of S-boxes, where
each S-box takes 5 bits as input to generate 2 output bits. Each Boolean function
takes 5 bits as input and produces 1 output bit. Let Sj(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) represent
the jth Boolean function with respect to 5 inputs, which are i0, i1, i2, i3, i4, For
more detail, see Appendix B, where Table B.1 presents the algebraic form of the
14 Boolean functions and Table B.2 shows the truth table of these 14 Boolean
functions.
Twelve of the Boolean function outputs are used directly to update the con-
tents of A0, B0 and (conditionally) F and c, while the other two Boolean function
outputs determine the manner in which B0, F and c are updated. The output
bits of the Boolean functions at time t can be grouped in terms of the compo-
nents they are used to update. We use notation corresponding to the previous
references [96, 104] as follows: four bits xt0, x
t
1, x
t
2, x
t
3 are labeled as X, four bits
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yt0, y
t
1, y
t
2, y
t
3 are labeled as Y , four bits z
t
0, z
t
1, z
t
2, z
t
3 are labeled as Z, one bit is
labeled as pt and last bit is labeled as qt; all of these output bits are represented
at time t as shown in Table 5.1. Note that the least significant bit or stage of
each nibble is indexed by 0, ⊕ denotes bitwise XORs,  denotes addition modulo
24 and ROLi represents a left rotation by i bits.
0 6 90 9
14 Boolean 
functions
35
bits
16
bits
RegisterRegister
4 4 
4 
4 
4 
2 
1 
4 
4 
4 4 
4 
4 
4 
Output
if q = 0
swap (E,F )
c = c
else
E = F
F = (E ￿ Z ￿ c) mod 24
c = (E ￿ Z ￿ c) div 24
≪ 1
if p = 1
4 1 
Figure 5.1: Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSA-SC)
5.1.1 Initialisation process
The initialisation process uses a 64-bit secret key and a 64-bit IV and performs
32 iterations (starting at t = −31) [104] to produce the 89-bit initial state. Once
the initial state is obtained, keystream generation can begin. The initialisation
process occurs in two phases: key loading phase and diffusion phase. Note that
loading of the IV is performed during the diffusion phase.
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Table 5.1: Input and output bits of the 14 Boolean functions
X Y Z
Functions S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14
Output bits xt0 x
t
1 x
t
2 x
t
3 y
t
0 y
t
1 y
t
2 y
t
3 z
t
0 z
t
1 z
t
2 z
t
3 p
t qt
it0 a3,3 a1,3 a2,1 a4,0 a3,1 a5,2 a3,3 a1,3 a2,1 a4,0 a3,1 a5,2 a2,2 a2,2
Input it1 a1,1 a2,0 a3,2 a1,2 a4,1 a4,3 a1,1 a2,0 a3,2 a1,2 a4,1 a4,3 a3,0 a3,0
bits it2 a2,3 a5,1 a6,3 a6,1 a5,0 a6,0 a2,3 a5,1 a6,3 a6,1 a5,0 a6,0 a7,1 a7,1
it3 a4,2 a5,3 a7,0 a7,3 a7,2 a8,1 a4,2 a5,3 a7,0 a7,3 a7,2 a8,1 a8,2 a8,2
ti4 a8,0 a6,2 a9,1 a9,0 a9,3 a9,2 a8,0 a6,2 a9,1 a9,0 a9,3 a9,2 a8,3 a8,3
Key loading phase
In the loading phase, firstly, all of the registers A and B and memories E,
F and c are set to zeros. Then the 64-bit secret key is transferred to specified
positions in the shift registers as follows:
ai,j =
k4·i+j for i ∈ {0, . . . , 7}0 for i ∈ {8, 9}
bi,j =
k32+4·i+j for i ∈ {0, . . . , 7}0 for i ∈ {8, 9}
Diffusion phase
The diffusion phase consists of 32 iterations of the initialisation state-update
function. During each iteration two different nibbles (4 bits) of the IVs I tA and
I tB are loaded into stages A
t
0 and B
t
0 at time t. These I
t
A and I
t
B can be described
as follows:
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I tA =
vx, vx+1, vx+2, vx+3 for t ∈ {−31,−29, . . .}vx+4, vx+5, vx+6, vx+7 for t ∈ {−30,−28, . . .}
I tB =
vx+4, vx+5, vx+6, vx+7 for t ∈ {−31,−29, . . .}vx, vx+1, vx+2, vx+3 for t ∈ {−30,−28, . . .}
for x = 8 · [7 + dt/4e]
Every byte of the IV is used in four consecutive iterations of the state update
function, as described above. Each byte consists of two nibbles: high and low,
(H,L). For odd t, I tA and I
t
B take the H and L values respectively. For even t
the nibbles are used in the other order, so I tA and I
t
B take the L and H values
respectively.
The state update functions for registers A and B during the initialisation
process (in Figure 5.1) are described as follows:
Ati =A
t−1
i−1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 9} (5.1a)
At0 =A
t−1
9 ⊕X t−1 ⊕Dt−1 ⊕ I tA (5.1b)
Bti =B
t−1
i−1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 9} (5.2a)
Bt0 =(B
t−1
6 ⊕Bt−19 ⊕ Y t−1 ⊕ I tB)ROLpt−1 (5.2b)
The state update functions for memories E, F and c during the initialisation
process and keystream generation are described as follows:
Et = F t−1 (5.3a)
F t =
Et−1 if qt−1 = 0Et−1  Zt−1  ct−1 mod 24 if qt−1 = 1 (5.3b)
ct =
ct−1 if qt−1 = 0(Et−1  Zt−1  ct−1) div 24 if qt−1 = 1 (5.3c)
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During the initialisation, the output of the combiner memories is also XORed
with the output of register B and 4 bits of the Boolean function outputs (Z) to
give a 4-bit output at time t denoted Dt as shown in Figure 5.1.
Dt = Et ⊕ Zt ⊕Btout (5.4)
where
Btout =(b
t
0,out ‖ bt1,out ‖ bt2,out ‖ bt3,out)
=(bt8,2 ⊕ bt5,3 ⊕ bt2,1 ⊕ bt7,0 ‖ bt4,3 ⊕ bt7,2 ⊕ bt3,0 ⊕ bt4,1 ‖
bt5,0 ⊕ bt7,1 ⊕ bt2,3 ⊕ bt3,2 ‖ bt2,0 ⊕ bt5,1 ⊕ bt6,2 ⊕ bt8,3)
After the diffusion phase is completed, the keystream generator is said to be
in its initial state. Following this, the keystream generation process begins.
5.1.2 Keystream generation
At t = 0, the CSA-SC has completed the initialisation processes and is ready for
keystream generation. During keystream generation, there is no feedback from
pre-output word D to the register A, and there is no input IV to the registers A
and B. During this phase, the state update function for the registers A and B
is as follows:
At0 =A
t−1
9 ⊕X t−1 (5.5a)
Bt0 =(B
t−1
6 ⊕Bt−19 ⊕ Y t−1)ROLpt−1 (5.5b)
The keystream generator generates two output bits zt at each clock time t
from the 4 bits D, by combining pairs of bits as follows: zt = (dt2 ⊕ dt3||dt0 ⊕ dt1).
5.2 State Convergence in CSA-SC
CSA-SC uses a 64-bit secret key and a 64-bit IV to form an 89-bit internal
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state. Thus, there are 2128 possible key-IV combinations but only 289 possible
internal states. When the 2128 possible key-IV combinations are mapped to at
most 289 possible internal states, there is clearly a compression of multiple key-IV
pairs to the same internal state. As the state-update function is nonlinear during
the diffusion phase, the degree of compression may not be uniform. However,
on average, there are 239 key-IV pairs corresponding to each internal state (even
before we consider the effect of state convergence).
In addition to this compression, state convergence occurs during initialisation
specifically during the IV loading-diffusion phase. Our analysis of the state
convergence that occurs during the initialisation process of CSA-SC is based on
assuming that the entire state contents are known at time t and considering the
possible contents of At−19 . A
t−1
9 is used as input to the state update function to
form the new values of At0, B
t
0, and for the case when q = 1 the values of F
t
and ct, and then At−19 is shifted out of the internal state. We show below that
multiple distinct values for the contents of At−19 may result in the same value for
each of At0, B
t
0, F
t and ct. Figure 5.2 shows the interaction between the contents
of stages At0, B
t
0 and A
t−1
9 .
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Figure 5.2: State convergence and stages’ interaction during initialisation process
5.2.1 Initialisation State Update Equations
Equations 5.1a to 5.4 describe the state update function of the initialisation pro-
cess in terms of 4-bit words. However, in this section, the state update equations
of the initialisation process are described at the bit level. This representation
helps to analyse and identify aspects of the initialisation process such as the
existence of converging state and slid pairs.
The bit values for pt and qt obtained from S13 and S14 determine the state
update processes for Bt0, F
t and ct via Equations 5.2b, 5.3b and 5.3c. The
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contents of register B and memories F and c can thus be written as follows:
Register B
It is possible to rewrite the first nibble of the register B as a function of the
Boolean function S13 (p
t). To simplify the notation, we write B′0 = (b
′
0, b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3)
for the transient value of B0 before the left rotation is applied; we have:
B′t0 = B
t−1
6 ⊕Bt−19 ⊕ Y t−1 ⊕ I tB
so
b′t0 = b
t−1
6,0 ⊕ bt−19,0 ⊕ yt0 ⊕ itB,0 (5.6a)
b′t1 = b
t−1
6,1 ⊕ bt−19,1 ⊕ yt1 ⊕ itB,1 (5.6b)
b′t2 = b
t−1
6,2 ⊕ bt−19,2 ⊕ yt2 ⊕ itB,2 (5.6c)
b′t3 = b
t−1
6,3 ⊕ bt−19,3 ⊕ yt3 ⊕ itB,3 (5.6d)
and
Bt0 = (B
′t
0 )ROLpt−1
The individual new bits for register B are described as follows:
bt0,0 = b
′t
0 (1⊕ pt−1)⊕ b′t1 (pt−1) (5.7a)
bt0,1 = b
′t
1 (1⊕ pt−1)⊕ b′t2 (pt−1) (5.7b)
bt0,2 = b
′t
2 (1⊕ pt−1)⊕ b′t3 (pt−1) (5.7c)
bt0,3 = b
′t
3 (1⊕ pt−1)⊕ b′t0 (pt−1) (5.7d)
Memories F and c
From Equations 5.3b and 5.3c, we have:
F t = Et−1(1⊕ qt−1)⊕ (Et−1  Zt−1  ct−1 mod 24)(qt−1) (5.8a)
ct = ct−1(1⊕ qt−1)⊕ ((Et−1  Zt−1  ct−1) div 24)(qt−1) (5.8b)
148 Chapter 5. Analysis of CSA-SC Initialisation Process
To express the integer addition in Equations 5.8a and 5.8b as binary addition,
we introduce new intermediate terms (h0, h1, h2, h3) as follows:
ht0 = e
t−1
0 z
t−1
0 ⊕ et−10 ct−1 ⊕ zt−10 ct−1 (5.9a)
ht1 = e
t−1
1 z
t−1
1 ⊕ et−11 ht0 ⊕ zt−11 ht0 (5.9b)
ht2 = e
t−1
2 z
t−1
2 ⊕ et−12 ht1 ⊕ zt−12 ht1 (5.9c)
ht3 = e
t−1
3 z
t−1
3 ⊕ et−13 ht2 ⊕ zt−13 ht2 (5.9d)
The system of equations for the memory stages F can then be written using
Equations 5.9 as follows:
f t0 = e
t−1
0 (1⊕ qt−1)⊕ (et−10 ⊕ zt−10 ⊕ ct−1)(qt−1) (5.10a)
f t1 = e
t−1
1 (1⊕ qt−1)⊕ (et−11 ⊕ zt−11 ⊕ ht0)(qt−1) (5.10b)
f t2 = e
t−1
2 (1⊕ qt−1)⊕ (et−12 ⊕ zt−12 ⊕ ht1)(qt−1) (5.10c)
f t3 = e
t−1
3 (1⊕ qt−1)⊕ (et−13 ⊕ zt−13 ⊕ ht2)(qt−1) (5.10d)
and similarly, we have
ct = ct−1(1⊕ qt−1)⊕ ht3(qt−1) (5.10e)
The new 4-bit words At0 and B
t
0 of both registers A and B, respectively, can
also be expressed in terms of individual bits as follows:
For register A:
at0,0 = a
t−1
9,0 ⊕ S1(at−13,3 . . . at−18,0 )⊕ S9(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 )⊕ et−10 ⊕ bt−10out ⊕ itA,0 (5.11a)
at0,1 = a
t−1
9,1 ⊕ S2(at−11,3 . . . at−16,2 )⊕ S10(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 )⊕ et−11 ⊕ bt−11out ⊕ itA,1 (5.11b)
at0,2 = a
t−1
9,2 ⊕ S3(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 )⊕ S11(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 )⊕ et−12 ⊕ bt−12out ⊕ itA,2 (5.11c)
at0,3 = a
t−1
9,3 ⊕ S4(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 )⊕ S12(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 )⊕ et−13 ⊕ bt−13out ⊕ itA,3 (5.11d)
5.2. State Convergence in CSA-SC 149
For register B:
b′t0 = b
t−1
9,0 ⊕ bt−16,0 ⊕ S5(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 )⊕ itB,0 (5.12a)
b′t1 = b
t−1
9,1 ⊕ bt−16,1 ⊕ S6(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 )⊕ itB,1 (5.12b)
b′t2 = b
t−1
9,2 ⊕ bt−16,2 ⊕ S7(at−13,3 . . . at−18,0 )⊕ itB,2 (5.12c)
b′t3 = b
t−1
9,3 ⊕ bt−16,3 ⊕ S8(at−11,3 . . . at−16,2 )⊕ itB,3 (5.12d)
5.2.2 State Convergence During Initialisation Process
We examine these individual update equations for each bit position in At0 and B
t
0
to determine if it is possible for any state to have multiple pre-images. Our focus
is on the update of A and B through the values of At−19 affecting new values of
At0 and B
t
0. From Equations 5.11a to 5.11d, we see that A
t−1
9 affects A
t
0 in two
different ways: both directly and through the Boolean functions S3, S4, S9, S10,
S11 and S12 (x
t
2, x
t
3, z
t
0, z
t
1, z
t
2 and z
t
3). Similarly, the values of A
t−1
9 affect the
new values of Bt0 through the Boolean functions S5, S6, S7 and S8 (y
t
0, y
t
1, y
t
2
and yt3) and S13 (p) as presented by Equations 5.12a to 5.12d. We note that the
contents of At−10 to A
t−1
8 and B
t−1
0 to B
t−1
8 are present in the subsequent state as
At1 to A
t
9 and B
t
1 to B
t
9 and are therefore assumed to be known. Likewise, we can
treat any term in the initialisation state update functions which depends only on
these values as fixed: these terms are S1, S2, S7, S8, b
t−1
0out to b
t−1
3out and b
t−1
6,0 to b
t−1
6,3 .
We also assume that itA,0 to i
t
A,3 and i
t
B,0 to i
t
B,3 are given and therefore fixed as
well. By doing this, we can introduce constants C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7 to
simplify Equations 5.11a to 5.11d and 5.12a to 5.12d as follows:
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Defining
C0 = S1(a
t−1
3,3 . . . a
t−1
8,0 )⊕ bt−10out ⊕ itA,0
C1 = S2(a
t−1
1,3 . . . a
t−1
6,2 )⊕ bt−11out ⊕ itA,1
C2 = b
t−1
2out ⊕ itA,2
C3 = b
t−1
3out ⊕ itA,3
C4 = b
t−1
6,0 ⊕ itB,0
C5 = b
t−1
6,1 ⊕ itB,1
C6 = b
t−1
6,2 ⊕ S7(at−13,3 . . . at−18,0 )⊕ itB,2
C7 = b
t−1
6,3 ⊕ S8(at−11,3 . . . at−16,2 )⊕ itB,3
we have
at0,0 =C0 ⊕ at−19,0 ⊕ S9(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 )⊕ et−10 (5.14a)
at0,1 =C1 ⊕ at−19,1 ⊕ S10(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 )⊕ et−11 (5.14b)
at0,2 =C2 ⊕ at−19,2 ⊕ S3(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 )⊕ S11(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 )⊕ et−12 (5.14c)
at0,3 =C3 ⊕ at−19,3 ⊕ S4(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 )⊕ S12(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 )⊕ et−13 (5.14d)
and
b′t0 =(C4 ⊕ bt−19,0 ⊕ S5(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 )) (5.15a)
b′t1 =(C5 ⊕ bt−19,1 ⊕ S6(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 )) (5.15b)
b′t2 =(C6 ⊕ bt−19,2 ) (5.15c)
b′t3 =(C7 ⊕ bt−19,3 ) (5.15d)
During the first two clocks of the initialisation process, the values of At9 are
zero, according to the loading format. Therefore, there are no multiple pre-
images for the internal state at t = −31 or t = −30. State convergence cannot
occur before the 3rd clock step.
Equations 5.14a to 5.14d and 5.15a to 5.15d can be rearranged to evaluate
the previous state at time t− 1 in terms of the state at time t, as follows:
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at−19,0 =C0 ⊕ at0,0 ⊕ S9(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 )⊕ et−10 (5.16a)
at−19,1 =C1 ⊕ at0,1 ⊕ S10(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 )⊕ et−11 (5.16b)
at−19,2 =C2 ⊕ at0,2 ⊕ S3(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 )⊕ S11(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 )⊕ et−12 (5.16c)
at−19,3 =C3 ⊕ at0,3 ⊕ S4(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 )⊕ S12(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 )⊕ et−13 (5.16d)
bt−19,0 =C4 ⊕ b′t0 ⊕ S5(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 ) (5.17a)
bt−19,1 =C5 ⊕ b′t1 ⊕ S6(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 ) (5.17b)
bt−19,2 =C6 ⊕ b′t2 (5.17c)
bt−19,3 =C7 ⊕ b′t3 (5.17d)
Note that the bits of At−19 still appear implicitly on the right hand sides of
these equations and also that the values of bt−19,0 to b
t−1
9,3 are determined uniquely
once at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 are known. (That is, every distinct solution for A
t−1
9 yields a
unique corresponding solution for Bt−19 .)
Now, we examine the set of Equations 5.16a to 5.16d to identify state con-
vergence in the CSA-SC. Let x denote the complement of x. In this section, for
any of the Boolean functions S3, S4, S9, S10, S11 and S12, the function is said to
have even parity with respect to i4 if S(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = S(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4), and
to have odd parity with respect to i4 if S(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = S(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) (For
the remainder of this section, we will refer to these parity conditions by saying
that S is even or odd respectively). From Equations 5.16a to 5.16d, the values
of at0,0 to a
t
0,3 are assumed to be fixed to investigate whether solutions for a
t−1
9,0
to at−19,3 exist which satisfy Equation 5.16a to 5.16d. We consider the analysis
separately for the two possible values of qt−1. For a randomly chosen state, the
probability that q is equal to 0 or 1 is 1
2
, since the Boolean function S14 is a
balanced function.
The procedures used to obtain the following result are:
• Use MAGMA to generate the system of equations after 1 clock as shown
in Appendix B.
• Use the real CSA-SC cipher to generate the truth table of the 14 Boolean
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functions to determine the even parity and odd parity functions with re-
spect to the fifth input, i4.
• Based on the theoretical analysis (as shown later), use specific number of
states that are applied to the CSA-SC cipher to generate the next states
that are identical states (to demonstrate state convergence practically).
State Convergence when qt−1 = 0
When qt−1 = 0, Et−1 = F t is known, so the bits et−10 to e
t−1
3 can be absorbed into
the constants C0 to C3. Consider this modified version of the Equations 5.16a
and 5.16b for at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 : If S9 is even, then the value of a
t−1
9,0 is determined
uniquely by Equation 5.16a, and Equation 5.16b then determines a unique value
for at−19,1 (whether S10 is even or odd, since the inputs (i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) of S10 are
then fully specified). Similarly, if S10 is even, the value of a
t−1
9,1 is determined
uniquely and leads to a unique solution for at−19,0 as well. Thus a
t−1
9,0 and a
t−1
9,1 are
both uniquely determined if either or both S9 and S10 is even.
For an example of a system of equations that has unique solutions, suppose
the following set of conditions holds:
1. at0,0 = a
t
0,1 = C0 = C1 = 0.
2. The inputs (i0, i1, i2, i3) = (0, 1, 1, 0) for both S9 and S10.
From Table B.2 in Appendix B, it is clear that S9 is even since S9(0, 1, 1, 0, a
t−1
9,1 )
= 0 whether at−19,1 = 0 or 1; likewise, it can be seen that S10 is odd. Now Equa-
tion 5.16a and Condition 1 (above) imply that at−19,0 = S9(0, 1, 1, 0, a
t−1
9,1 ) = 0, and
from Equation 5.16b, at−19,1 = S10(0, 1, 1, 0, 0) = 1. So, the value of a
t−1
9,0 is 0 which
leads to a unique value of at−19,1 that is 1. Therefore, both a
t−1
9,0 = 0 and a
t−1
9,1 = 1
have unique values.
Conversely, if S9 and S10 are both odd, then the pair of Equations 5.16a
and 5.16b may be either inconsistent or consistent. If the equations are inconsis-
tent, there is no solution for at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 , but if they are consistent, then there
are two valid solutions (a, b) and (a, b) for (at−19,0 , a
t−1
9,1 ).
For example, if
1. at0,0 = C0 = C1 = 0 and a
t
0,1 = 1, S9(. . . , a
t−1
9,1 ) = a
t−1
9,1 .
2. S10(. . . , a
t−1
9,0 ) = a
t−1
9,0 .
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Then Equation 5.16a and 5.16b imply respectively that at−19,0 ⊕ at−19,1 = 0 and
at−19,0 ⊕ at−19,1 = 1, so there is no solution for at−19,0 and at−19,1 .
The solutions of at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 have been determined. Now, consider Equa-
tions 5.16c and 5.16d for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 . For any particular solution of Equa-
tions 5.16a and 5.16b, the given value of at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 will determine the values
of S3(. . . , a
t−1
9,1 ) and S4(. . . , a
t−1
9,0 ). These values can be included in the constants
C2 and C3 then the situation of the third and fourth equations are identical to
that discussed above for at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 . A similar argument and analysis can be
used to draw the following conclusion for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 :
• If either S11 or S12 is even, then the values of at−19,2 and at−19,3 are determined
uniquely from the related equations.
• If S11 and S12 are both odd, then there is either no solution for at−19,2 and
at−19,3 or there are two complementary solution pairs for these variables.
Combining the above arguments, we see that there can be between zero and
four solutions to the full equation set 5.16a to 5.16d. We now discuss these
outcomes in more detail.
If there is no solution for at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 , then it is not possible to obtain a valid
solution set for the full set of variables at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3 . However, if there is a unique
solution for at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 , then there will be either no, one or two solutions for
the full set of variables exactly when at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 have no, one or two solutions.
Now, we consider the case when there are two valid solution pairs for at−19,0 and
at−19,1 . If either S11 or S12 is even, then each of these will have a unique solution
for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 . Then, there will be exactly two solutions for the full set of
variables at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3 (these sets will differ in a
t−1
9,0 and a
t−1
9,1 and may or may not
differ in the other two variables at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 ). If S11 and S12 are both odd, then
the equations for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 may have zero or two solutions. Therefore, each
of at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 solutions will have either no or two solutions for a
t−1
9,2 and a
t−1
9,3 .
By considering S3 or S4 further as follows, we find:
• If S3 and S4 are both even, then both solutions for at−19,0 and at−19,1 lead to the
same pair of equations for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 and therefore, one of the following
points is valid:
– There is no solution for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 in either case.
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– There are two solutions for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 in both cases and the same
solution applies in both cases.
• If S3 and S4 are both odd, the two solutions for at−19,0 and at−19,1 lead to
different pairs of equations for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 , but either both pairs are
consistent or both pairs are inconsistent. Therefore, either of the following
descriptions is valid:
– There is no solution for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 in either case.
– There are two solutions for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 in each case, but the pair
of solutions for one case is different from the pair of solutions in the
other case.
• If one of S3 or S4 is odd and the other is even, then the two solutions of
at−19,0 and a
t−1
9,1 lead to pairs of equations with one common equation in each
pair. In this case, one pair of equations will be consistent and the other
must be inconsistent. So, one case will have no solution for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3
and the other will have two solutions for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 .
Putting these results together, then:
• If S3 and S4 are both even, there are either zero or four solution sets for
at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3 , which differ in a
t−1
9,0 and a
t−1
9,1 but have the same two solutions
for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 .
• If S3 and S4 are both odd, there are either zero or four solution sets for
at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3 , which differ in a
t−1
9,0 and a
t−1
9,1 and also in a
t−1
9,2 and a
t−1
9,3 .
• If one of S3 and S4 is even and the other is odd, there are exactly two
solution sets for at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3 .
By examining the truth tables for S3, S4, S9, S10, S11 and S12 (presented in
Appendix B, Table B.2), we can determine the probabilities that each of the
above Boolean function is even or odd, assuming a uniform distribution over all
possible contents forA0 toA8 in registerA. Also, assuming a uniform distribution
of the content of A9, the probability of consistent and inconsistent equations
when both of the relevant functions are odd will be 1
2
. From Figure 5.3, the total
probability for each branch can be calculated.
The number of solutions presented above for the variable set at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3
also represents the number of pre-images for each case. Table 5.2 collates the
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Figure 5.3: Branching of number of solutions (pre-images)
proportion and number of pre-images for each case. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show
examples of states with two and four pre-images respectively. Note that the only
difference between the pre-image states is the bold bits a9,0 to a9,3 and b9,0 to
b9,3.
Table 5.2: Proportions and number of pre-images for cases when qt−1 = 0
Case (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Number of pre-images 0 1 2 4
Proportion 5085
16384
833
2048
2205
8192
225
16384
Proportion (decimal) 0.31 0.407 0.269 0.014
As mentioned above, state convergence can occur from the third clock in the
diffusion phase of initialisation. Now, if we assume that the state convergence
occurs after the 64 key bits and 8 IV bits are loaded, and we have a 72 bits of
information in the internal state. Then the number of distinct internal states
after the first clock with state convergence is (1 − 5085
16384
) · 272 = 271.46 states
(when q = 0), where the proportion of 0 pre-image in Table 5.2 represents the
proportion of inaccessible patterns at this clock, which is 5085
16384
≈ 0.31.
As the secret key is loaded to the registers A and B, we assume the content
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of register A is approximately independent identically distributed random bits
during the clocks from the 3rd to 10th. From this assumption, the probabilities
of state convergence apply approximately for the 8 clocks during diffusion phase
(considering the output bit of the Boolean functions), that start from the 3rd
clock. Therefore, we argue that the inaccessible patterns for each clocking step
is quite similar across these 8 clocks. We can estimate the upper bound of
the accessible states (for only qt−1 = 0) is (2−0.54)8 ≈ 2−4.29, based on this
assumption, the accessible states decreases approximately by 4 bits after the
10th clock of the initialisation process. After that, the contents of registers A
and B are generated from the feedback and the output of Boolean functions, so
we cannot assume the contents of registers A and B are independent identically
distributed random form.
Table 5.3: Two pre-images for a given state when qt−1 = 0
A
State 1110010101010101000100001101010101010001
1st pre-image 0101010101010001000011010101010100010100 . . .
2nd pre-image 0101010101010001000011010101010100010111
B E F c
0010111001011110010101101110110101010011 0010 1100 1
. . . 1110010111100101011011101101010100110111 1100 0010 1
1110010111100101011011101101010100110111 1100 0010 1
State Convergence when qt−1 = 1
In the case of q = 1, from Equations 5.9a to 5.9d and 5.10a to 5.10e, the contents
of the memories F t and ct are computed using addition modulo 24 of the values
of Et−1, Zt−1 and ct−1. The investigation of the case q = 1 requires to solve
the relevant equations, Equations 5.10a to 5.10e and 5.11a to 5.11d in term of
the set of variables at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3 , e
t−1
0 to e
t−1
3 , c
t−1 and the intermediate variables
ht0 to h
t
3. They will result in the number of valid solutions, which represent the
number of pre-images.
Equations 5.10a to 5.10e are quintic equations. We expect multiple solutions
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Table 5.4: Four pre-images for a given state when qt−1 = 0
A
State 0100010101010001000101010101010001110101
1st pre-image 0101010100010001010101010100011101010000
2nd pre-image 0101010100010001010101010100011101010011 . . .
3rd pre-image 0101010100010001010101010100011101011110
4th pre-image 0101010100010001010101010100011101011101
B E F c
1001111001011110010101101110110101010011 0010 0001 1
1110010111100101011011101101010100110100 1100 0010 1
. . . 1110010111100101011011101101010100111000 1100 0010 1
1110010111100101011011101101010100110000 1100 0010 1
1110010111100101011011101101010100111100 1100 0010 1
for these set of variables at−19,0 to a
t−1
9,3 . Table 5.5 shows an example of two pre-
images of one state when qt−1 = 1. The complexity of solving this set of equations
is the degree of these equations (fifth) and considering the behaviour of the
Boolean functions S1 to S4 and S9 to S12 during the update function. The
analysis of qt−1 = 1 will be left for future work.
Table 5.5: Two pre-images for a given state when qt−1 = 1
A
State 0010010101010111000100001101110101010001
1st pre-image 0101010101110001000011011101010100010111 . . .
2nd pre-image 0101010101110001000011011101010100010100
B E F c
1001111001011110010101101110110101110011 0010 0011 1
. . . 1110010111100101011011101101011100111000 0101 0010 0
1110010111100101011011101101011100111100 0101 0010 1
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5.2.3 State Convergence During Keystream Generation
This section describes the investigation to determine whether state convergence
can occur during keystream generation. Figure 5.4 illustrates the interaction
between At−19 with both of A
t
0 and B
t
0 at the same time. The state update
function during the keystream generation of CSA-SC can be described as follows:
At0 =A
t−1
9 ⊕X t−1
Bt0 =(B
t−1
6 ⊕Bt−19 ⊕ Y t−1)ROLpt−1
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Figure 5.4: State convergence and stages’ interaction during keystream genera-
tion
The new values of stages At0 and B
t
0 can be considered in terms of their
individual bits as follows:
at0,0 =a
t−1
9,0 ⊕ S1(at−13,3 . . . at−18,0 ) (5.18a)
at0,1 =a
t−1
9,1 ⊕ S2(at−11,3 . . . at−16,2 ) (5.18b)
at0,2 =a
t−1
9,2 ⊕ S3(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 ) (5.18c)
at0,3 =a
t−1
9,3 ⊕ S4(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 ) (5.18d)
b′t0 =(b
t−1
9,0 ⊕ bt−16,0 ⊕ S5(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 )) (5.18e)
b′t1 =(b
t−1
9,1 ⊕ bt−16,1 ⊕ S6(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 )) (5.18f)
b′t2 =(b
t−1
9,2 ⊕ bt−16,2 ⊕ S7(at−13,3 . . . at−18,0 )) (5.18g)
b′t3 =(b
t−1
9,3 ⊕ bt−16,3 ⊕ S8(at−11,3 . . . at−16,2 )) (5.18h)
Equations 5.18a to 5.18h can be treated in a similar way to Equations 5.11a
to 5.11d and 5.12a to 5.12d. By considering anything which depends only on
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the values of stages At−10 to A
t−1
8 and B
t−1
0 to B
t−1
8 to be fixed, we can introduce
constants C ′0, C
′
1, C
′
2, C
′
3, C
′
4 and C
′
5 to simplify these equations as follows:
C ′0 = S1(a
t−1
3,3 . . . a
t−1
8,0 )
C ′1 = S2(a
t−1
1,3 . . . a
t−1
6,2 )
C ′2 = b
t−1
6,0
C ′3 = b
t−1
6,1
C ′4 = b
t−1
6,2 ⊕ S7(at−13,3 . . . at−18,0 )
C ′5 = b
t−1
6,3 ⊕ S8(at−11,3 . . . at−16,2 )
at0,0 =C
′
0 ⊕ at−19,0 (5.20a)
at0,1 =C
′
1 ⊕ at−19,1 (5.20b)
at0,2 =a
t−1
9,2 ⊕ S3(at−12,1 . . . at−19,1 ) (5.20c)
at0,3 =a
t−1
9,3 ⊕ S4(at−14,0 . . . at−19,0 ) (5.20d)
b′t0 =C
′
2 ⊕ bt−19,0 ⊕ S5(at−13,1 . . . at−19,3 ) (5.20e)
b′t1 =C
′
3 ⊕ bt−19,1 ⊕ S6(at−15,2 . . . at−19,2 ) (5.20f)
b′t2 =C
′
4 ⊕ bt−19,2 (5.20g)
b′t3 =C
′
5 ⊕ bt−19,3 (5.20h)
Equations 5.20a and 5.20b have unique solutions for the variables at−19,0 and
at−19,1 . Using Equations 5.20c and 5.20d, these solutions lead to unique solutions
for at−19,2 and a
t−1
9,3 , and hence from Equations 5.20e to 5.20h there are unique
solutions for bt−19,0 to b
t−1
9,3 also. As a result, there is only one pre-image for each
state of register A. Hence, there is no state convergence in CSA-SC during the
keystream generation process. Thus, the state convergence occurs only during
the initialisation process of CSA-SC.
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5.3 Analysis of Slid Pairs
In this section we investigate the possibility of finding multiple pairs (K, IV)
and (K ′, IV′) which produce a phase shifted version of the same keystream. For
the CSA-SC, the loaded state corresponds to loaded keys only since the IV is
loaded during the diffusion phase. Because of this, the second state of a slid pair
depends only on the associated key, K ′, and we only need to consider the cor-
responding IV′, when determining whether the slid pair gives shifted keystream.
Therefore, we can classify the steps that are required to obtain slid pairs and
shifted keystream as follows:
i) The constraints that are required to obtain slid pairs.
ii) The constraints that are required to obtain slid pairs.
iii) The constraints that are required to obtain shifted keystream from slid pairs.
Note that Condition (ii) applies because the diffusion phase in CSA-SC is
non-autonomous (there is an external input to the internal state); this condition
does not apply to most other stream ciphers.
The purpose of this analysis is to identify the constraints that are required to
obtain slid pairs and shifted keystream for the CSA-SC in the same cycle after
α iterations. Comparing the properties listed in Section 2.7.3 with the operation
of the CSA-SC, we note that properties (a) and (b) apply, but the state update
functions during the initialisation and keystream generation processes have a
degree of difference from one another.
Now, for a given key-IV pair, the first task is to identify the next key loaded
state that may occur during the diffusion phase and to be in the same cycle (to
satisfy the key loaded state of CSA-SC). Moreover, it is important to determine
the relationship between the first key-IV pair, (K, IV), and the second key, K ′,
which is obtained from the first key-IV after α iterations.
As presented in the above argument, there are some general conditions that
are required to obtain slid pairs to meet the key loaded state format of the CSA-
SC after α iterations. Slid pairs can occur after α iterations if the contents of
stages Aα8 , A
α
9 , B
α
8 and B
α
9 become zeros, and the memories E
α, Fα and cα are
still zeros to follow the CSA-SC’s key loading format (Note from Equations 5.3a
to 5.3c that Et, F t and ct cannot become zero simultaneously once any of them
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has a non-zero content). The contents of stages Aα8 , A
α
9 , B
α
8 and B
α
9 can be zeros
as follows:
1) If α = 1, it requires 8 key bits to be zeros. These key bits are k28 − k31 and
k60 − k63.
2) For 2 ≤ α ≤ 8, two key bytes, k32−4α − k39−4α and k64−4α − k71−4α, are zeros
and separated by 32 bits.
3) For α = 9, the key bits k0 − k3 and k32 − k35 should be zeros, and Equa-
tions 5.21a and 5.21b (below) should be satisfied at t = −31.
4) For α ≥ 10, Equations 5.21a and 5.21b (below) should be satisfied for two
successive iterations to generate two consecutive stages of zeros for registers
A and B at the same time.
At−19 ⊕X t−1 ⊕Dt−1 ⊕ I tA = 0 (5.21a)
(Bt−16 ⊕Bt−19 ⊕ Y t−1 ⊕ I tB)ROLpt−1 = 0 (5.21b)
In addition, the output bits of either the Boolean functions S9 to S12 (Z) or
the function S14 (q) should be zeros for 0 ≤ t ≤ α to ensure that the contents
of the memories Eα, Fα and cα are zeros. In all the above cases, note that the
second key, k′, is uniquely determined by the first key, k, and the first dα
4
e bytes
of the first IV. The second IV′, is uniquely determined based on the first IV, and
the number of shifted steps.
Because the registers are not autonomous during the diffusion phase, we
must also consider the conditions that IV and IV′ must satisfy in order for the
states resulting from (K, IV) and (K ′, IV′) to remain in step for the rest of the
diffusion phase. The required specific conditions depend on the value of α and
are discussed below in further detail.
To obtain shifted keystream from a slid pair that has remained in step, the
following equations (Equations 5.22a and 5.22b) should be satisfied for the last
α iterations of the second key-IV pair, (K ′, IV′).
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Dt−1 ⊕ I tA = 0 (5.22a)
I tB = 0 (5.22b)
If all of the above equations are satisfied, the second keystream will be shifted
from the first keystream by 2α bits.
Recall the IV loading format of the CSA-SC. The IV is loaded during the dif-
fusion phase and each IV byte is loaded into registers A and B for four successive
iterations. If α is not a multiple of 4, this operation imposes significant restric-
tions on the form of the IVs for the states of a slid pair to remain in step with one
another. For this reason, we will describe slid pairs for α = 1, 2 and 3 iterations
briefly. Then, we will examine and focus on slid pairs for α = 4 iterations (which
have reasonable result for attacks).
The following process was used to obtain the result presented below:
• Use the above theoretical analysis to determine which key and IV pairs
that result in slid pairs
• Use the real CSA-SC cipher to generate two keystream sequences using the
two key-IV pairs to demonstrate practically the shifted keystream .
For α = 1 iteration
Recalling the three steps that are mentioned in the beginning of this section, slid
pairs and shifted keystream may occur with the following conditions:
i) 8 key bits (k28 to k31 and k60 to k63) must be zeros (with probability 2
−8).
Either the value of q−32 or the output of Boolean functions S9 to S12 (z−320
to z−323 ) are zeros (with probability
17
32
≈ 2−0.913).
ii) The bytes of the first IV, are identical and the low nibbles of IV′ equal to
the high nibbles of IV, v′L = vH and vice versa vL = v
′
H . This condition
restricts IV to 28 values of the potential 264 and determines v′ uniquely in
terms of v.
iii) Shifted keystream may occur if the v′H is zeros (with probability 2
−4). More-
over, Equation 5.22a must be satisfied for the last iteration of the diffusion
phase (with probability 2−4).
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In summary, the probability of a randomly chosen key leading to a slid pair
is 2−8.913 and the probability of a valid IV which will allow the slid pair to
propagate and lead to shifted keystream, is 2
8
264
· 2−4 = 2−60. There is also
a further probability of 2−4 that (K ′, IV′) will satisfy Equation 5.22a at time
t = 0. The second key K ′ is determined uniquely from K bits and some IV
bits using Equations 5.11a to 5.11d to find k′0 − k′3, Equations 5.12a to 5.12d to
find k′32 − k′35 and the remaining key bits of K ′ are shifted by 4, K ′ = K  4.
The IV′ is determined directly from IV. Table 5.6 demonstrates two key-IV pairs
which generate two keystreams shifted by 2 bits. These two keystreams are
identical except the first two bits from the first keystream, that is keystream2 =
keystream1  2.
Table 5.6: For α = 1, two key-IV pairs generate two keystreams shifted by 2 bits
key1 FFD7FFF0FFFFFFF0
IV1 7070707070707070
keystream1 {10} A914DA57A7CF11B65B00EEFDA9F7ABB8635E2DD117
04348B7FBFF30076BA92AC1893E9DDB2332F0949FCB24
648C61E34C7581A5624D2507AD6BFACEB6168C32
key2 6FFD7FFFCFFFFFFF
IV2 0707070707070707
keystream2 A914DA57A7CF11B65B00EEFDA9F7ABB8635E2DD117
04348B7FBFF30076BA92AC1893E9DDB2332F0949FCB24
648C61E34C7581A5624D2507AD6BFACEB6168C32
For α = 2 iterations
Recalling the three steps that are presented in the beginning of this section, slid
pairs and shifted keystream may occur with the following conditions:
i) 16 key bits from K must be zeros (k24 to k31 and k56 to k63) with probability
2−16. The memories E, F and c should be zeros for t = −31 and t = −30
(with probability (17
32
)2 ≈ 2−1.825).
ii) The bytes of first IV should be identical and IV = IV′. This condition again
restricts IV to 28 values of the potential 264.
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iii) To obtain shifted keystream, the last byte of second IV′, should be zero
(with probability 2−8), so the entire bytes of IVs, IV and IV′ should be
zeros. Equation 5.22a must be satisfied for (K ′, IV′) at time t = −1 and
t = 0, which happens with probability 2−8.
The probability of a randomly chosen key leading to a slid pair is 2−17.825.
The probability of a valid IV which will allow slid pairs to propagate and lead
to shifted keystream becomes 2−56 · 2−8 = 2−64. There is a further probability of
2−8 for Equation 5.22a to be satisfied for two clocking steps. The second key-IV
pair, (K ′, IV′), can be determined uniquely from the first key-IV pair, (K, IV),
by extension of the method shown for α = 1.
For α = 3 iterations
Similarly to α = 1 or 2, and recalling the three steps for occurrence of slid pairs
and shifted keystream, we require
i) 16 key bits must be zeros (k20 to k27 and k52 to k59) with probability 2
−16.
The memories E, F and c should be zeros for the three clock steps (with
probability (17
32
)3 ≈ 2−2.738). Thus the probability of a randomly chosen key
leading to a slid pair is 2−18.738.
ii) The valid IV that is required to keep slid pairs in step for this case is similar
to the case of α = 1, and occurs with probability of 2−56.
iii) To obtain shifted keystream from slid pairs, the last byte of the second
IV′ should be zero (with probability of 2−8) and Equation 5.22a should be
satisfied for the last 3 clocks (with probability 2−12).
Thus, the total probability of a valid IV which will allow slid pairs to propagate
and lead to shifted keystream becomes 2−64 with an additional probability of
2−12 that Equation 5.22a is satisfied for time t = −2, t = −1 and t = −0. The
second key-IV pair, (K ′, IV′), can again be determined uniquely and directly
from (K, IV).
These cases when α = 1, 2 and 3, seem to be impractical due to the very
small range of IV values for the which the slid pairs will lead to shifted keystream.
Likewise other cases when α 6≡ 0 (mod 4) e.g. α = 5, 6 and 7 have the same
probabilities and process of obtaining valid IV as for α = 2 and 3. Moreover, the
probabilities of possible valid keys, which is required to obtain slid pairs, and the
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conditions of shifted keystreams are successively lower, as are the probabilities
of satisfying Equation 5.22a to guarantee shifted keystream.
For α = 4 iterations
In this case, the three steps that are required for slid pairs and shifted keystream
are as follows:
i) Two bytes of the first key, K, must be zeros, namely k16 to k23 and k48
to k55 (with probability of 2
−16). Either the values of q or the output of
Boolean functions S9 to S12 are zeros for the first four clocks to ensure
that the memories E, F and c are in the initial condition (with probability
(17
32
)4 = 2−3.65).
ii) This case works with any IV (the first IV) and the second IV′ is a 1-byte
shifted version of the first IV.
iii) Shifted keystream from slid pairs may occur if the last byte of second IV′
is zero which happens with probability of 2−8. Equation 5.22a must be
satisfied for the last four iterations of the diffusion phase (the 29th, 30th,
31st and 32nd clocks) and has probability of 2−16.
If a specific second IV′ is found (256 out of 264 IVs) then a slid pair may occur
with probability of 2−19.65 and this slid pair may lead to shifted keystream with
probability of 2−16. Therefore, the total probability to obtain shifted keystream
from all the key-IV set is 2−43.65. In this case, the keystreams are out of phase
by 8 bits.
We do not provide an example for this case of α = 4, since the previous
example of α = 1 is enough to demonstrate the work of the slid pairs and shifted
keystreams. For this case of α = 4, if the key-IV pairs (K, IV) and (K ′, IV′) are
predetermined then slid pairs and shifted keystream may occur with probabilities
2−3.65 and 2−19.65 respectively.
The second key-IV pair, (K ′, IV′), can be determined directly from the first
key-IV pair, (K ′, IV′), as mentioned above in the case of α = 1. The second IV′
is a shifted version of the first IV by one byte where (IV′ =IV 1(byte)), and
its last byte should be zero. The second key K ′ can be determined directly from
Equations 5.11a to 5.11d and 5.12a to 5.12d for four clocks with the remainder
of K ′ again being a shifted copy of K. For each clock, 8 bits from K ′ can be
expressed in term of key-IV pair, (K, IV).
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The principle of slid pairs for α = 4 can be applied for multiples of 4 for
α = 4, 8, . . . 28. The probability of slid pairs and shifted keystreams of these
cases of multiples of 4 can be calculated as follows:
• Obtaining two bytes of zeros in the first key, K, for probability of 2−16.
• The memories E, F and c to be in the initial condition (zeros), the proba-
bility is (17
32
)α.
• The last (α/4) bytes of the second IV′ should be zeros (with probability
2−2α).
• Equation 5.22a should be satisfied for α clocks (it has probability of 2−4α).
Thus, the combined probability of obtaining shifted keystream when α is a
multiple of 4 is 2−16−0.913α−2α−4α = 2−16−6.913α. This analysis shows that the best
probability that can be found to obtain slid pairs and shifted keystream is for
α = 4.
The probabilities of obtaining slid pairs and shifted keystream are shown
Table 5.7, for the previous cases when α = 1, 2, 3, 4 and also for α = 8. This
table sets out the probabilities for the three steps discussed above:
i) The probability that a randomly chosen key, K, will lead to a slid pair.
ii) The proportion of the first IV for which the states of the slid pair will
remain in step during the rest of the diffusion phase.
iii) The combined probability of Equation 5.22a and the condition on IV′ being
satisfied, so that shifted keystream is obtained.
Table 5.7: Probabilities of obtaining slid pairs and shifted keystreams for α clocks
α 1 2 3 4 8
(i) To obtain slid pairs 2−8.913 2−17.825 2−18.738 2−19.65 2−23.3
(ii) To keep slid pairs in step 2−56 2−56 2−56 20 20
(iii) To obtain shifted keystream 2−8 2−16 2−20 2−24 2−48
Total probabilities 2−72.913 2−89.825 2−94.738 2−43.65 2−71.3
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5.4 Weak Key-IV Combinations
The CSA-SC transfers the secret key directly into the internal state and
applies specific padding. The IV is loaded during the diffusion phase using the
state update function. So, the IV loading operation makes the state update
function during the diffusion phase a non-autonomous operation. Therefore, the
weak key-IV combination seems possible to happen at the end of the initialisation
process. The registers A and B can reset to contain all-zero values at the end
of the initialisation process. But the memories c, E and F cannot be reset
to contain all-zero values if any of them gain value other than zero during the
diffusion phase. Therefore, the weak key-IV problem (as defined in Section 2.7.5)
may occur in CSA-SC but it is hard to keep the memory c, E and F contain
all-zero values during all the iterations of the diffusion phase. This problem is
left for future work.
5.5 Summary and Security Impact
The initialisation process of the CSA-SC stream cipher was examined in this
chapter. We based our analysis on the description of CSA-SC from [96], which
uses an internal state of 89 bits. The initialisation process of CSA-SC loads
the secret key into the internal state using a linear function to form a specific
key loaded state (where some stages are filled by zeros). Following this, the
IV is loaded during the diffusion phase. There are 32 iterations (clocks) during
the diffusion phase and each IV byte is used for four consecutive iterations.
The diffusion phase and keystream generation both use nonlinear state update
functions with a degree of difference as shown in Figure 5.1.
This internal state is shorter than the combined key-IV length (64+64) of 128
bits. This leads to an effective reduction in the key-IV space during initialisation
process, so that on average 239 key-IV pairs correspond to each internal state.
In this chapter, investigations into two flaws in the CSA-SC initialisation
process were described: state convergence and slid pairs. These problems have
been discussed in detail in this chapter and are summarized below.
During the initialisation process (specifically during the diffusion phase), the
state update function of CSA-SC is not one-to-one due to a combination of the
linear feedback and the output of the 14 Boolean functions. This results in state
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convergence during the diffusion phase only of the CSA-SC initialisation process.
Precisely, the content of stage At−19 , which is shifted out of the internal state at
time t, affects the contents of stages At0 in two different ways: through the linear
feedback function and through the output of seven Boolean functions namely S3,
S4, S9, S10, S11, S12 and S14. State convergence cannot occur in the first two
iterations of the diffusion phase due to the specified format of the key loaded
state. State convergence may start to occur from the third iteration of diffusion
phase once At9 is not constrained to be zero.
We identify two distinct cases, qt−1 = 0 and qt−1 = 1, each occurring with
probability of 1
2
. In the case of qt−1 = 0, as a result of the state convergence,
after the third iteration of the diffusion phase, the state space is reduced by at
least 5085
16384
≈ 0.31. Therefore, the overall proportion of states lost in this way is
half of this value, that is approximately 0.155. In the case when qt−1 = 1, we
have demonstrated by an example in Table 5.5 that state convergence occurs,
but the exact degree of convergence is yet to be determined; this case is left
for future work. We argue that the proportion of inaccessible states in the case
qt−1 = 0 is approximately 0.31 for each clocking step from 3rd to 10th clocks, as
the assumption of independent identically distributed random bits in register A
is valid for these 8 clocks. After that, the assumption may not be valid. Based
on our analysis when qt−1 = 0, there is a significant reduction in the state space
that could be exploited by attackers for example using TMTO attacks.
The similarity of the iterations of the state update function during initial-
isation process (diffusion phase) and the format of key loaded state results in
slid pairs in the internal state. For randomly chosen keys, slid pairs occur with
probability that depends on the value of α. Slid pairs may lead to shifted version
of the same keystream provided certain conditions on IV and IV′ are satisfied,
along with additional conditions relating IV′ to the output D. However the state
update functions of the initialisation and keystream generation processes have a
degree of difference. Therefore, slid pairs may lead to shifted keystreams with
a specific probability. Thus, slid pairs may occur during the diffusion phase of
the initialisation process of CSA-SC and may lead to shifted version of the same
keystream. From this investigation, the best result to find slid pairs is at α = 4,
where the key-IV pair (K, IV) generates a key loaded state after 4 iterations.
This case has a probability of 2−19.65 of obtaining slid pairs. These slid pairs may
lead to shifted key stream with a probability of 2−24, as presented in Table 5.7
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for α = 4. Slid pairs and shifted keystream may help attackers to perform key
recovery attack.
170 Chapter 5. Analysis of CSA-SC Initialisation Process
Chapter 6
Security Issues in the
Initialisation Process of Stream
Ciphers
Keystream generator of stream ciphers produces pseudorandom sequence aim-
ing to mimic the one-time-pad (OTP). OTP uses a keystream which is ran-
domly chosen and whose length is equal to the length of the messages and never
used again for another encryption [98, p.27] [102, 103]. It is a secure cipher and
proved by Shannon [92]. Keystream generator takes secret key and IV as in-
put to form an initial state before keystream generation begin. A well-designed
initialisation process should ensure that each key-IV pair generates a distinct
and unpredictable session key (initial state), and then from this a distinct and
unpredictable keystream. The analyses in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and other results
reported in the existing literature demonstrate flaws in both the loading and
diffusion phases of the initialisation processes of several ciphers as discussed in
Chapter 2, so it is clear that this aim is not always achieved.
Flaws may appear during either the loading phase, the diffusion phase or both.
Examination of the flaws, based on the phases in which they occur, gives the
ability to identify and understand the causes. From this detailed examination,
we provide design guidelines to enable these flaws to be avoided or to at least
reduce significantly the probability of occurrence.
Initialisation processes must be secure against at least the known generic
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attacks. The initialisation process should prevent secret key recovery attacks
even when the session key (initial state) has been obtained (for example, through
a state recovery attack). Therefore, the initialisation process should play a role
like a security guard.
Other aspects to be considered when using stream ciphers are factors that
can affect the efficiency of the initialisation process, especially for real-time ap-
plications. Although they are not our major focus. It is important to avoid
processes which simultaneously decrease both efficiency and security. Some fur-
ther observations about the security and efficiency of the initialisation process
are provided in the remaining sections of this chapter. Within this context, the
number of iterations for each specific design should be considered in terms of
both the security and efficiency perspectives.
Table 6.1 summarises the results that have been found related flaws which
are investigated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. These flaws are compression, conver-
gence, slid pairs, shifted keystream and weak Key-IV pairs. In this table, we
considered our results related to A5/1, Sfinks and CSA-SC, and we also listed
similar results from the literature for other ciphers. Concerns of these flaws are
that may increase the vulnerability to some attacks such as TMTO attacks, dif-
ferential attacks or ciphertext-only attack to recover the secret key as discussed
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. For example shifted slid pairs and weak Key-IV lead to
key recovery attacks, and convergence can increase the vulnerability to TMTO
attacks. Therefore, these flaws can make easy to use these attacks.
Table 6.1 shows the ciphers investigated in this thesis are highlighted in the
table in bold font. The check-marks (X) and X indicate that the flaws have been
identified: in the existing literature, and in our work in this research, respectively.
The (x) mark indicates that the flaw does not exist for the particular cipher. The
absence of a mark for a specific flaw means that the particular cipher has not
yet been analysed for this flaw.
Chapter 6 is organised as follows: Section 6.1 describes flaws that have been
identified in the initialisation processes of shift-register stream ciphers. Security
aspects during the loading and diffusion phases are presented in Section 6.2 and
Section 6.3, respectively. Section 6.4 presents recommendations for new proposals
of initialisation processes. Section 6.5 summarises and concludes this chapter.
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Table 6.1: Security flaws in the initialisation processes of specific stream ciphers
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Compression x x x x X8 X 10 x X12
Convergence x x X6 x9 X 10 X 11 X 13
Slid pairs X2 X3 X7 X 10 X 11 X 13
Shifted keystream X2 X3 X7 X 10 X 11 X 13
Weak key-IV X1 X4 ? X 10  ?
? theoretically, weak key-IV pairs exist due to the non-autonomous
feedback during the initialisation process.
 further investigation is required to clarify weak Key-IV in Sfinks
as discussed in Section 4.4.
1 Based on the observation in [79] and [52]. They described a weakness in the second
output of RC4 which is based on the secret key.
2 Priemuth-Schmid and Biryukov [86] demonstrated slid pairs and shifted keystream
in the Trivium cipher.
3 Kuc¸uk [73] and Banik et al [10] demonstrated slid pairs and shifted keystream in
Grain v1.
4 Zhang and Wang [108] demonstrated some sliding weak key-IV combination.
6 Hong and Kim [65] reported a state entropy loss in the MICKEY v1.
7 Helleseth et al [61] examined the existence of slid pairs and shifted keystream.
8 Biham and Dunkelman [20] reported Key-IV compression in LILI-II during the
loading phase.
9 Teo [100] reported that state convergence does not exist in the LILI family of
stream ciphers.
10 For A5/1, compression and State convergence are investigated in Section 3.2, Slid
pairs and shifted keystream are examined in Section 3.3, weak Key-IV Combina-
tions is discussed in Section 3.4, and the key recovery is covered in each of the
previous sections.
11 For Sfinks, State convergence is analyzed in Section 4.2, Slid pairs and shifted
keystream are examined in Section 4.3, weak Key-IV Combinations is considered
in Section 4.4, and the key recovery is covered in each of the previous sections.
12 Simpson et al [96] commented on the compression of the Key-IV in the CSA-SC
13 For the CSA-SC, State convergence is investigated in Section 5.2, and Slid pairs
and shifted keystream are analyzed in Section 5.3,
6.1 Security Flaws in Initialisation Process
In this research, we investigated the initialisation processes of three stream
ciphers, namely A5/1, Sfinks and CSA-SC. These ciphers have the same structure
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as most other stream ciphers, in that they use shift registers in combination
with non-linear functions. They consist of a variety of structures and non-linear
functions. Therefore, the recommendations and outcomes from these analyses
are relevant to most stream ciphers that are based on shift registers. Moreover,
the recommendations are considered based on our work and the literature.
The investigation focuses on the security of the initialisation process and
flaws. There are some security flaws identified and discussed in this chapter.
This section focuses in the identified security flaws and their causes in brief as
follows:
Compression. Compression occurs when the sum of the key and IV sizes is
greater than the internal state size and result in two or more Key-IV pairs
generating the same loaded state.
Convergence. This condition occurs when two or more internal states map to
the same internal state after applying a state update function for α ≥ 1
iterations. State convergence may result from using a state update function
that is not one-to-one .
Slid pairs. Slid pairs may occur due to the similarity of the state update func-
tion during successive iterations of the initialisation process and is also
affected by the form of the padding pattern. If any used when the key and
IV bits are loaded into the internal state during the initialisation process.
Shifted keystream. Shifted keystream may occur for an identified slid pair due
to the similarity or partial similarity between the state update functions
during both the initialisation and keystream generation processes.
Weak Key-IV combinations. Non-autonomous operation for either loading
or diffusion phases may result in one or more shift registers containing
all-zero after the relevant phase.
The following sections (Sections 6.2 and 6.3) discuss more the properties and
features of the loading and diffusion phases of the initialisation process thor-
oughly that could cause the above flaws.
6.2 Loading Phase and Security Flaws
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The loading phase is the process of transferring the secret key and IV into the
internal state of the keystream generator for a stream cipher. Note however that
this does not happen in every case: for some stream ciphers, the IV is loaded
during the diffusion phase (e.g. CSA-SC [104]). During the loading phase, the
secret key and IV may be directly transferred to pre-determined stages of the
internal state (e.g. Sfinks [29] and Trivium [43]), or the transfer may be achieved
by using a linear state update function (e.g. A5/1 [30]), or a non-linear state
update function (e.g. MICKEY [6–8]).
6.2.1 Padding Pattern Weaknesses
For ciphers in which the secret key, of length l and IV of length j are transferred
directly to the internal state S of size s, where l + j < s, then some stages of
S remain unfilled. Padding is required to fill these remaining stages. A specific
padding pattern must be prescribed in the cipher proposal to obtain the loaded
state. For example, Sfinks [29] uses a padding pattern which is all-zeros except
one specific bit (which is one), and Grain [58–60] uses all-ones as the padding
pattern.
The choice of padding pattern may affect the security of the initialisation
process as, for some ciphers, this increases the ease with which slid pairs can
occur and these in turn may result in shifted keystreams. Appropriate padding
may defer the occurrences of slid pairs to further clocking steps and increase
constraints that are required to obtain slid pairs and shifted keystream. This
can clearly be seen for ciphers such as Trivium, Sfinks and Grain, as discussed
below.
In the case of Trivium, as reported by Priemuth-Schmid and Biryukov in [86],
slid pairs can not occur for less than 111 clocks. If the padding pattern was
changed so that the last 3 stages are filled with zeros rather than ones, (identical
pattern), then slid pairs could occur after only one clock, with probability of 1/2.
The Sfinks stream cipher is another example where the padding pattern and
the state update function defer the first slid pair; in this case to after the 17th
iteration. If the content of the stage s40 in Sfinks is changed to one in the padding
format, then the occurrence of a slid pair will be deferred until the 24th iteration
and the relevant conditions on the state contents will also be more complicated.
In contrast, if the padding is all zeros (identical pattern), then slid pairs may
occur after one iteration with high probability as shown in Section 4.3.
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In another example, for the Grain cipher, the padding pattern is identical
(all of them are ones) and the state update functions of the initialisation process
and keystream generation have a degree of similarity. As shown by Zhang and
Wang [108], a slid pair can be found after one clock and gives shifted keystream
by one bit with probability of 2−2. If the first bit or last bit of the 16-bit padding
pattern, which is (1111111111111111), is changed to such as (0111111111111111)
or (1111111111111110), then the slid pair will not occur until after 16 iterations,
which would generate a shifted keystream with a 16 bit shift with probability of
2−32. In summary, careful design of the padding patterns may defer the occur-
rence of the slid pairs and reduce its probability.
If the padding system is carefully designed (using extensive analysis), then
it may make slid pairs that are generated by either the same secret key with
different IVs, different secret keys with the same IV, or both, more complicated
or need additional constraints to occur. For example, Priemuth-Schmid and
Biryukov [86] discussed the search to find these two cases (same secret key and
different IVs, or different secret keys and same IV) for the analysis of slid pairs of
Trivium. They checked for clock-shifts from 111 to 142 and they could not find
a solution for this system. Recall that the occurrence of slid pairs for the case of
the same secret key with multiple IVs is the most important flaw for practical
attacks, as shown in Section 2.7.3.
6.2.2 Loading Process and Flaws
Loading may be performed in a linear or non-linear manner. If the loading
is performed using a linear function, then the loading function is one-to-one and
there is no convergence during this phase. For example, A5/1 [30] loads the secret
key and IV using a linear state update function (the LFSR feedback functions
alone), so there is no state convergence during this phase. If the loading function
is nonlinear, then the loading function must be examined to determine whether
it is one-to-one or not. For example, MICKEY v1 [6] uses a nonlinear state
update function to load the IV and secret key. MICKEY v1 suffers from state
convergence during the loading and diffusion phases, as discussed by Helleseth
et al [61].
Loading the secret key and IV into the internal state can be performed in one
of these ways:
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1. Loading the key then IV. The secret key is loaded first and then the IV using
a state update function as shown in A5/1 stream cipher in Section 3.1.
This loading process may result in state compression. If the state update
function during the loading phase is not one-to-one, state convergence may
occur during this phase. Each internal state may be a legitimate loaded
state and that may lead to slid pairs after each clocking step. Another
problem, it may end by all-zeros in one or more components of the cipher
that is produced by weak key-IV combinations. For example, as shown in
Section 3.4, the loading phase of A5/1 stream cipher may end by one, two
or three registers containing all-zeros values.
2. Loading the IV then secret key. The IV is loaded first and then the secret
key as shown in MICKEY stream cipher [6]. This loading process may
result in some flaws: state compression, state convergence, slid pairs and
weak key-IV combinations. Each internal state may be a legitimate loaded
state and slid pairs may occur after each clocking step.
3. Transferring the secret key and IV into the internal state simultaneously. This
loading process does not require more operations for the loading process.
It transfers the key and IV bits directly into specific stages in the internal
state such as Grain [58–60], Trivium [43] and Sfinks [29] stream ciphers.
Provided the state space is large enough and the key and IV are loaded
into different parts of the state, state compression and convergence cannot
occur during this phase. Slid pairs may still occur. If a padding pattern
is used, it should be considered carefully as discussed in Section 6.2.1, so
all-zeros components in the loaded state may not occur during this phase
and the occurrence of the slid pairs may be deferred to further clocking
steps.
6.2.3 Autonomy in Loading Phase and Flaws
Ciphers are made up of several components, which can operate either inter-
dependently or autonomously. Many of the security properties of the sequences
produced by the components are only guaranteed under the condition that the
components are operating autonomously. When this is not the case, more care
needs to be taken to ensure that security problems are not introduced. For ex-
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ample, the well known properties of LFSR sequences depend on the LFSR being
autonomous, having a primitive feedback function and a non-zero initial state.
When a register is not autonomous then the possibility of an all-zero state can
not be discounted and its properties can no longer be guaranteed.
Lack of autonomy during the initialisation process can arise in two ways:
through non-autonomous feedback and through the use of non-autonomous clock-
ing mechanisms. Non-autonomous feedback occurs when the content of the new
stage of an internal state depends on an external input. Non-autonomous clock-
ing mechanism is the situation when the clocking of any component of a ci-
pher is governed by the contents of another component. These two types of
non-autonomous mechanisms affect the security of the initialisation process in
different ways.
During the loading phase, the non-autonomous feedback is more common
than the use of non-autonomous clocking mechanisms. For example, the secret
key and IV are transferred using state update function to form the loaded state
using a non-autonomous feedback mechanism. This non-autonomous feedback
mechanism of the loading phase is used in the A5/1 stream cipher [30]. It is a
one-to-one function and there is no state convergence as shown in Section 3.2,
but it introduces the weak key-IV problems as shown in Section 3.4. As another
example, MICKEY v1 [6] uses a non-autonomous feedback mechanism in the
loading phase. The non-autonomous function results in a non one-to-one state
update function. So, state convergence may occur during the loading phase
of MICKEY, as reported by Helleseth et al [61]. We defer discussion of non-
autonomous clocking to Section 6.3 (Diffusion phase).
In non-autonomous feedback mechanism, the loading phase may load the
secret key and IV using a state update function as mentioned above in the first
and second loading methods of the loading process in Section 6.2.2. For each
of these two loading methods, it is important to consider the behavior of the
loading function to avoid any possibility of weak key-IV combinations that may
occur at the end of the loading phase. For example, at the end of the loading
phase of the A5/1 stream cipher, weak key-IV combination may result in all zero
contents for one or more of the registers. Consequently, during the keystream
generation process, those registers will generate a sequence of all zeros, resulting
in a keystream that is either zeros or ones (when two or three registers contain
all-zero values) as discussed in Section 3.4. Note that it is not practical to test
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this condition for each key-IV pair, due to the short time frame. Applying such
a test for this condition will reduce the efficiency of the cipher.
In the case of transferring the key and IV directly into the internal state, weak
key-IV can be avoided with non-zero key, IV or padding pattern that should be
carefully designed to mix ones and zeros. This will prevent obtaining a zero
internal state as the loaded state. For example, in Sfinks [29] there is one stage
in the padding pattern that contains the value one. As well Trivium [43] contains
three stages from the padding pattern that contains ones.
6.3 Diffusion Phase and Security Flaws
In the diffusion phase of the initialisation process, a number of iterations of
the state update function are performed. The purpose of this phase is to diffuse
the secret key and IV across the entire internal state. This section examines the
required number of iterations and investigates the properties of the state update
function that may affect the security of the diffusion phase.
Most stream ciphers use non-linear state update functions to perform the
diffusion phase. This is important to prevent the secret key recovery attack for
a given initial state (session key). Diffusion phases should be secure at least
against the generic known attacks. For example, the diffusion phase should dif-
fuse the key-IV across the entire internal state to provide resistance to differential
attacks [20,85]. This may be achieved by increasing the number of iterations.
6.3.1 Number of Iterations and Security
A common belief in symmetric key cryptography is that if the number of
iterations during a nonlinear initialisation process is increased then the security
of the cipher is increased. This belief is based on the concept that performing
more mixing of the key-IV to prevent some attacks such as differential attacks.
However, if state convergence occurs during the initialisation process, then in-
creasing the number of iterations may decrease the number of obtainable initial
states and may actually decrease the security and leave the stream cipher vul-
nerable to attacks such as TMTO attacks. This is the case of the A5/1 stream
cipher as described in Section 3.2.
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Increasing the number of iterations decreases the efficiency of the initialisation
process. The qualitative curves in Figure 6.1 illustrate this concept of the impact
of the number of iterations on the effective state space size due to the existence
of state convergence, the complexity of attacks such as differential attacks and
the efficiency of the initialisation process.
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Figure 6.1: Qualitative effects of the state convergence
For each stream cipher, the optimal number of iterations during the initialisa-
tion process should be chosen carefully through extensive security analysis. It is
necessary to determine the lower bound for complexities of attacks (e.g. differen-
tial, fault and algebraic attacks) at each iteration to draw the attack’s complexity
curve. State convergence and efficiency curves should be identified as a function
of the number of iterations. Then these multidimensional curves should be drawn
to decide the required number of iterations as a trade-off between these security
and efficiency aspects.
If slid pairs and shifted keystreams occur during the initialisation process,
then this may reduce the effective number of iterations during the diffusion phase
and leave the stream cipher vulnerable to attack. For example, we illustrated
slid pairs and shifted keystream in both A5/1 (in Section 3.3) and Sfinks (in
Section 4.3) that may allow attackers to exploit this flaw to perform secret key
recovery attacks.
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6.3.2 Properties of State Update Function and Flaws
Properties of the state update function in the diffusion phase may affect the
security of the initialisation process. These properties may introduce some secu-
rity flaws such as state convergence, slid pairs and weak key-IV as shown in Chap-
ters 3 to 5. This may reveal some information about the secret key given some
keystream obtained from a particular session key (initial state). This section
highlights the main points that have been identified in this research for the diffu-
sion phase operation. These properties are: autonomous and non-autonomous,
importance of one-to-one and the similarity in functions.
Autonomous Function
As discussed in Section 6.2.3, the components of stream ciphers can operate
interdependently or autonomously during the loading phase. Also they can op-
erate as well interdependently or autonomously during the diffusion phase based
on the state update function and the structure of the initialisation process.
During diffusion phase, there are two reasons for lack of autonomy in stream
ciphers: non-autonomous feedback and non-autonomous clocking mechanisms.
Either both or one of these two types of non-autonomous mechanisms may occur
in the diffusion phase of the initialisation process of some stream ciphers.
The non-autonomous feedback mechanism occurs during the diffusion phase
of the initialisation process of stream ciphers when an external value is used
as input to a component of the internal state. The external value may be a
value which is from another component of stream cipher (such as another shift
register, memory or output function). For example, for the Grain [58–60] stream
cipher, during the diffusion phase the output bit of the h (output) function is
fed back to both registers LFSR and NFSR and another external input into the
NFSR which is from the LFSR register. In another example, CSA-SC as shown
in Section 5.1 uses four output bits to feedback into register A, as well four bits
from four Boolean functions are used as input to register B.
The non-autonomous feedback mechanism may result in undesirable initial
state (session key) at the end of the diffusion phase. It may result in all zeros con-
tents for the register that uses a non-autonomous feedback function. Therefore,
this non-autonomous feedback mechanism may result in some key-IV combina-
tions which are referred to as weak key-IV. A weak key-IV may be exploited
182 Chapter 6. Security Issues in Initialisation
by an attacker to perform secret key recovery. For example, in Grain stream
cipher, Zhang and Wang [108] demonstrated some weak key-IV pairs that result
in zeros contents in one register (LFSR) for the session key. Therefore, during
the initialisation process, weak key-IV should be considered.
The non-autonomous clocking mechanism may occur during the diffusion
phase of the initialisation process of stream ciphers where the clocking mechanism
of a register depends of values from another component. For example, the A5/1
cipher as shown in Section 3.2 uses a majority clocking mechanism, where each
register is clocked based on the whether a specific bit agrees with the majority
value. This clocking mechanism may lead to a non one-to-one state update
function which is discussed in the following section.
One-To-One Functions
A one-to-one state update function is a function where each distinct state
maps to a distinct state after the update. That is, every state has a unique pre-
image. In contrast, if many-to-one state update functions are used, the cipher
may suffer from state convergence during the iteration of this function. State
convergence may leave stream ciphers vulnerable to the attacks discussed in
Section 2.7.1. Hence, state convergence from this point of view is an undesirable
property of the initialisation process. To avoid the problem of state convergence,
the state update function should be one-to-one. It is not only the individual
components but also the combination of these components which should be one-
to-one, as shown in Section 4.2. The disadvantage of the one-to-one function is
that state recovery leads to the key recovery.
The many-to-one state update function can be caused by different ways. It
can be caused by a non-autonomous clocking mechanism as illustrated in Sec-
tion 3.2 for A5/1 stream cipher. It can be caused by the interaction between the
components of the state update function which result in non one-to-one state
update function while the individual components are one-to-one. This problem
is discussed in Section 4.2 for the Sfinks stream cipher.
The one-to-one function during the initialisation and keystream generation
processes has a advantage to prevent state convergence. Conversely, it has a
draw back which is that state recovery may lead to key recovery. This is seen
clearly in the Trivium stream cipher.
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Similarity of Functions
The similarity of functions means that iterations of the state update functions
of both the initialisation and keystream generation processes have commonalities.
Similarity between the iterations of the state update function means that each
iteration is identical. This similarity may lead to slid pairs after one or more of
iterations. The similarity between the state update functions of the initialisation
and keystream generation processes may lead to shifted keystream for given slid
pairs.
Slid pairs and shifted keystreams can be obtained due to the similarity as
mentioned above. This section discusses the effect of the diffusion phase on the
similarity that may result in slid pairs and shifted keystreams. There are three
conditions of similarity that are considered in Section 2.7.3 as follows:
a) similarity between iterations of the initialisation process.
b) similarity between iterations of the keystream generation process.
c) similarity between the state update functions for the initialisation and keystream
generation processes.
Most stream ciphers satisfy conditions (a) and (b), but there is a wide variety in
the extent to which condition (c) is satisfied.
As a result of similarity, the slid pairs can occur if a second loaded state is
obtained from the first loaded state after a number of iterations. Therefore, slid
pairs depends on both the loading and diffusion phases where the condition (a) is
satisfied. Shifted keystream may occur if all three of the previous conditions are
satisfied. So, shifted keystream for given slid pairs depends on the state update
functions of both the diffusion phase and the keystream generation process. For
example, the A5/1 stream cipher, as shown in Section 3.3, satisfies all the three
conditions of similarity, so slid pairs and shifted keystream may occur after each
clock and each slid pair produce a shifted keystream. Other examples include
Sfinks (discussed in Section 4.3), CSA-SC (discussed in Section 5.3), Grain [10,
11,45,73,76,108], MICKEY [61] and Trivium [86] stream ciphers that satisfy the
conditions (a) and (b). The third condition (c) is satisfied with some constraints
for these stream ciphers. However, if the three conditions are satisfied for any
cipher then this cipher may be vulnerable to slid pairs attacks.
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6.4 Recommendations
It is an important that the initialisation process is secure and efficient for
stream ciphers. A well-designed initialisation process should reduce the effect
of security flaws and prevent attacks. Based on the ciphers examined in this
thesis (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and on previous analyses (Chapter 2), we present
here some recommendations for the design of the initialisation process. These
recommendations are for both the loading and diffusion phases as follows:
1- State, key and IV sizes. State size should be larger than 2.5 times the
key size. Golic´ [54] reported that the internal size should be larger than the
key size to prevent TMTO, and Babbage [9], and Biryukov and Shamir [23]
stated that the state size should be twice the key size to prevent TMTO.
After that Hong and Sarkar [66,67] in their revised TMTO attacks, reported
that the IV size should be at least equal to the key size. Later on, Dunkelman
and Keller [46] shown that the IV size should be at least 1.5 times the key
size to prevent TMTO attacks.
Based on the consideration in the 2nd recommendation (the next point),
the total state size should be larger than the combined key and IV sizes to
include a large padding pattern. So, the large padding pattern will reduce
the probability of slid pairs to an acceptable level. To sum up the scattered
recommendations in the literature, the state size should be more than 2.5
times the key size.
2- Padding pattern. The padding pattern should not be identical or cyclic.
Identical means that the padding is all-zeros or all-ones, and cyclic means
that the padding consists of repeated specific pattern. It is important to avoid
these patterns in order to ensure that the same pattern can not be reproduced
with fewer clocking steps than the maximum length of the padding pattern.
This condition will then defer the occurrence of slid pairs to the maximum
possible shift. In most cases, this will thereby reduce the chance of finding
slid pairs and also reduce the probability of obtaining shifted keystreams.
3- One-to-one functions. The state update function should be one-to-one.
Both the individual components and the combination of these components
should be one-to-one. This is required to prevent the occurrence of state
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convergence. Conversely, this leads to another problem: inversion can be
used in the case of state recovery to effect key recovery.
4- Similarity of functions. The similarity of the state update functions within
and between the initialisation and keystream generation processes should be re-
duced. If this similarity is reduced then the occurrence of the slid pairs and
shifted keystream will be reduced also. This reduction of the degree of sim-
ilarity should be considered along with consideration for efficiency. It may
affect efficiency negatively. De Cannie`re et al [42] recommended involving a
counter in each step of the iterations. A degree of difference between the state
update functions of the initialisation and keystream generation processes is
recommended for stream ciphers. This recommendation is based on the ac-
cepted probability of the occurrence of slid pairs and shifted keystreams, and
also on efficiency. If the initialisation state update function differs from that
of the keystream generation process, then this may prevent shifted keystream
and key recovery for a given state recovery but it may affect negatively the
efficiency of the cipher. Therefore, the trade-off between these aspects is
important.
5- Non-autonomous feedback functions. The use of non-autonomous feed-
back functions should be avoided or add another mechanism to prevent weak
state. This consideration should prevent weak key-IV combination during
the loading or diffusion phases. Weak session keys may leave the cipher
vulnerable to attacks.
6- Diffusion process. The diffusion process should ensure that the key and IV
bits are both diffused and distributed across the entire the state in a non-linear
way. An appropriate diffusion process provides resistance against specific
attacks which depend on the diffusion process, such as differential and fault
attacks.
7- Number of iterations. Number of iterations, during the diffusion phase,
should be in the optimal range. Increasing the number of iterations may in-
crease the resistance to some attacks such as differential attacks but may
leave the cipher vulnerable for another potential attack such as TMTO at-
tacks (e.g. if state convergence is present). Increasing the number of iter-
ations also decreases the efficiency of the cipher. Therefore, the number of
186 Chapter 6. Security Issues in Initialisation
iterations during the initialisation process should be based on extensive secu-
rity analysis and the accepted efficiency. This process is a trade-off between
the security aspects and efficiency.
8- Integration between these features. A trade-off between the previous
features and properties must be considered. The study of these features and
properties may have a degree of conflict (advantages and disadvantages).
Therefore, the trade-off between these features and properties should be con-
sidered by the designers of initialisation process.
6.5 Summary
Stream cipher proposals usually include both design specifications and an analy-
sis section outlining resistance against generic attacks. The focus of the security
analysis is generally on the keystream generation function. Less attention is
paid to the analysis of the initialisation process, though it is considered in some
proposals. We recommend that stream cipher designers consider carefully the
initialisation process, and perform sufficient analysis to ensure that both the
loading and diffusion phases of this process are secure against at least the known
attacks and prevent the known flaws discussed above.
Based on discussion above, we have provide a series of recommendations on
the following aspects of stream cipher initialisation processes:
• State, key and IV sizes. State size should be larger than 2.5 times the
key size.
• Padding pattern. The padding pattern should not be identical or cyclic.
• One-to-one functions.The state update function should be one-to-one.
• Similarity of functions. The similarity of the state update functions
within and between the initialisation and keystream generation processes
should be reduced.
• Non-autonomous feedback functions. The use of non-autonomous
feedback functions should be avoided or add another mechanism to prevent
weak state.
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• Diffusion process. The diffusion process should ensure that the key and
IV bits are both diffused and distributed across the entire the state in a
non-linear way.
• Number of iterations during diffusion process. Number of iterations,
during the diffusion phase, should be in the optimal range.
• Integration between these properties and features. A trade-off be-
tween the previous features and properties must be considered.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
A well-designed initialisation process (comprising both loading and diffusion
phases) should not reveal any information about the secret key, or possess proper-
ties that may help to facilitate attacks. The initialisation process should ensure
that performing a key recovery attack is hard even if state recovery has oc-
curred, because the mathematical relationships between the key-IV pair and the
keystream are hard to establish. For real-time applications, efficient initialisation
processes are required particularly since the initialisation process or rekeying is
performed frequently. Thus, the initialisation process is significant with respect
to both the security and efficiency of stream ciphers.
As expressed in Section 1.2, the main aim and objective of this research
project was to examine the initialisation processes of shift-register based stream
ciphers and identify features which might reduce the security of ciphers. This
examination was performed by investigating the features and properties of the
initialisation processes of three specific stream ciphers: A5/1, Sfinks and CSA-
SC. From this perspective, specific features and properties of the loading and
diffusion phases (the phases of the initialisation process) of these ciphers were
investigated. The final aim of the research project was to use both the literature
review and the results of the investigations outlined in this thesis to propose
design criteria and recommendations for improved initialisation processes for
shift-register based stream ciphers.
This research was conducted using both theoretical analysis and computer
simulations. The theoretical analysis is based on the mathematical and statistical
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analysis of the initialisation processes of these three ciphers. The computer
simulation is performed using C codes and the MAGMA software package. It is
used to implement and examine the flaws in the initialisation processes and also
to work with relevant systems of equations.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.1 reviews the contributions of
this thesis. Section 7.2 explores some directions for future work in the security
and efficiency of the initialisation process of stream ciphers.
7.1 Review of Contributions
This section summarises the contributions to knowledge regarding the initial-
isation process of stream ciphers presented in this thesis. We have examined
the initialisation process of three stream ciphers: A5/1, Sfinks and the Com-
mon Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSA-SC). These three ciphers are
all based on shift registers, and each cipher has its own specific features and
properties. From this analysis and existing public literature, design criteria and
recommendations of the initialisation processes of stream ciphers are provided.
7.1.1 Analysis of the Initialisation Process of A5/1
This contribution focused on the analysis of the initialisation process of a well-
known stream cipher, A5/1 [30], which is used to provide confidentiality for GSM
mobile phone communications. We have identified two new security flaws in this
initialisation process: slid pairs and weak key-IVs, and further quantified the
extent of a third flaw, namely state convergence,.
State Convergence in the A5/1 Stream Cipher
We extended Golic´’s work [54,55] for a further 5 iterations and gave an extrapo-
lation of the number of distinct internal states after 100 iterations (at the end of
the initialisation process). We show that the total number of distinct states after
six iterations was reduced to approximately half of the total number of internal
states, and estimate the number of the distinct states at the end of initialisation
process to be approximately 5%, which is equivalent to a reduction in the key
size by 4.3 bits.
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Slid Pairs in the A5/1 Stream Cipher
In this cipher, the same state update function is used for both the initialisation
and keystream generation processes. We showed that slid pairs may occur after
each clocking step of the initialisation process and that each slid pair generates
shifted keystream. In this work, we considered slid pairs after 1 and 2 clocking
steps and showed that there are around 245 and 245.49 slid pairs after 1 and 2
clocking steps respectively. Moreover, we presented a ciphertext-only attack for
the A5/1 stream cipher based on the slid pairs attacks that can recover the secret
key.
Weak Key-IV pairs in the A5/1 Stream Cipher
This work focused on the non-autonomous feedback mechanism during the load-
ing phase, where the secret key and IV bits are loaded sequentially using the
state update function. The impact of the non-autonomous feedback mechanism
on the content of the registers results in the possibility that one, two or three
registers containing all-zeros. In the case where two or three registers contain
all-zeros, the output keystream will be all-zeros or all-ones. We demonstrated a
ciphertext-only attack on A5/1 in these cases.
7.1.2 Analysis of the Initialisation Process of Sfinks
This contribution analysed the initialisation process of the Sfinks stream ci-
pher [29] submitted to the eSTREAM project [50] in PROFILE 2A. To our
knowledge, analysis of the initialisation process of Sfinks has not appeared in the
public literature. We have identified two security flaws in the Sfinks initialisation
process: state convergence and slid pairs.
State Convergence in the Sfinks Stream Cipher
We showed that state convergence can occur even if the individual components
of the state update function are one-to-one. The combination of the individual
components should also be one-to-one to prevent the state convergence. However,
this is not the case for the Sfinks stream cipher. We have demonstrated a state
space reduction of Sfinks at the end of the initialisation process. Although the
impact of this convergence on the security of Sfinks is minor, it can be avoided
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entirely by more careful design of the tap positions (so that the distance between
any input and output of the S-box does not match the number of the delay steps).
Slid pairs in the Sfinks Stream Cipher
This work demonstrated the effect of the properties of the padding pattern and
the state update functions of both the initialisation and keystream generation
processes on the slid pairs attacks. The specification of padding pattern and the
state update function of the initialisation process defer the occurrences of slid
pairs in Sfinks to occur only after 17 iterations. For a given slid pair, shifted
keystream may be obtained with a probability that is based on the similarity of
these two state update functions.
This work also demonstrated the effect of the padding pattern on the slid
pairs. We have examined two modified versions of the padding pattern of Sfinks.
If the padding pattern is identical, which is all zeros (just change the content of
one bit, s95), then slid pairs may occur after any clocking step. This means slid
pairs may occur after the 1st clocking step instead of the 17th and also with less
constraints and higher probability. Conversely, if the content of the stage s40 in
the padding format is changed to one, then the occurrence of slid pair will be
deferred to 24 iterations and the relevant constraints on the state contents will
also be more complicated.
7.1.3 Analysis of the Initialisation Process of CSA-SC
This research concentrated on the analysis of the initialisation process of a well-
known stream cipher for the digital TV: CSA-SC [104]. Based on the public
literature, there is no existing analysis of the initialisation process of CSA-SC.
So, this is the first analysis of the initialisation process of the CSA-SC. The
CSA-SC is word based in its operation (using 4-bit words). The IV bits are
loaded during the diffusion phase. We have identified two security flaws in this
initialisation process: state convergence and slid pairs.
State Convergence in the CSA-SC
We have demonstrated that the state update function during the initialisation
process is not one-to-one, although the keystream generation process is one-to-
one. So state convergence occurs only during the initialisation process. This is
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due to the non-autonomous feedback mechanism during the initialisation process,
where the output bits from the output function are fed back into one of the
registers. The state convergence may occur from the 3rd clocking step until the
end of the diffusion phase, as the padding pattern prevents the state convergence
for the 1st and 2nd clocking steps.
Slid Pairs in the CSA-SC
We have demonstrated the existence of slid pairs and shifted keystream in the
CSA-SC. In this cipher, slid pairs may occur after the first clocking step. The
word based operation affects the complexity of obtaining the slid pairs and shifted
keystream. We have demonstrated that the highest probability of slid pairs
occurs when the shifted steps are four (due to the matching of the number of
insertion of IV words which is four times).
7.1.4 Criteria for the Initialisation Process of Stream Ci-
phers
An in-depth analysis of the features and properties of the loading and diffusion
phases of the initialisation processes of shift-register based stream ciphers was
presented. This analysis was based on the previous analysis in the literature
as shown in Chapter 2 and our work in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Based on this
analysis, we also presented eight recommendations for the initialisation process
that should minimise the occurrence of the flaws identified in this analysis and
reduce the severity of their effects. These recommendations cover topics such as
the size of the cipher’s state space, the format of the loaded state and desirable
properties of the state update functions used during the initialisation process.
These recommendations should enhance the ability of future designers to design
stream ciphers that are both secure and efficient.
7.2 Future Work
The initialisation process of stream ciphers has not been analysed thoroughly in
the literature. Many stream cipher proposals seem to use an ad-hoc approach to
the initialisation process and less attention has been paid to the security analysis
of the initialisation process than to the keystream generation process. However,
194 Chapter 7. Conclusion and Future Work
the security and efficiency of the initialisation process are important aspects,
with potentially serious impact. This research area needs more attention. An
outline of possible future research work is given in this section.
The case when one register of A5/1 contains all-zeros could be exploited in
an attack if it can be distinguished efficiently. As presented in Section 3.4.3 the
standard statistical tests applied to A5/1 were not able to distinguish between
the case where a single register contains all-zeros and the case where no register
contain all-zeros. Further analysis into this may find a possible distinguisher
where a weak key-IV combination of this sort is used.
The flaw of weak Key-IV pairs in Sfinks cipher needs further investigation.
At the end of the initialisation process of Sfinks may or may not end with zero
state (including the memory pipeline) as discussed in Section 4.4. As we argue,
it may occur with negligible probability and complicated conditions. Further
investigation is required to clarify the occurrence of weak Key-IV.
The analysis of the state convergence of the CSA-SC when qt−1 = 1 is left for
future work. It is a potential research point to perform theoretical analysis to
find out the proportion of state convergence when qt−1 = 1. It is recommended to
perform theoretical analysis and computer simulation using a number of random
key-IV combinations to find out the number of distinct initial states (session
keys). This will be the total number of distinct states for the random key-IVs
(for both qt−1 = 0 and 1).
For a state update function, we have recommended this function to be one-
to-one to avoid state convergence. Moreover, this function should be nonlinear
to increase the complexity of inverting. This difficult to invert property ensures
that the performing of the key recovery attack is hard even the if state recovery
has occurred. Now, the open problem is to construct a one-to-one function which
is difficult to invert and which can be used for the state update process during
the diffusion phase of stream ciphers.
The initialisation processes of stream ciphers requires more analysis. This
investigation may add more knowledge for types of flaw identified in this thesis or
identify other flaws and their causes that have not yet been addressed. Therefore,
we recommend further investigation into the initialisation processes of the stream
ciphers that are presented in Table 6.1.
Security and efficiency are not always independent properties. Therefore, the
analysis of the initialisation process should be considered in terms of security
7.2. Future Work 195
and efficiency (trade-off between them). We recommend to consider the analysis
of the efficiency in the loading and diffusion phases.
The security of the diffusion phase depends on the state update function
and the number of iterations performed before the keystream generation begins.
Increasing the number of iterations may prevent some generic attacks such as
differential attacks. From this research, we have demonstrated that increasing
the number of iterations may reduce the state space if state convergence exists,
which may leave the cipher vulnerable to TMTO attacks. Increasing the number
of iterations also reduces the efficiency of the initialisation process. The optimal
number of iterations in the diffusion phase for each cipher is another recom-
mended area for further research. From this point of view, development of a tool
to help estimate the optimal number of iterations performed during the diffusion
phase would be a worthwhile goal.
Studying the impact of flaws such as state convergence and the existence of
slid pairs on other generic attacks is another significant area related to the anal-
ysis of initialisation processes. Theses flaws may facilitate some generic attacks;
for example state convergence may reduce the complexity of TMTO attacks. On
the other hand, some properties may reduce the occurrence or the impact of
some flaws in the same time these properties may leave the cipher vulnerable for
other attacks.
The flaws that have been studied in this thesis are: state convergence, slid
pairs and weak key-IV combinations. It is important to investigate their impact
if they occur in the same cipher at the same operation (for example, for the same
conversation of the GSM system). For example state convergence and slid pair
may occur in the same cipher during the initialisation process. This may cause a
further reduction of the attack complexity of the cipher and may leave the cipher
vulnerable to other attacks.
This research investigated flaws during the initialisation processes of the shift-
register based stream ciphers. Other ciphers that are not based on shift-register
(e.g. RC4 stream cipher) need investigation to identify flaws that may occur
during the initialisation processes.
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Appendix A
A5/1 Algebraic Representation
A.1 The Key and IV Relationship for Slid Pairs
The key-IV combinations of the first and second states are described for the
operation cases of A5/1 stream cipher as shown in Section 3.3 as follows:
Clocking A, B and C registers (case 1)
This case assumes that the contents of the three stages s8a, s
10
b and s
10
c are the same
(s8a = s
10
b = s
10
c ). This assumption is included in the key dependent calculation
that is presented later.
The secret key for both pairs are the same (according to our assumption).
The relationship between the first IV, v, and the second IV, v′ is computed and
shown as follows.
Note: c0, c1 . . . c21 are secret key dependent constants (each ci is obtained by
XORing some of key bits). They can be calculated easily using the Gaussian
elimination of the system of equations.
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δ0 = c0 ⊕ v1
δ1 = c1 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2
δ2 = c2 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3
δ3 = c3 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
δ4 = c4 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
δ5 = c5 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
δ6 = c6 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7
δ7 = c7 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8
δ8 = c8 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
δ9 = c9 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10
δ10 = c10 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
δ11 = c11 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
δ12 = c12 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13
δ13 = c13 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14
δ14 = c14 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
δ15 = c15 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
δ16 = c16 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
δ17 = c17 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
δ18 = c18 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
δ19 = c19 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
δ20 = c20 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ21 = c21 ⊕ v21
From the Gaussian elimination of the remaining system equations of the
matrix representation, there are 20 free key bits which are free to be chosen.
These bits are {k42, k44, k45, k47, k48, k49, k50, k51, k52, k53, k54, k55, k56, k57, k58,
k59, k60, k61, k62, k63}. Therefore, 44 bits are dependent on the 20 key bits and 4
IV bits, {v0, v3, v11, v13, }. Therefore, there is a slid pair shifted by one bit for the
same key and two different IV’s with probability of 2−44.The following equations
show how to form the 44 key bits from other 20 key bits and 4 IV bits.
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k0 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k1 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k2 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k3 =k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k4 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
k5 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k6 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k7 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k8 =k42 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3⊕
v11 ⊕ v13
k9 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
k10 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3
k11 =k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k12 =k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k13 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k14 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k15 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3
k16 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k17 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k18 =k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3
k19 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k20 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k21 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k22 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3
k23 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3
k24 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k25 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k26 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
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k27 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k28 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
k29 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k30 =k42 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k31 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k32 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
k33 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3
k34 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63
k35 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k36 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0⊕
v11 ⊕ v13
k37 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k38 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k39 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3
k40 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
k41 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k43 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3
k46 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
Clocking A and B registers (case 2)
This case assumes that the contents of the two stages s8a and s
10
b are the same
but differ from s10c , (s
8
a = s
10
b 6= s10c ). This assumption is included in the key
dependent calculation that is presented later.
The secret key for both pairs are the same (according to our assumption).
The relationship between the first IV, v, and the second IV, v′ is computed and
shown as follows.
Note: c′0, c
′
1 . . . c
′
21 are secret key dependent constants (each c
′
i is obtained by
XORing some of key bits). They can be calculated using the Gaussian elimination
of the system of equations.
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δ0 =c
′
0 ⊕ v1
δ1 =c
′
1 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2
δ2 =c
′
2 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3
δ3 =c
′
3 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
δ4 =c
′
4 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
δ5 =c
′
5 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
δ6 =c
′
6 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7
δ7 =c
′
7 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8
δ8 =c
′
8 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
δ9 =c
′
9 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10
δ10 =c
′
10 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
δ11 =c
′
11 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
δ12 =c
′
12 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13
δ13 =c
′
13 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14
δ14 =c
′
14 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
δ15 =c
′
15 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
δ16 =c
′
16 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
δ17 =c
′
17 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
δ18 =c
′
18 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
δ19 =c
′
19 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
δ20 =c
′
20 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ21 =c
′
21 ⊕ v21
From the Gaussian elimination of the remaining system equations, there are
22 free key bits which are free to be chosen. These bits are {k42, k43, k44, k45, k47,
k48, k49, k50, k51, k52, k53, k54, k55, k56, k57, k58, k59, k60, k61, k62, k63}. Therefore,
there are 42 key bits that are dependent on other 22 key bits and 22 IV bits.
So, there is a slid pair shifted by one bit for the same key and two different IV’s
with probability of 2−42.The following equations show how to form the 42 key
bits from other 22 key bits and 22 IV bits.
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k0 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k1 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63⊕
v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k2 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0⊕
v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k3 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1⊕
v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k4 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2⊕
v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k5 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3⊕
v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k6 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k7 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k8 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k9 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k10 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k11 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k13 =k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
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k14 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k15 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k63 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k16 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61⊕
v0 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k17 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k18 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2⊕
v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k19 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4⊕
v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ 1
k20 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54⊕
k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k21 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62⊕
v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k22 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k23 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k24 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k25 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k26 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
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k27 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k28 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k29 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k30 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k31 =k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k32 =k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k33 =k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v20
k34 =k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k35 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7⊕
v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k36 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2⊕
v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k37 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k38 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v1⊕
v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k39 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k40 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k41 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
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Clocking A and C registers (case 3)
This case assumes that the contents of the two stages s8a and s
10
c are the same
but differ from s10b , (s
8
a = s
10
c 6= s10b ). This assumption is included in the key
dependent calculation that is presented later.
The secret key for both pairs are the same (according to our assumption).
The relationship between the first IV, v, and the second IV, v′ is computed, and
the relationship between the first IV, v, and the second IV, v′ is as follows.
Note: e0, e1 . . . e21 are secret key dependent constants (each ei is obtained by
XORing some of key bits). They can be calculated using the Gaussian elimination
of the system of equations.
δ0 =e0 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
δ1 =e1 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ2 =e2 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v19
δ3 =e3 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
δ4 =e4 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
δ5 =e5 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
δ6 =e6 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7
δ7 =e7 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8
δ8 =e8 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
δ9 =e9 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10
δ10 =e10 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
δ11 =e11 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
δ12 =e12 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13
δ13 =e13 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14
δ14 =e14 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
δ15 =e15 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ16 =e16 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
δ17 =e17 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
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δ18 =e18 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
δ19 =e19 ⊕ 0
δ20 =e20 ⊕ 0
δ21 =e21 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
From the the Gaussian elimination of the remaining system equations, there
are 21 free key bits which are free to be chosen. These key bits are {k42, k44,
k45, k47, k48, k49, k50, k51, k52, k53, k54, k55, k56, k57, k58, k59, k60, k61, k62, k63}.
Therefore, 43 key bits are dependent on other 21 key bits and 22 IV bits. So,
there is a slid pair shifted by one bit for the same key and two different IVs with
probability of 2−43. The following system of equations show how to form the 43
key bits from other 21 key bits and 22 IV bits.
k0 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k1 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14⊕
v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k2 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9⊕
v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k3 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k4 =k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k5 =k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12⊕
v17 ⊕ v19
k6 =k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13⊕
v18 ⊕ v20
k7 =k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
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k8 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k9 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9
⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k10 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0
⊕ v2 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k11 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1
⊕ v3 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k12 =k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2
⊕ v4 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k13 =k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3
⊕ v5 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k14 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2
⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17
k15 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1
⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ 1
k16 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19
k17 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k18 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k19 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7
⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k20 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9
⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ 1
k21 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
208 Appendix A. A5/1 Algebraic Representation
k22 =k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k23 =k42 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
k24 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13
⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k25 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4
⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k26 =k42 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ 1
k27 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1
⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k28 =k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18
⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k29 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1
⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k30 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2
⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k31 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3
⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k32 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k33 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k34 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k35 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12⊕
v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
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k36 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1
⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k37 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5
⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k38 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61
⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k39 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ 1
k40 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5
⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k41 =k44 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4
⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k43 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1
⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ 1
Clocking B and C registers (case 4)
This case assumes that the contents of the two stages s10b and s
10
c are the same
but differ from s8a, (s
8
a 6= s10b = s10c ). This assumption is included in the key
dependent calculation that is presented later.
The secret key for both pairs are the same (according to our assumption).
The relationship between the first IV, v, and the second IV, v′ is computed and
shown as follows: Note: e′0, e
′
1 . . . e
′
21 are secret key dependent constants (each
e′i is obtained by XORing some of key bits). They can be calculated using the
Gaussian elimination of the system of equations.
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δ0 =e
′
0 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
δ1 =e
′
1 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ2 =e
′
2 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v19
δ3 =e
′
3 ⊕ 0
δ4 =e
′
4 ⊕ 0
δ5 =e
′
5 ⊕ 0
δ6 =e
′
6 ⊕ 0
δ7 =e
′
7 ⊕ 0
δ8 =e
′
8 ⊕ 0
δ9 =e
′
9 ⊕ 0
δ10 =e
′
10 ⊕ 0
δ11 =e
′
11 ⊕ 0
δ12 =e
′
12 ⊕ 0
δ13 =e
′
13 ⊕ 0
δ14 =e
′
14 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
δ15 =e
′
15 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ16 =e
′
16 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v19
δ17 =e
′
17 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
δ18 =e
′
18 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v20
δ19 =e
′
19 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
δ20 =e
′
20 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ21 =e
′
21 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v19
From the Gaussian elimination of the remaining system equations, there are
20 free key bits which are free to be chosen. These key bits are {k44, k45, k47, k48,
k49, k50, k51, k52, k53, k54, k55, k56, k57, k58, k59, k60, k61, k62, k63}. Therefore, there
are 42 key bits are dependent on other 22 key bits and 22 IV bits. Therefore,
there is a slid pair shifted by one bit for the same key and two different IVs with
probability of 2−42. The following system of equations show how to form the 42
key bits from other 22 key bits and 22 IV bits.
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k0 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18
k1 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k2 =k44 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k3 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ 1
k4 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2⊕
v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ 1
k5 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k6 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k7 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ 1
k8 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v14⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k9 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k10 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7⊕
v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k11 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ 1
k12 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63⊕
v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k13 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
k14 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4⊕
v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k15 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v21
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k16 =k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v15
k17 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k18 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k19 =k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18
k20 =k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v19
k21 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k22 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4
⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k23 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2
⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18
k24 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2
⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k25 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14⊕
v19 ⊕ v20
k26 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k27 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1
⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k28 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k29 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k30 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2
⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k31 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7
⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
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k32 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8
⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k33 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3
⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k34 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k35 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10
⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k36 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3
⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k37 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2
⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ 1
k38 =k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k39 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3
⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k40 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7
⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k41 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7
⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k42 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7
⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k43 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62
⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17
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A.2 The Key and IV Relationship for Weak
Key-IV
The weak Key-IV combinations as described in Section 3.4 are expressed in the
three scenarios of the operation of A5/1 as follows.
First scenario: The relationship between key and IV bits
To freeze the three registers A, B and C, the conditions for the system of equa-
tions that are required to result in registers A, B and C containing all-zero values
can be described as follows:
k0 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v18
k1 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v19
k2 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v20
k3 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v21
k4 =v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15
k5 =v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16
k6 =v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17
k7 =v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18
k8 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k9 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k10 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k11 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k12 =v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k13 =v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k14 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k15 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k16 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k17 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k18 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
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k19 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k20 =v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k21 =v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k22 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k23 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k24 =v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k25 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k26 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k27 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k28 =v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k29 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k30 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k31 =v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k32 =v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
k33 =v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k34 =v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k35 =v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k36 =v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k37 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k38 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k39 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k40 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k41 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k42 =v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k43 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k44 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
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k45 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
k46 =v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
k47 =v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
k48 =v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k49 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17
k50 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18
k51 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19
k52 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v20
k53 =v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
k54 =v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k55 =v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k56 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v20
k57 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k58 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20⊕
v21
k59 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k60 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k61 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k62 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
k63 =v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v17
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Second scenario: the relationship between key and IV bits
Case 1: to freeze two registers A and B, the required conditions to the system
of equations that result in these two registers A and B containing all-zero values
at the end of loading phase can be described as follows:
k0 =k41 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0⊕
v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k1 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1⊕
v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k2 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2⊕
v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k3 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k4 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4⊕
v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k5 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k6 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k7 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k8 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k9 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k10 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k11 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
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k13 =k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
k14 =k41 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59⊕
k62 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k15 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k63 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k16 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k17 =k41 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4⊕
v8 ⊕ v18
k18 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k19 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53⊕
k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8⊕
v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k20 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54⊕
k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9⊕
v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k21 =k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
k22 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k23 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k24 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k25 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
A.2. The Key and IV Relationship for Weak Key-IV 219
k26 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k27 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k28 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k29 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k30 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k31 =k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k32 =k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
k33 =k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k34 =k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k35 =k41 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61⊕
v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k36 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k37 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4⊕
v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k38 =k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61⊕
k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k39 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k40 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
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Case 2: to freeze two registers A and C, the conditions for the system of
equations that are required to result in these two registers A and C containing
all-zero values after completing loading phase can be expressed as follows:
k0 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k1 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k2 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9⊕
v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k3 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k4 =k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k5 =k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12⊕
v17 ⊕ v19
k6 =k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13⊕
v18 ⊕ v20
k7 =k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
k8 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k9 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61⊕
k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k10 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62⊕
v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k11 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63⊕
v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k12 =k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0⊕
v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k13 =k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1⊕
v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
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k14 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1⊕
v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17
k15 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18
k16 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19
k17 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k18 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k19 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v21
k20 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k21 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k22 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k23 =k42 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
k24 =k43 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k25 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4⊕
v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k26 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
k27 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63⊕
v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
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k28 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0⊕
v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k29 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1⊕
v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k30 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2⊕
v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k31 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3⊕
v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k32 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4⊕
v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k33 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5⊕
v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k34 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6⊕
v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k35 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
k36 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ v0⊕
v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k37 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58⊕
k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k38 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0⊕
v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k39 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1⊕
v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k40 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10⊕
v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k41 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
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Case 3: to freeze two registersB and C, the system of equations that is required
to result in these two registers B and C containing all-zero values requires some
constraints as follow:
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k0 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k1 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k2 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k3 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k4 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k5 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k6 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k7 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k8 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v14⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k9 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v15⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k10 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v16⊕
v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k11 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v17⊕
v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v18⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k13 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k14 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v20
k15 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v21
k16 =k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v15
k17 =k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v16
k18 =k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v17
k19 =k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18
k20 =k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v19
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k21 =k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v20
k22 =k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v21
k23 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k24 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k25 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k26 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k27 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v21
k28 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17
k29 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v17
k30 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9⊕
v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k31 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k32 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k33 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12⊕
v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k34 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k35 =k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k36 =k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k37 =k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16⊕
v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k38 =k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
k39 =k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
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k40 =k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k41 =k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k42 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v21
k43 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
k44 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
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Third scenario: the relationship between key and IV bits
Case 4: to freeze register A, there are some constraints for the system of equa-
tions that are required to result in register A containing all-zero values at the
end of the loading phase as follows:
k0 =k19 ⊕ k20 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k42⊕
k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2⊕
v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v19
k1 =k20 ⊕ k21 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k43⊕
k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4⊕
v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v20
k2 =k21 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44⊕
k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v21
k3 =k22 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45⊕
k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
k4 =k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46⊕
k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k5 =k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47⊕
k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k6 =k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48⊕
k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k7 =k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49⊕
k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k8 =k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50⊕
k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
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k9 =k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51⊕
k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k10 =k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50⊕
k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k11 =k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51⊕
k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52⊕
k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k13 =k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53⊕
k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k14 =k19 ⊕ k20 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50⊕
k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k15 =k20 ⊕ k21 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51⊕
k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k16 =k21 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52⊕
k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k17 =k19 ⊕ k20 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41⊕
k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k18 =k19 ⊕ k21 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41⊕
k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0⊕
v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
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Case 5: to freeze register B, there are some constraints for the system of
equations that are required to result in register B containing all-zero values at
the end of loading phase, as follows:
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k0 =k22 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35⊕
k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55⊕
k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k1 =k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36⊕
k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56⊕
k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k2 =k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37⊕
k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57⊕
k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k3 =k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38⊕
k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58⊕
k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k4 =k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39⊕
k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59⊕
k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k5 =k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40⊕
k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60⊕
k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k6 =k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41⊕
k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61⊕
k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k7 =k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41⊕
k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58⊕
k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k8 =k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42⊕
k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59⊕
k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
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k9 =k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43⊕
k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60⊕
k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k10 =k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44⊕
k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61⊕
k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k11 =k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45⊕
k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62⊕
v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46⊕
k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63⊕
v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k13 =k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47⊕
k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0⊕
v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k14 =k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48⊕
k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1⊕
v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k15 =k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49⊕
k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2⊕
v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k16 =k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50⊕
k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5⊕
v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k17 =k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51⊕
k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6⊕
v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
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k18 =k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52⊕
k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k19 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53⊕
k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8⊕
v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k20 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54⊕
k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9⊕
v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k21 =k22 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34⊕
k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52⊕
k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
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Case 6: to freeze register C, there are some constraints for the system of
equations that are required to result in register C containing all-zero values at
the end of the loading phase as follows:
k0 =k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42⊕
k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k1 =k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43⊕
k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k2 =k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44⊕
k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k3 =k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45⊕
k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k4 =k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46⊕
k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k5 =k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47⊕
k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k6 =k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48⊕
k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k7 =k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49⊕
k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k8 =k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k42⊕
k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4⊕
v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
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k9 =k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k43⊕
k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5⊕
v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k10 =k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k44⊕
k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k11 =k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k45⊕
k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k12 =k27 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k46⊕
k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k13 =k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47⊕
k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k14 =k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48⊕
k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k15 =k30 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49⊕
k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k16 =k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50⊕
k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k17 =k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51⊕
k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k18 =k33 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52⊕
k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
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k19 =k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53⊕
k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k20 =k35 ⊕ k36 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54⊕
k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k21 =k23 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k27 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k30 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k33 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k37 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45⊕
k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k22 =k23 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k26 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k32 ⊕ k34 ⊕ k35 ⊕ k38 ⊕ k39 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k41⊕
k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
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Appendix B
Common Scrambling Algorithm
Stream Cipher
B.1 The Boolean Functions of the CSA-SC
The following two tables summaries 14 Boolean functions that are used in Chap-
ter 5 for the Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSA-SC) as re-
ported in [96,104].
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Table B.1: Algebraic Normal Forms of the 14 Boolean functions
x0 = S1(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = 1 + i4 + i3 + i3i4 + i2i4 + i2i3 + i1i4 + i1i3 +
i1i2 + i1i2i4 + i1i2i3 + i0 + i0i3i4 + i0i2 + i0i2i3
+ i0i1 + i0i1i3 + i0i1i3i4 + i0i1i2 + i0i1i2i3
x1 = S2(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = i3+ i2i4+ i1+ i1i4+ i1i3i4+ i0i4+ i0i1+ i0i1i3+
i0i1i2+ i0i1i2i4
x2 = S3(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = 1 + i4 + i3 + i2i4 + i2i3 + i2i3i4 + i1+ i0i2i3 +
i0i1i4 + i0i1i3 + i0i1i3i4+ i0i1i2
x3 = S4(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = 1 + i3 + i2 + i2i4 + i1i3i4 + i1i2i4 + i0i3i4 + i0i2
+ i0i1 + i0i1i3i4+ i0i1i2i4
y0 = S5(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = 1 + i4 + i3 + i2i4 + i2i3 + i2i3i4 + i1 + i1i4 +
i1i3 + i1i3i4 + i1i2 + i1i2i3 + i0 + i0i3 + i0i3i4 +
i0i2 + i0i2i4 + i0i2i3 + i0i2i3i4 + i0i1i4 + i0i1i2+
i0i1i2i3
y1 = S6(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = i3 + i3i4 + i2i4 + i1 + i0
y2 = S7(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = 1 + i4 + i3i4 + i2 + i2i3i4 + i1 + i1i2i3 + i0 + i0i4
+ i0i3 + i0i2i3i4 + i0i1 + i0i1i4 + i0i1i3i4 + i0i1i2
+ i0i1i2i3
y3 = S8(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = 1 + i3 + i3i4 + i2 + i1i4 + i1i3i4 + i1i2 + i0i4 +
i0i3 + i0i2i3i4 + i0i1 + i0i1i4 + i0i1i3i4 + i0i1i2 +
i0i1i2i3
z0 = S9(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = 1 + i4 + i3 + i3i4 + i2i4 + i2i3 + i2i3i4 + i1 +
i1i4 + i1i3i4 + i1i2i4 + i1i2i3 + i0i4 + i0i3 + i0i2
+ i0i2i3 + i0i2i3i4 + i0i1i4 + i0i1i3 + i0i1i2i4 +
i0i1i2i3
z1 = S10(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = i3i4 + i2 + i2i4 + i2i3i4 + i1i4 + i1i3 + i1i2i4 + i0i4
+ i0i2 + i0i2i4 + i0i2i3 + i0i2i3i4 + i0i1 + i0i1i4 +
i0i1i3 + i0i1i3i4
z2 = S11(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = i3 + i2i4 + i1i3i4 + i1i2 + i1i2i4 + i0 + i0i3i4 +
i0i1i4
z3 = S12(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = i4 + i2 + i2i3 + i2i3i4 + i1i3 + i1i2 + i1i2i3 + i0i3i4
+ i0i2i3 + i0i2i3i4 + i0i1i3i4 + i0i1i2i3
p = S13(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = i4 + i3 + i3i4 + i2 + i1 + i1i3i4 + i0i4 + i0i3i4 +
i0i2 + i0i2i3 + i0i2i3i4 + i0i1i3i4 + i0i1i2i3
q = S14(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4) = i4 + i3i4 + i2 + i2i3 + i2i3i4 + i1 + i1i2 + i0 +
i0i1i3 + i0i1i3i4
B.1. The Boolean Functions of the CSA-SC 239
Table B.2: The truth table of the 14 Boolean functions
Input S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14
00000 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
00001 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
00010 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
00011 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
00100 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
00101 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
00110 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
00111 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
01000 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
01001 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
01010 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
01011 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
01100 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
01101 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
01110 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
01111 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
10000 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
10001 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
10010 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
10011 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
10100 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
10101 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
10110 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
10111 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
11000 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
11001 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
11010 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
11011 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
11100 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
11101 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
11110 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
11111 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
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B.2 Algebraic Equations at Time t = −31
From Equation 5.1 in Section 5.1, during the initialisation process, the system
of equations of the new 4-bit word after the first clock of the registers A can be
written in term of stage bits as follows:
a−310,0 =a
−32
9,0 ⊕ S1(a−313,3 , a−311,1 , a−312,3 , a−314,2 , a−318,0 )⊕
S9(a
−31
2,1 , a
−31
3,2 , a
−31
6,3 , a
−31
7,0 , a
−31
9,1 )⊕ e−320 ⊕ b−320out ⊕ v4
a−310,1 =a
−32
9,1 ⊕ S2(a−311,3 , a−312,0 , a−315,1 , a−315,3 , a−316,2 )⊕
S10(a
−31
4,0 , a
−31
1,2 , a
−31
6,1 , a
−31
7,3 , a
−31
9,0 )⊕ e−321 ⊕ b−321out ⊕ v5 (B.1)
a−310,2 =a
−32
9,2 ⊕ S3(a−312,1 , a−313,2 , a−316,3 , a−317,0 , a−319,1 )⊕
S11(a
−31
3,1 , a
−31
4,1 , a
−31
5,0 , a
−31
7,2 , a
−31
9,3 )⊕ e−322 ⊕ b−322out ⊕ v6
a−310,3 =a
−32
9,3 ⊕ S4(a−314,0 , a−311,2 , a−316,1 , a−317,3 , a−319,0 )⊕
S12(a
−31
5,2 , a
−31
4,3 , a
−31
6,0 , a
−31
8,1 , a
−31
9,2 )⊕ e−323 ⊕ b−323out ⊕ v7
by substituting key and IV bits in Equation B.1, the above equations can be
written as follows:
a−310,0 = k5k11k15k18 ⊕ k9k14k27k28 ⊕ k5k11k15 ⊕ k5k11k18 ⊕ k5k15k18 ⊕ k11k15k18
⊕ k9k14k28⊕ k9k27k28⊕ k14k27k28⊕ k5k11⊕ k5k15⊕ k11k15⊕ k5k18⊕ k11k18
⊕ k9k27 ⊕ k9k28 ⊕ k27k28 ⊕ k14 ⊕ k15 ⊕ k18 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k41 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v4
a−310,1 =k7k8k21k26 ⊕ k7k8k21 ⊕ k7k8k23 ⊕ k8k23k26 ⊕ k6k16k31 ⊕ k16k25k31 ⊕ k7k8
⊕ k6k16 ⊕ k16k25 ⊕ k7k26 ⊕ k8k26 ⊕ k21k26 ⊕ k6k31 ⊕ k8 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k44
⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v5
a−310,2 =k9k14k27 ⊕ k9k14k28 ⊕ k9k27k28 ⊕ k17k20 ⊕ k27k28 ⊕ k13 ⊕ k14 ⊕ k28 ⊕ k30
⊕ k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v6 ⊕ 1
a−310,3 =k6k16 ⊕ k19k24 ⊕ k16k25 ⊕ k24 ⊕ k25 ⊕ k31 ⊕ k40 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v7 ⊕ 1
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Using Equations 5.6 and 5.7 of the initialisation process, the system of equa-
tions for the first 4-bits word of the registers B after the first clock can be
described in the term of key-IV bits as follows:
b−310,0 = k10k13k17k20k29k30 ⊕ k10k13k17k20k29 ⊕ k12k13k17k20k30 ⊕ k10k13k20k29k30
⊕ k10k17k20k29k30 ⊕ k13k17k20k29k30 ⊕ k12k13k17k20 ⊕ k10k13k20k29
⊕ k10k17k20k29 ⊕ k13k17k20k29 ⊕ k12k13k20k30 ⊕ k12k17k20k30 ⊕ k13k17k20k30
⊕ k10k13k29k30 ⊕ k10k17k29k30 ⊕ k10k20k29k30 ⊕ k13k20k29k30 ⊕ k17k20k29k30
⊕ k12k13k20 ⊕ k12k17k20 ⊕ k13k17k20 ⊕ k10k13k29 ⊕ k10k17k29 ⊕ k10k19k29
⊕ k13k20k29 ⊕ k17k20k29 ⊕ k10k22k29 ⊕ k12k13k30 ⊕ k12k17k30 ⊕ k12k20k30
⊕ k13k20k30 ⊕ k17k20k30 ⊕ k10k29k30 ⊕ k13k29k30 ⊕ k17k29k30 ⊕ k20k29k30
⊕ k10k29k56 ⊕ k10k29k57 ⊕ k10k29v0 ⊕ k10k29v1 ⊕ k12k13 ⊕ k12k17 ⊕ k12k19
⊕ k13k20 ⊕ k17k20 ⊕ k12k22 ⊕ k10k29 ⊕ k13k29 ⊕ k17k29 ⊕ k19k29 ⊕ k22k29
⊕k12k30⊕k13k30⊕k17k30⊕k20k30⊕k29k30⊕k12k56⊕k29k56⊕k12k57⊕k29k57
⊕ k12v0⊕ k29v0⊕ k12v1⊕ k29v1⊕ k12⊕ k13⊕ k17⊕ k29⊕ k30⊕ k56⊕ v0⊕ 1
b−310,1 = k5k10k11k15k18k29 ⊕ k5k11k12k15k18 ⊕ k5k10k11k15k29 ⊕ k5k10k11k18k29
⊕ k5k11k15k18k29 ⊕ k5k11k12k15 ⊕ k5k11k12k18 ⊕ k5k10k15k29 ⊕ k5k11k15k29
⊕ k5k11k18k29 ⊕ k10k15k18k29 ⊕ k5k12k15 ⊕ k12k15k18 ⊕ k5k10k29 ⊕ k10k11k29
⊕ k5k15k29 ⊕ k10k15k29 ⊕ k15k18k29 ⊕ k10k19k29 ⊕ k10k22k29 ⊕ k10k29k57
⊕k10k29k58⊕k10k29v1⊕k10k29v2⊕k5k12⊕k11k12⊕k12k15⊕k12k19⊕k12k22
⊕k5k29⊕k10k29⊕k11k29⊕k15k29⊕k19k29⊕k22k29⊕k12k57⊕k29k57⊕k12k58
⊕ k29k58 ⊕ k12v1 ⊕ k29v1 ⊕ k12v2 ⊕ k29v2 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k19 ⊕ k22 ⊕ k29 ⊕ k57 ⊕ v1
b−310,2 = k5k10k11k15k18k29⊕k7k8k10k21k23k29⊕k7k8k10k23k26k29⊕k7k10k21k23k26k29
⊕ k5k11k12k15k18 ⊕ k7k8k12k21k23 ⊕ k7k8k12k23k26 ⊕ k7k12k21k23k26
⊕ k5k10k11k15k29 ⊕ k5k10k11k18k29 ⊕ k5k11k15k18k29 ⊕ k7k8k10k21k29
⊕ k7k8k21k23k29 ⊕ k7k8k10k26k29 ⊕ k7k8k23k26k29 ⊕ k8k10k23k26k29
⊕ k7k21k23k26k29 ⊕ k5k11k12k15 ⊕ k5k11k12k18 ⊕ k5k11k15k18 ⊕ k7k8k12k21
⊕ k7k8k12k26 ⊕ k8k12k23k26 ⊕ k7k8k10k29 ⊕ k5k10k15k29 ⊕ k5k11k15k29
⊕ k5k11k18k29 ⊕ k10k15k18k29 ⊕ k7k8k21k29 ⊕ k8k10k21k29 ⊕ k7k10k23k29
⊕ k7k8k26k29 ⊕ k7k10k26k29 ⊕ k8k10k26k29 ⊕ k8k23k26k29 ⊕ k10k23k26k29
⊕k7k8k12⊕k5k11k15⊕k5k12k15⊕k5k11k18⊕k12k15k18⊕k8k12k21⊕k7k12k23
⊕k7k12k26⊕k8k12k26⊕k12k23k26⊕k7k8k29⊕k5k10k29⊕k10k11k29⊕k5k15k29
⊕ k10k15k29 ⊕ k15k18k29 ⊕ k8k21k29 ⊕ k10k21k29 ⊕ k7k23k29 ⊕ k10k23k29
⊕ k7k26k29 ⊕ k8k26k29 ⊕ k23k26k29 ⊕ k10k29k58 ⊕ k10k29k59 ⊕ k10k29v2
⊕ k10k29v3 ⊕ k5k12 ⊕ k11k12 ⊕ k5k15 ⊕ k12k15 ⊕ k15k18 ⊕ k12k21 ⊕ k12k23
⊕ k5k29 ⊕ k11k29 ⊕ k15k29 ⊕ k21k29 ⊕ k23k29 ⊕ k12k58 ⊕ k29k58 ⊕ k12k59
⊕ k29k59 ⊕ k12v2 ⊕ k29v2 ⊕ k12v3 ⊕ k29v3 ⊕ k5 ⊕ k11 ⊕ k15 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v2 ⊕ 1
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b−310,3 = k7k8k10k21k23k29 ⊕ k7k8k10k23k26k29
⊕ k7k10k21k23k26k29 ⊕ k10k13k17k20k29k30
⊕ k7k8k12k21k23 ⊕ k7k8k12k23k26 ⊕ k7k12k21k23k26
⊕ k10k13k17k20k29 ⊕ k7k8k10k21k29 ⊕ k7k8k21k23k29
⊕ k7k8k10k26k29 ⊕ k7k8k23k26k29 ⊕ k8k10k23k26k29
⊕ k7k21k23k26k29 ⊕ k12k13k17k20k30
⊕ k10k13k20k29k30 ⊕ k10k17k20k29k30
⊕ k13k17k20k29k30 ⊕ k12k13k17k20 ⊕ k7k8k12k21
⊕ k7k8k21k23 ⊕ k7k8k12k26 ⊕ k7k8k23k26
⊕ k8k12k23k26 ⊕ k7k21k23k26 ⊕ k7k8k10k29
⊕ k10k13k20k29 ⊕ k10k17k20k29 ⊕ k13k17k20k29
⊕ k7k8k21k29 ⊕ k8k10k21k29 ⊕ k7k10k23k29
⊕ k7k8k26k29 ⊕ k7k10k26k29 ⊕ k8k10k26k29
⊕ k8k23k26k29 ⊕ k10k23k26k29 ⊕ k12k13k20k30
⊕ k12k17k20k30 ⊕ k10k13k29k30 ⊕ k10k17k29k30
⊕ k10k20k29k30 ⊕ k13k20k29k30 ⊕ k17k20k29k30
⊕ k7k8k12 ⊕ k12k13k20 ⊕ k12k17k20 ⊕ k7k8k21
⊕ k8k12k21 ⊕ k7k12k23 ⊕ k7k8k26 ⊕ k7k12k26
⊕ k8k12k26 ⊕ k8k23k26 ⊕ k12k23k26 ⊕ k7k8k29
⊕ k10k13k29 ⊕ k10k17k29 ⊕ k13k20k29 ⊕ k17k20k29
⊕ k8k21k29 ⊕ k10k21k29 ⊕ k7k23k29 ⊕ k10k23k29
⊕ k7k26k29 ⊕ k8k26k29 ⊕ k23k26k29 ⊕ k12k13k30
⊕ k12k17k30 ⊕ k12k20k30 ⊕ k10k29k30 ⊕ k13k29k30
⊕ k17k29k30 ⊕ k20k29k30 ⊕ k10k29k56 ⊕ k10k29k59
⊕ k10k29v0 ⊕ k10k29v3 ⊕ k7k8 ⊕ k12k13 ⊕ k12k17
⊕ k8k21 ⊕ k12k21 ⊕ k7k23 ⊕ k12k23 ⊕ k7k26 ⊕ k8k26
⊕k23k26⊕k13k29⊕k17k29⊕k21k29⊕k23k29⊕k12k30
⊕ k29k30⊕ k12k56⊕ k29k56⊕ k12k59⊕ k29k59⊕ k12v0
⊕ k29v0 ⊕ k12v3 ⊕ k29v3 ⊕ k21 ⊕ k23 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v3 ⊕ 1
Using Equation 5.11, the content of memory F after the first clock can be
described in term of the key-IV bits as follows:
f−310 = k9k12k14k27k28k29 ⊕ k9k10k14k27k28 ⊕ k9k12k14k27k28 ⊕ k9k12k14k28k29
⊕ k9k12k27k28k29 ⊕ k9k14k27k28k29 ⊕ k12k14k27k28k29 ⊕ k9k10k14k28
⊕ k9k12k14k28 ⊕ k9k10k27k28 ⊕ k9k12k27k28 ⊕ k10k14k27k28 ⊕ k12k14k27k28
⊕ k9k12k27k29 ⊕ k9k12k28k29 ⊕ k9k14k28k29 ⊕ k9k27k28k29 ⊕ k12k27k28k29
⊕ k14k27k28k29 ⊕ k9k10k27 ⊕ k9k12k27 ⊕ k9k10k28 ⊕ k9k12k28 ⊕ k10k27k28
⊕k12k27k28⊕k12k14k29⊕k9k27k29⊕k9k28k29⊕k12k28k29⊕k27k28k29⊕k10k14
⊕ k12k14 ⊕ k10k28 ⊕ k12k28 ⊕ k12k29 ⊕ k14k29 ⊕ k28k29 ⊕ k10 ⊕ k12 ⊕ k29
f−311 = k6k12k16k29k31 ⊕ k12k16k25k29k31 ⊕ k6k12k16k29 ⊕ k12k16k25k29
⊕ k6k10k16k31 ⊕ k6k12k16k31 ⊕ k10k16k25k31 ⊕ k12k16k25k31
⊕ k6k12k29k31 ⊕ k6k16k29k31 ⊕ k16k25k29k31 ⊕ k6k10k16 ⊕ k6k12k16
⊕ k10k16k25 ⊕ k12k16k25 ⊕ k6k16k29 ⊕ k12k25k29 ⊕ k16k25k29
⊕ k6k10k31 ⊕ k6k12k31 ⊕ k6k29k31 ⊕ k10k25 ⊕ k12k25 ⊕ k25k29
B.2. Algebraic Equations at Time t = −31 243
f−312 = k12k17k20k29 ⊕ k10k17k20 ⊕ k12k17k20 ⊕ k12k13k29 ⊕ k17k20k29
⊕ k12k29k30 ⊕ k10k13 ⊕ k12k13 ⊕ k13k29 ⊕ k10k30 ⊕ k12k30 ⊕ k29k30
f−313 = k12k19k24k29 ⊕ k10k19k24 ⊕ k12k19k24 ⊕ k12k24k29
⊕ k19k24k29 ⊕ k10k24 ⊕ k12k24 ⊕ k24k29
Note: During keystream generation, there is no IV input to both register A
and B and no feedback from the output function (labeled D) to register A, so, the
complexity of the system of equations is less than that during the initialisation
process.
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